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Abstract
The accident analysis methodology of the Reactor Safety
Study (RSS) for light water reactors is extended for appli-
cation to the design evaluation of a gas-cooled fast breeder
reactor (GCFR). Specifically, the conceptual design of the
300 MW(e) demonstration plant is studied, and a detailed
description of the design is provided.
The probability of core-melt accidents resulting from
the loss of adequate decay heat removal following a reactor
shutdown is investigated in detail. Also, the reactor shut-
down initiating events are grouped into categories which
cover the spectrum of these events. For each initiating
event category, a median point estimate of the core-melt
probability is developed using failure data from the RSS.
Sensitivity analyses are performed in which the effect on the
core-melt probability is determined for variations in the
input parameters.
By the methods developed in this report, the overall
probability of a core meltdown is estimated to be 7 x 10-6
per year. Common mode failures are included in this value.
The common mode failure uncertainty is considered to be the
major contributor to the uncertainty in the overall prob-
ability. Considering the uncertainty in the common mode
failure probabilities ields a range for the core-melt
probability of 3 x 10- to 3 x 10- per year.
In conclusion, the design of the GCFR demonstration
plant shutdown cooling systems is shown to be quite well
3balanced. Also, the results of the sensitivity analyses
are applied to determine the effect of potential shutdown
cooling system design changes.
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Chapter 1
Scope and Intent of Research
1.1 Introduction
The design of a nuclear power plant requires the con-
sideration of a number of factors. The more important of
these include safety, economics, reliability, and environ-
mental impacts. In terms of an overall assessment, only the
economics involved with designing, building, and operating
the plant have generally been quantified. In the past few
years, efforts have been started toward including environ-
mental impacts quantitatively in the overall cost-benefit
analysis of the plant. However, while safety has always been
a major concern influencing nuclear power plant design, attempts
are just beginning toward quantifying this aspect of the
overall design process.
The nuclear power industry in the United States was the
first major industry in which the safety of the public was a
legislated concern prior to the establishment of the industry.
The design review and safety analysis of the regulatory staff
of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (formerly the Atomic
Energy Commission) before the construction and operation of an
electricity generating nuclear power plant are unprecedented,
27
and these efforts are in part responsible for the presently
excellent safety record of the industry. The philosophy of
the regulatory staff in its review process has generally been
that of the skeptic -- constantly asking, "What if ... ?" and
"Show that ... " -- in order to test, and verify when possible,
the basic design assumptions of the plant. This approach has
led to a high quality of safety, but only recently has a de-
tailed quantitative assessment of nuclear power plant safety
been performed for U.S. reactors. This study, known as the
Reactor Safety Study (RSS) , demonstrated in the United
States the usefulness of analytical techniques in assessing
power plant safety. This has subsequently spurred interest
toward applying these techniques to the design process itself
where changes and improvements in the plant can be made more
easily and cheaply.
The reliability techniques used in the RSS have been
used by both NASA and the British, and the experience of the
British particularly shows that accurate and useful results
can be obtained given a good data base. (2,3) In this study,
failure data from the RSS has been used. This data is based
on the present nuclear power plant operating experience in
the United States, and it should apply to the similar equip-
ment and components of future nuclear power plants built in
the United States. However, the emphasis of a design study
is to provide useful design inputs by directing attention
to those areas of the design with the greatest potential
28
impact on the public safety. It can then provide a useful
basis for further design efforts and development work.
It should be mentioned that the techniques used in this
research project are, in general, also applicable to a study
of the plant reliability. Considering the cost of plant
outages, such an undertaking would be quite worthwhile.
1.2 Outline of Thesis Research
This research project is an attempt to utilize the
techniques of the RSS toward performing a first-cut safety
assessment of the conceptual design of a nuclear power plant
before it is actually constructed. The nuclear power plant
design that was analyzed is the 300 MWe demonstration plant
design of the gas-cooled fast-breeder reactor (GCFR). This
reactor is being designed and developed by the General Atomic
Company (GA) (4). Figure 1.1 is a cross-sectioned view of
the nuclear steam supply portion of the plant showing the
principal components of the primary coolant system.
The main thrust of the analysis has been directed towards
the investigation of the probability of accident sequences
which might lead to a meltdown of the reactor core. Core melt
accidents were specifically chosen because the largest inven-
tory of radioactive nuclides is located in the core of the
reactor. If these nuclides were to be released by the melting
of the nuclear core, they would represent the largest poten-
tial hazard to the health and safety of the public. However,
FIGURE 1.1 Cutaway View showing the Principal Components of the
Nuclear Steam Supply System within the PCRV.
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the evaluation of the consequences of a core meltdown to the
public was not a part of this study.
The accident analysis methodology developed in the RSS
was utilized to construct a model of the plant response under
various transient and accident conditions, including those
sequences of events which could lead to a core meltdown. This
included:
1) the identification of the types of accidents which
might cause the core to melt and the most probable
types of event sequences which lead to core meltdown;
2) the modeling of the plant response following the
initiating event in a probabilistic manner in order
to allow the quantitative analysis of the accident
sequences; and
3) the determination of the reliability values used in
the probabilistic analysis of the accident sequences.
In general, GCFR core meltdown accidents can be classi-
fied as resulting either from severe power to heat removal
imbalances following a reactor shutdown, or from severe power
to heat removal imbalances during reactor operation. The
first class of accidents results from losses of forced helium
circulation or heat removal capability following a reactor
shutdown. The second class of core-melt accidents may result
from losses of adequate forced helium circulation without a
reactor shutdown, or from a reactor overpower transient.
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Thus the total probability of a core meltdown for a
given initiating event may be considered to be the sum of
two contributors:
Pi = (PS + PF IE, where
P is the total probability of a core meltdown for a
given initiating event;
P3 S is the conditional probability of a meltdown
following reactor shutdown, given the initiating
event;
P F is the conditional probability of a meltdown due to
the failure of the reactor shutdown systems, given
the initiating event; and
PIE is the probability or frequency of occurrence of
the event requiring a reactor shutdown.
Because of the high reliability that is expected for the
GCFR reactor shutdown systems, the events following the reactor
shutdown were modeled in the most detail. The modeling of
the shutdown cooling and decay heat removal operations was
performed for two specific sets of circumstances. One model
was constructed for those reactor shutdowns in which the
reactor primary coolant system remains pressurized. The
second model pertains to the reactor shutdown cooling opera-
tions following a reactor coolant system depressurization.
Each of these models represents the possible shutdown event
sequences which might occur due to the combinations of success
or failure of the shutdown heat removal sub-systems. The
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reactor shutdown initiating events were investigated and
categorized according to their affect on the performance of
either shutdown cooling system. For each of the shutdown
heat removal subsystems, three contributors to the subsystem
failure probability were considered. These were random
equipment failures, intra-system common mode failures, and
test and maintenance unavailabilities. A median probability
of a loss of decay heat removal was determined for each of
the initiating event categories, and the sensitivity of this
valve to large changes in each of the subsystem failure con-
tributors was determined.
In the remaining sections of this chapter, the research
objectives of this study are outlined and the accident analysis
methodology of the reactor safety study is outlined. Chapter
2 provides a description of the GCFR 300 MW(e) demonstration
plant design with emphasis placed on the reactor shutdown
cooling systems. Chapter 3 is a detailed description of the
modeling of the plant responses following the initiation of
a reactor shutdown signal. Chapter 4 is a discussion of the
reactor shutdown initiating events, a description of the
method in which the accident sequence probability calcula-
tions were performed, and a summary of the failure data and
other probability inputs used in the analysis. In Chapter 5,
the results of the sensitivity analyses performed for each
of the reactor shutdown initiating event categories are pre-
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sented. This includes the determination of a median point
estimate of the core-melt probability for each reactor shut-
down initiating event category along with the variation
in this value due to changes in each of the subsystem failure
contributors. The major results of the study are presented
in this chapter. In chapter 6, the overall median proba-
bility of a core meltdown is determined and the various con-
tributors to this final value are discussed. Chapter 7
summarizes the major results of the study and presents
comments on both the GCFR shutdown cooling systems design
and the methodology used in the study.
1.3 Research Objectives
The purpose of this study is to provide a first-cut
assessment of the safety of a gas-cooled fast breeder reactor,
as embodied in the 300 MW(e) demonstration plant design
described in Ref. 4, in regard to the potential for core
meltdown accidents. The quantitative analysis of the core-
melt accident sequences allowed the determination of both
the accident sequence probabilities and the sensitivity of
these results to the reliability values of the subsystems
and components involved in the reactor shutdown operations.
It is hoped that this information will prove to be useful
in the following ways:
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1) The determination of the sensitivity of the sub-
systems and component reliability values will
indicate those items which are most important
in regard to changes in the probability of a
core-melt accident. The future design and
development efforts for these key subsystems
can then be focused toward assuring an appro-
priately high reliability value. The intensi-
fication of effort into these key areas allows
the overall plant safety to be increased more
effectively than if the design effort were spread
over all the systems which potentially affect
the plant safety.
2) The analysis of the core-melt accident sequences
also includes the determination of those specific
accident paths which are the dominant contribu-
tors to the probability of a core meltdown. The
identification of these accident paths may indi-
cate possible design changes which could mitigate
or even eliminate these dominant paths.
3) The detailed modeling of the accident sequences
will provide useful information regarding calcu-
lations of both the core meltdown process and the
accident consequences. These are needed to deter-
mine the risk to the health and safety of the public
which would result from a core meltdown.
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4) Lastly, the analysis should provide some quan-
tifiable inputs into the overall plant optimi-
zation process which reflect the tradeoffs
between the plant safety and the other aspects
of the plant design.
1.4 Reactor Safety Study Accident Analysis Methodology
One of the stated objectives of the Reactor Safety
Study (RSS) was to:
Perform a quantitative assessment of the risk
to the public from reactor accidents. This
requires analyses directed toward determining
both the probabilities and the consequences
of such accidents.
However, in the following GCFR study, only the accident
probabilities are to be investigated. The accident analysis
methodology of the RSS is described briefly below, and
examples are given to clarify the explanation of the method-
ology. These examples, which pertain to Light Water Reactors
(LWR), were used because it was felt that the reader would
be more generally familiar with LWRs.
The accident analysis methodology developed in the RSS
allows for both a detailed determination of the events
leading to a specified accident, and for an objective evalu-
ation of the probabilities of the various events involved.
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To describe the events leading to an accident, an event tree
is used. This is a logical representation that describes
a series of accident chains. These accident chains are
sequences of events which start with the various initiating
events and include the responses of the protection systems
and engineered safeguard features that are designed into the
plant. The event tree is developed from an understanding
of the plant design and operation. It is used not only to con-
sider the operability of the safety systems under the actual
accident conditions, but also to help identify the detailed
inter-relation of these various systems and any effects which
this might have.
A simplified event tree is shown in Figure 1.2. It
describes the accident sequences involved in a loss of
coolant accident (LOCA) for a light water reactor. The
diagram starts with a pipe break, as the initiating event,
and includes the responses of the basis safeguard systems
activated in this type of accident. The probabilities P1
through P5 depend upon the specific conditions associated
with this initiating event, and they must be either calcu-
lated or estimated if the accident sequence probabilities
are to be evaluated (5). It is important to note that the
analyst who constructed this tree used his knowledge of the
plant operation and response to accident situations to
Fission
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FIGURE 1.2 A Simplified Event Tree for a Loss of Coolant Accident in a Light Water
Reactor (taken from reference 5)
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arrange the tree in a manner which allowed major system
interdependencies to be taken into account. For example,
all of the safeguard systems, as shown here, depend upon
electricity being available for power. Thus no success
paths for these systems need be included given no electric
power available. Also, the diagram shows that the contain-
ment integrity cannot be maintained if the ECCS fails,
irrespective of what the fission product removal system does.
Thus the event tree explicitly includes the major system
inter-relationships.
The accident sequence probabilities can then be deter-
mined from the event tree if the probabilities of the
individual events can be evaluated. However, these events
represent the operation of complex engineering systems, and,
in the case of nuclear power plants being built today, there
is little directly applicable empirical data on which to base
system failure rates. Therefore, in order to obtain these
probabilities objectively, a fault tree is used. The fault
tree employs a logic almost the reverse of the event tree in
that it starts with the undesired event and proceeds through
the intermediate events until the basic attributable causes
are reached. Fault tree analysis is used to determine the
probability with which a specific engineering system will
operate, under specific conditions, from the existing or
(6)
proposed failure rates of the system components
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A simplified fault-tree, shown in Figure 1.3, indicates
that the loss of power to the engineered safeguard features
is dependent on the loss of either DC power to the control
systems, or AC power to both the plant buses. Since either
condition is sufficient to cause the loss of power, an "or"
gate is used to couple the two events. The failure proba-
bility is then the sum of the probabilities of the two
individual events. The loss of all AC power is dependent
on the loss of both on-site and off-site AC power. Since
both of these events are necessary to cause a loss of all
AC power, they are coupled by an "and" gate. This signifies
that the overall probability is the product of two individual
probabilities. The actual probability values used in the
bottom blocks of the fault tree depend upon the specific
conditions determined by the initiating accident in the event
tree in which the failure probability is to be used.
"OR" Gate
0 "AND" Gate
FIGURE 1.3 A Simplified Fault Tree for the Loss of Electrical
Power (taken from reference 5)
Loss of Power to
Emergency Safeguard
Features
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41
Chapter 2
The Gas-Cooled Fast-Breeder Reactor (GCFR)
2.1 Introduction
The design and development of the gas-cooled fast-breeder
reactor (GCFR) has been undertaken by the General Atomic
Company (formerly the Gulf General Atomic Company) with
support by ERDA and a large group of electric utility com-
panies. Work on the design has continued since 1962. Con-
ceptual designs for the major systems and components of the
Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) have been made, and these
and the initial safety and design analyses have been com-
piled in a document called the Preliminary Safety Informa-
tion Document (PSID) (l). This document served as the basis
for a review between March, 1971, and November, 1974, by both
the regulatory staff of the AEC and by the Advisory Committee
on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). The questions and answers from
this review process are contained in references 2 and 3, and
a summary of the review was published in August, 19 7 4, by
the regulatory staff entitled "Preapplication Safety Evaluation
of the Gas-Cooled Fast-Breeder Reactor" . The material
presented in this chapter is largely from these four documents.
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A detailed balance-of-plant design study has been com-
pleted by the Bechtel Corporation (5) and was made available
for this thesis research project. Since this study is not
in the public domain, any material taken from it will be
presented in full.
Basically, this chapter will describe the GCFR concept
particularly as embodied in the design of a 300 MW(e) demon-
stration plant with emphasis on those aspects of the design
which were of primary interest in performing this study. In
reading this description, it should be kept in mind that the
development of the GCFR concept has benefited greatly from
technology developed for both the high temperature gas-cooled
reactor (HTGR), and the liquid-metal fast breeder reactor
(LMFBR). Specifically, the GCFR will utilize prestressed
concrete reactor vessel (PCRV) technology, steam generator
technology and helium circulator technology developed for the
HTGR. In the areas of core physics and fuel element technology
much of the work from the LMFBR development program is readily
extended to the GCFR.
2.2 Design Description
2.1-1 Introduction
The GCFR, as its name states, utilizes a gaseous coolant.
The coolant, which is pressurized helium, is the agent for
removing heat from the core and for transferring it to the
working power cycle. The term "fast" refers to the pre-
dominant energy of the neutrons in the core, which is much
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greater for a "fast" reactor than for "thermal" reactors
which, for example, use water as a coolant or contain large
amounts of carbon in the core. The term "breeder" signifies
that the reactor will actually generate more fissile fuel
material than it consumes. Figure 2.1 is a cut-away view of
the demonstration plant. The design capacity of the plant
is 300 MW(e) and 830 MW(th).
2.2-2 The Nuclear Steam Supply System
Table 2-I is a summary of the principal design data
for the GCFR, and Figure 2.2 is a schematic illustration of
the nuclear steam supply system (NSSS). It shows the pre-
stressed concrete reactor vessel (PCRV) and the major reactor
components contained within it. A very important feature of
the PCRV is that it encloses the entire primary coolant
system. The helium coolant operates at a working pressure
of 1305 psi and an average core outlet temperature of 1022 0F.
The primary system consists mainly of two core cooling sys-
tems, which are the main loop cooling system and the core
auxiliary cooling system (CACS). Each of these systems con-
sists of three independent cooling loops. The nuclear core
and surrounding breeder blanket is located in the central
PCRV cavity. The three main cooling loops and the three CACS
loops are located in separate cavities in the PCRV sidewall
surrounding the central cavity and connected to it by cross
ducts.
300 MW(e)
GAS COOLED FAST BREEDER REACTOR
CUTAWAY-PERSPECTIVE
TURBINE BUILDING,
CONTAINMENT BUILDING
REACTOR SERVICEI
BUllDING -
FIGURE 2.1 Cutaway View of 300 MW(e) Gas-Cooled Fast Breeder
Reactor Demonstration Plant
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Table 2-1
Summary of Principal Design Data for the
300 MW(e) GCFR Demonstration Plant (Reference 1)
PLANT CHARACTERISTICS
Reactor thermal power, MW(t).........
Gross electrical power, MW(e)........
Net electrical power, MW(e)..........
Plant efficiency, %..................
Net heat rate, Btu/kWh...............
Reactor outlet temperature, OF ......
Reactor inlet temperature, 0 F........
Steam conditions
Superheat outlet temperature, OF...
Superheat outlet pressure, psia....
Resuperheat outlet temperature, OF.
Resuperheat outlet pressure, psia..
Condenser pressure, in. Hg.........
Feedwater temperature, 0F..........
Fuel lifetime, full-power days.......
Refueling cycle, yr................
Fuel material........................
Reactor coolant...............................
Reactor vessel and primary coolant boundary...
PCRV dimensions
Vessel outside diameter, ft.................
Vessel height, ft...........................
Reactor cavity ID, ft.....................
Reactor cavity height, ft..................
Reactor cavity penetration diameter, ft.....
Steam-generator cavity penetration diameter,
Steam-generator cavity diameter, ft.........
830
304
300
36.0
9,474
1,022
613
876
2,900
927
1,260
3.0
412
750
1
PuO2-U02
Helium
PCRV
84
80.5
20.5
41.8
12.5
12.7
11.5
ft.
... 
. . . . .
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Table 2-I (continued)
REACTOR
Reactor geometry
Core height, in................
Core length-to-diameter ratio..
Axial blanket length (each end)
Radial blanket elements, 3 rows
Reactor assemblies
Fuel elements..................
Control elements...............
Blanket elements...............
Control and shutdown rods
Control........................
Shutdown.......................
Reactor heat transfer
Helium temperatures
Reactor inlet, OF (0C).......
Mixed mean outlet, OF (OC)....
Flow control...................
39.2
0.5
17.7
ThO2
in.
91
27
147
21
6
Maximum linear rating, at full power, kW/ft.......
Maximum (hot-spot) cladding temperature (mid-wall),
OF (0C).........................................
Radial maximum-to-average power ratio.............
Axial maximum-to-average power ratio..............
Average core heat flux, Btu/(hr)(ft2).............
Maximum heat flux, Btu/(hr)(ft2 )..................
Reactor inlet coolant pressure, psia..............
Reactor pressure drop, psi........................
Total helium coolant flow rate, lb/sec............
Average power density, kW(t)/liter of core ........
613 (322)
1022 (550)
Replaceable
fixed orifices
12.5
1,292 (700)
1.25
1.21
340,000
510,000
1,305
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1,548
240
..
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Table 2-I (continued)
REACTOR (continued)
Nuclear characteristics
Core fissile enrichment, average, at-%............ 17.0
Fissile masses at midcycle
Core (Pu239 + Pu 241), kg........................ 1,210
Axial blanket (Pu239 + Pu 241), kg............... 81
Radial blanket (3-row ThO2 (U 233)), kg.......... 320
Fissile loading at beginning of cycle, kg......... 1,244
Initial loading (Pu + U + Th)
Core, kg,.................................... 7,900
Axial blanket (UO2 ) kg......................... 7,400
Radial blanket (3 rows ThO2), kg................ 28,930
Average breeding ratio............................ 1.40
Maximum fuel burnup, MWd/Te heavy metal........... 100,000
Doppler constant, Tdk/kdT (T in 0K)............... -0.0040
Total helium reactivity worth, $................. 0.55
Power coefficient, C/MW(t)......................... -0.11
Average fast neutron flux (E > 0.1 MeV),
2 1
n/cm -sc....................................... 2.2x10 1 5
Reactor rating, MW(t)/kg fissile................... 0.60
Reactivity control requirements
Cold-to-hot operating, $............... ...- 3.47
Reactivity swing over equilibrium cycle, $......-9.00
Compensation for He, $...................... -0.55
Shutdown margin, $............................. -3.70
Total control requirements, $................. -16.72
Absorber material................................. B4 C
Reactivity control requirements
Cladding material............................... 316 SS
Average rod worth
Control, $................................... 0.85
Shutdown, $.............................. ... 1.60
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Table 2-I (continued)
REACTOR (continued)
Fuel and blanket elements
Shape of cross section............................
Distance across flats, external, in...............
Lattice spacing, in...............................
Duct wall thickness, in...........................
Element overall length, ft........................
Fuel-rod cladding material........................
Rod spacer type...................................
Fuel element
Number of rods, standard element................
Number of rods, control element.................
Rod outside diameter, in........................
Rod inside diameter, in.........................
Fuel length, in.................................
Fuel material...................................
Fuel smear density, % theoretical...............
Axial blanket length (each), in.................
Axial blanket material..........................
Axial blanket material smear density,
% theoretical.................................
Fuel-rod surface roughening
Fraction of active core length roughened, %...
Heat-transfer multiplier......................
Friction-factor multiplier....................
Blanket element
Number of rods................................
Rod outside diameter, in......................
Rod inside diameter, in.......................
Blanket material..............................
Blanket material smear density, % theoretical.
Hexagonal
6.642
6.892
0.100
11.5
316 SS
Grid
270
232
0.282
0.244
39.2
Mixed PuO2 -UO2
86
17.7
Depleted UO2
90
75
2
3
126
0.504
0.474
ThO
2
90
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Table 2-I (continued)
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM
Number of loops.....................................
Helium inventory at design condition in PCRV, lb ....
MAIN LOOP COMPONENTS
Main helium circulator (each of 3)
Type............................................
Drive...........................................
Flow, lb/hr.......................................
Pressure rise, psi..............................
Brake horsepower (per circulator).................
Steam generators (each of 3)
Economizer, evaporator, superheater sections
Type............................................
Heat duty, Btu/hr...............................
2
Surface area, ft ...............................
Helium flow per steam generator, lb/hr..........
Water inlet temperature, 0F.....................
Steam outlet temperature, 0F....................
Number of tubes per steam generator.............
Tube outside diameter, superheater, in..........
Tube outside diameter, evaporator-economizer, in
Resuperheater section
Type..........................
Heat duty, Btu/hr.............
2
Surface area, ft2.............
Helium flow, lb/hr............
Steam flow, lb/hr.............
Helium temperature in, 0 F.....
Helium temperature out, OF....
Steam temperature in, 0F......
Steam temperature out, 0 F.....
Number of tubes...............
Tube outside diameter, in.....
3 main
3 auxiliary
10,240
Single-stage
axial
Steam turbine
1.86x10 6
54
21,000
Helical
8.46x108
31,700
1.86x106
412
876
218
1.0
0.75
Helical
1.47x10 8
3,930
1.86x106
0. 88x106
1,022
958
682
928
297
1.0
...............
............... 0
............... 0 0
.............. 0 0 .
...... ...... 
Table 2-1 (continued)
AUXILIARY LOOP COMPONENTS
Auxiliary heat exchanger (design maximum
conditions for each of 3)
Type...............................................
Heat duty, Btu/hr................................
2Surface area, ft.................................
Helium flow, lb/hr...............................
Helium temperature in, 0F.........................
Helium temperature out, 0F.........................
Water inlet temperature, 0F.......................
Water outlet temperature, 0F......................
Water flow, lb/hr..................................
Number of tubes...................................
Tube outside diameter, in.........................
Auxiliary helium circulator (design maximum
conditions for each of 3)
Type..............................................
Drive.............................................
Flow, at depressurized condition, lb/hr...........
Pressure rise, psi................................
Brake horsepower (per circulator).................
TURBINE GENERATOR
Type................................................
Speed, rpm..........................................
Throttle flow, lb/hr................................
Throttle pressure, psia.............................
Throttle temperature, 0F............................
Condenser pressure, in. Hg (abs)....................
Number of feedwater heaters.........................
Final feedwater heater temperature, OF ..............
Gross electrical output, MW.........................
Helical
50.4x106
1,140
40,000
1,414
400
180
500
154,000
60
0.75
Single-stage
Centrifugal
Electric motor
40,000
1.36
460
TC4F-25
3,600
2.62x10 6
1,179
922
3.0
6
412
304
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Table 2-I (continued)
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT
Type................................................ Reinforced
concrete
Inside diameter, ft...................--..--- 116
Inside height, ft...............---....-..----.174
Atmosphere......................-.- - -- Air
Equilibrium pressure, atm (abs)...................... 1.8
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The flow of the helium coolant is downward through the
core and then upward through the annular passage between the
reactor thermal shield and the PCRV liner to the cross ducts.
The cross ducts direct helium to the steam generators of the
main loops or to the heat exchangers of the auxiliary loops
as appropriate. In the main cooling loops, the helium flows
down through the helically coiled steam generator and up the
annular passage between the steam generator shroud and the
PCRV liner to the helium circulator inlet. The helium, after
it is discharged from the circulator, then passes through the
main loop isolation valve, and into the reactor inlet plenum.
In the auxiliary loops, the helium flow is up through the
heat exchanger, through the auxiliary loop isolation valve,
and then to the auxiliary circulator before it returns to the
reactor inlet plenum. The CACS is only used when the reactor
is shut down. During normal reactor operation the auxiliary
circulators are not running, and the auxiliary loop isolation
valves remain shut preventing any backflow of helium.
2.2-3 The Main Loop Cooling System
The major components of the main loops are the main loop
isolation valves, the main helium circulators, and the steam
generators. Figure 2.3 is a drawing of both a main helium
circulator and its loop isolation valve. The main loop
isolation valves are louver-type self-actuating valves. The
valve consists of seven louvers which have an air foil
cross-section in the direction of normal loop flow. The
LOOP OLAT4N W.VE
FIGURE 2.3 General Arrangement of Main Helium Circulator
and its Loop Isolation Valve
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valve is opened by the positive pressure head created by
the operation of the helium circulator in its loop. Should
its circulator stop, the valve will close due to the forces
on the air foil created by the reversed pressure differential
and thus prevent back-flow through the loop. The main helium
circulators are single-stage, axial-flow helium compressors.
The circulator drive is a direct coupled steam turbine. The
circulator-turbine unit utilizes water-lubricated bearings,
and a buffer-helium seal prevents the leakage of steam or
water into the PCRV. The steam generator is a forced circu-
lation, single pass helically-coiled unit. The lower portion
of the steam generator module consists of an economizer, an
evaporator, and a superheater. The superheated steam exiting
this portion of the steam generator is used to drive the
helium circulator. The steam exhausted from the circulator
turbine then is returned to the upper portion of the steam
generator module where it is resuperheated before it is used
to drive the main turbine-generator set of the power plant.
Figure 2.4 is a schematic illustration of the plant steam
and helium flow paths, Because the entire steam flow from
the steam generators passes through the helium circulator-
turbines, the helium circulation can be maintained proportional
to the steam generation. This provides a direct relationship
between the helium cooling requirements and the supply of
steam produced,
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2.2-4 The Core Auxiliary Cooling System (CACS)
The CACS is designed for long-term shutdown cooling
and as a backup to the main loops for emergency core cooling.
The equipment of the CACS is functionally diverse and
independent from that of the main loops. The diversity
of the main loop cooling system and the CACS includes the
circulators, the isolation valves, and the methods of heat
rejection. These areas are summarized in Table 2-II.
The auxiliary loop isolation valve is a butterfly-type
check valve which is closed by the normal pressure differen-
tial created by the main loop operation. The valve is
opened by the pressure rise created by the auxiliary circu-
lator operating after the main circulators have stopped.
The auxiliary heat exchanger is a pressurized water heat
exchanger and the auxiliary circulator is a radial-flow,
single-stage compressor which is powered by a variable speed
electric motor drive. Each CACS loop is equipped with a
forced-air heat exchanger for ultimate heat rejection to
the atmosphere. A schematic illustration of the CACS
operation is shown in Figure 2.5.
2.2-5 The GCFR Core Design
The reactor consists of 265 hexagonal elements
on a triangular pitch. Of these, 147 are radial blanket
elements, 91 are standard fuel elements, and 27 are control
elements. The core and blanket dimensions are given in
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Table 2-I
GCFR Cooling System Diversity
Main Cooling
System
Auxiliary Cooling
System
Helium Circulators
Type
Drive
Bearings
Power Source
Loop Isolation Valves
Type
Position in Power
Operation
Actuation
Heat Dump
Heat Exchangers
Coolant
Feed Source
Heat Sink
Axial Flow
Steam Turbine
Water Lubricated
Nuclear Steam for
30 Min. or
Oil Fired Boilers
After 20 Min.
Multiple Louver
Open
Reverse Flow
Main Steam Generators
Steam/Water
Main Condenser Hot
Well or Condensate
Storage
Main Condenser or
Steam Exhaust to
Atmosphere
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Table 2-I. Each element is 6.642 inches across the outside
flats and 11.3 feet in overall length. A core plan and cross-
sections of each fuel element type are shown in Figure 2.6.
In the GCFR, the core is supported from above by a
two-foot-thick grid plate which is mounted in the upper por-
tion of the central PCRV cavity. The elements are rigidly
latched to the grid plate, but they are unrestrained over
their remaining length. The fuel element latching mechanisms
extend down from the PCRV central cavity closure, and they
are also designed to provide backup support for the core from
the PCRV head. Figure 2.7 is an illustration of the GCFR
core, and Figure 2.8 shows a cross-section of the grid plate
support structure.
Each standard fuel element contains 270 fuel rods with
an outside diameter of 0.282 inches. The cladding surface
of the rods is roughened over the lower 75 percent of the
active core region to improve the convective heat transfer.
The rods are positioned by means of grid plates at either
end and eight intermediate spacer grids. The central
position of each element contains, instead of a fuel rod,
a rod containing three thermocouples for monitoring the outlet
gas temperature from the element. A typical fuel element
configuration is shown in Figure 2.9.
A significant design feature of GCFR fuel is the system
for venting the fuel rods, known as the pressure equalization
0.28 IN.
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FUEL ELEMENTS
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FIGURE 2.6 Core and Fuel-element Plan.
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system (PES). This system is designed to limit the static
pressure differential across the fuel cladding to very low
values during steady state and transient operation. It does
this by providing a means for venting fission product gases
directly from the fuel rods to a helium purification system.
Both the core and the blanket elements are connected to the
PES.
The nuclear design for the core and axial blankets is
based on the uranium-plutonium cycle. The fuel element
cladding material is type 316 stainless steel with a wall
thickness of 0.019 inches, and the fuel consists of sintered
pellets of mixed oxides of uranium and plutonium with a
smear density of 80 percent. However, the design of the
radial blanket utilizes the uranium-thorium cycle. The
average calculated breeding ratio is 1.40 with a maximum
fuel burnup of 100,000 MWd/Te(U+PU).
2.2-6 Reactivity Control and Shutdown Systems
Control of the GCFR is accomplished with the control
rod system. This is a set of twenty-one B4C control rods
that will provide for the normal control, burnup, and
shutdown requirements of the reactor. The core plan in
Figure 2.6 shows the location of these rods. These rods are
located in control elements, and the concentration of absor-
ber material in the rods varies so that each rod has a
reactivity worth of 854. The control rod absorber section
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is connected to the extension rod by a ball joint to allow
rod insertion even in the event of some fuel element bowing.
A schematic of a control element is provided in Figure 2.10.
The control rods are connected to their drive mechanisms by
electro-magnetic couplings, and the rods are inserted, during
a reactor scram, by gravity drop after deenergizing the
couplings. The fall is snubbed by a flywheel energy absorber,
and a backup impact energy absorber is also provided.
Backup shutdown protection is provided by the shutdown
rod system. This is a set of six rods each of which has a
reactivity worth of 1.60$. These rods are also located in
control elements. They are positioned outside the core region
in the upper axial blanket under normal operation, and their
insertion is initiated by all scram signals. The design of
the shutdown rods is similar to that of the control rods with
the exception that wear rings are not provided on the shut-
down rods, and this increases their diametral clearance.
However, the shutdown rods are mechanically coupled to their
drive mechanisms, which are constant speed, direct-current
motors. Each drive motor has its own individual battery
power source, and during a scram the rods are power driven
into the core. Figure 2.11 illustrates the drive mechanisms
for the two shutdown rod systems, and a summary of the diverse
features of the two systems is supplied in Table 2-III.
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A Summary of
Table 2-111
the GCFR Shutdown Systems Diverse. Features
Control Rod System Backup Shutdown Rod System
Control Element
Worth $
Diametral Clearance (in.)
Wear Rings
Drive
Power Supply
Motor
Trip Insertion
Trip Snubber
Plant Control Rod Drive
Power Supply
Slow Speed, Stepping Motor
Magnet Release, Initial
Spring Assistance, Gravity
Fall
Cam Operated Flywheel
Individual Battery for Each
Drive
Constant Speed DC Motor
Power Driven Insertion,
Initiated by All Trip Signals
None Required
Performance
Regulating Mode
Trip-Insertion Times (sec.):
Core Midplane
Full Insertion
0.85
0.05
Yes
1.60
0.20
No
Yes
0.3
0.5
No
5
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2.2-7 The Prestressed Concrete Reactor Vessel (PCRV)
The PCRV is a multicavity pressure vessel which serves
as the primary containment for the reactor core, the primary
coolant system, and portions of the secondary coolant system.
It is a thick-walled cylindrical concrete structure which
contains a cylindrical central cavity for the reactor core
and core support structures. The central cavity is sur-
rounded by six cylindrical cavities. Three of these contain
the main helium circulators and steam generators, and the
other three contain the auxiliary circulators and auxiliary
heat exchangers. Radial coolant ducts connect the top of the
central cavity to all of the peripheral cavities. The upper
end of the central cavity and the steam generator cavities
are sealed by concrete closures. Figure 2.12 is a drawing
of a vertical cross-section through the PCRV.
All of the PCRV cavities, ducts and penetrations are lined
with steel liners that act as impermeable gastight membranes
to contain the helium coolant. These, in turn, are lined
with thermal insulation to protect the vessel from the high
helium temperatures. The liner is also equipped with cooling
coils on the concrete side which act to maintain acceptable
concrete temperatures. Each PCRV penetration is equipped
with a leaktight closure that is sealed to the liner by a
gasketed joint or by welding. All of the penetrations are
provided with flow restrictor means of limiting the leakage
flow area in the event of a closure seal
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failure, and at least two independent means of transferring
the pressure load from the primary closure to the PCRV
structure are provided.
The PCRV is constructed with high strength concrete
that is reinforced with bonded reinforcing steel. The
concrete vessel is prestressed vertically by a multiplicity
of linear steel tendons, and the radial prestress is pro-
vided by bands. of circumferential wire wrapping. The
prestressing creates compressive stresses'in the concrete
which remain even at the maximum design internal cavity
pressure. A high degree of structural integrity and
strength are attained by the highly redundant amount of
prestressing and reinforcing steels. The vertical tendons
are located in metal conduits, and the circumferential wire
strands are placed in steel channels around the outer
surface of the PCRV. Not only are many redundant tendons
and wire strands used, but the wire tension in typical
locations can be monitored during operation and over the
design life of the plant to assure that appropriate com-
pressive stresses are available.
2.2-8 Plant Control and Protection Systems
The control and protection functions in the GCFR are
provided by three separate systems. These are:
1) the Plant Control System (PCS), which regulates
the plant in all normal modes of operation;
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2) the Operational Protection System (OPS), which
initiates actions intended to limit damage to
the plant in fault situations which do not
entail immediate risk to the health and safety
of the public; and
3) the Plant Protection System (PPS), which initiates
appropriate actions to mitigate the.consequences
of system or component failures where the health
and safety of the public may be involved.
The Plant Control System
This system provides three separate functions. These
are: 1) the normal on-load plant control; 2) shutdown heat
removal control actions; and 3) control of the long-term
decay heat removal operations.
The normal on-load portion of the control system is
designed to provide automatic plant regulation in accor-
dance with load demand between 25 and 105 percent of the
rated load. Over this range, the steam pressure and tem-
perature at the main turbine throttle should remain
approximately constant. Also, as a result of directing
the full steam generator output to drive the circulator
turbines, the helium flow and steam flow both vary in
proportion to the load. Therefore, the helium temperature
rise through the core should remain constant. The helium
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temperature level, however, will vary slightly due to heat
transfer considerations.
The shutdown heat removal function of the plant control
system is accomplished by individual shutdown control systems
for each main loop. Each of these consists of a shutdown
controller, which regulates the throttling of the circulator-
turbine small control valve, and a resuperheater bypass
controller, which regulates the resuperheater bypass control
valve. The shutdown controller functions to maintain accept-
able helium temperatures by controlling the steam flow for
the circulator turbine. The resuperheater bypass controller
functions to maintain the circulator-turbine exhaust pressure
proportional to the reactor coolant inlet pressure. This
function maintains the proportionality of the steam flow to
the helium flow.
The decay heat removal control functions are also pro-
vided by separate control systems. These operate whenever
the main circulator-turbines are being supplied by steam
from the auxiliary boilers. They provide control of the
circulator speed for long-term decay heat removal
requirements.
The Operational Protection System
The OPS serves to prevent or limit damage to the plant
in fault situations which do not present an immediate risk
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to the public health and safety. It thereby serves to
increase the plant availability.
The OPS provides four major actions:
1) automatic loop shutdown;
2) steam generator dump;
3) programmed load reduction; and
4) rod-withdrawal prohibit.
The signals initiating these actions are summarized in
Table 2-IV, and these OPS actions are described in more
detail below.
Automatic Loop Shutdown
In the event of a failure in a single main
cooling loop, the loop can be shutdown and isolated
by 1) closing the feedwater inlet and resuperheater
outlet isolation valves, and 2) closing the circu-
lator-turbine large control valve for the loop.
These actions stop the helium circulator and allow
the loop isolation valve to close. The signal
that causes automatic loop shutdown also initiates
a programmed load reduction to 60 percent power.
Steam Generator Dump
The indication of a high coolant-moisture
level in a particular loop will trigger an automatic
loop shutdown followed immediately by the opening
of the valve connecting the steam generator to the
Table 2-IV
A List of Operational Protection System Parameters and Protective Actions
Automatic Steam Programmed Rod-
Loop Generator Load withdrawal
Sensed Plant Parameter Indications Shutdown Dumpa Reduction Prohibit
Loop reactor-coolant moisture High Yes Yes To 60% level No
Loop resuperheater steam pressure Low Yes No To 60% level No
Loop acoustic monitor High Yes No To 60% level No
Loop feedwater pressure Low Yes No To 60% level No
Loop superheat steam temperature Low Yes No To 60% level No
Loop safety valves Open Yes No To 60% level No
Loop circulator bearing-water Low Yes No To 60% level No
pressure
Loop circulator speed High Yes No To 60% level No
Reactor-coolant pressure High No No To 25% level No
Reactor-coolant pressure Low No No To 25% level No
Anomalous reactivity High/Low No No To 25% level No
Main turbine stop valves Close No No To 25% level No
Main boiler feedpump flow rate Low No No To 60% level No
Main steamline pressure Low No No To 25% level No
Main turbine control valves High No No To 25% level No
closure rate
Rate of neutron-flux change High No No No Yes
Neutron-flux level High No No No Yes
aFollowing loop shutdown, the contents of the steam generator are dumped.
77
steam generator dump system. The entire contents of
the steam generator can be dumped thus limiting the
leakage of steam into the reactor coolant.
Programmed Load Reduction
A programmed load reduction is accomplished by
the rapid automatic insertion of one or more control
rods. Also, the plant load index is adjusted
to the lower load value so that the plant control
system can reestablish steady state conditions at
this new power level. Operator intervention is
required at this point to determine whether the
plant can continue operating at the reduced power,
or if an orderly shutdown is required.
Rod Withdrawal Prohibit
This action terminates the withdrawal of any
control rods and thus prevents further positive
reactivity insertion.
The OPS is independent of the plant protection system.
However, the two systems do receive some inputs from common
sensors, and in some cases actuate the same valves.
The Plant Protection System (PPS)
The PPS includes all electrical and mechanical devices
and circuitry involved in generating signals associated with
protective functions. These include those that 1) initiate
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reactor shutdown, and 2) in the event of a serious reactor
accident, actuate the engineered safeguard systems.
The initiation of a reactor shutdown signal actuates
both the control rod system and the shutdown rod system
along with the other plant actions necessary in the shut-
down heat removal process. (These are described in detail
in section 2.3-2.)
Table 2-V is a list of the trip parameters for the PPS.
Item 15, two-main-loop trouble, is an interlock with the
operational protection system which initiates a reactor
shutdown in the event that the OPS receives signals from
two main loops.
The engineered safeguard features include 1) the CACS
and those portions of the main loop cooling system necessary
to provide adequate core cooling during the start-up of the
CACS; 2) the containment isolation system; and 3) the con-
tainment-atmosphere cleanup system.
2.3 Reactor Coolant System Operation
2.3-1 Main Loop Operation
The main loop cooling system primary side consists of
the steam turbine-driven helium circulators, the steam
generator and the main loop isolation valves. The secondary
side of this system is the steam/water power cycle which
drives the main turbine-generator set. The major components
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Table 2-V
Plant Protection System Trip Parameters
Manual................................
Neutron flux .........................
Power-to-flow ratio ..................
Reactivity ...........................
Reactor-coolant moisture .............
Delayed-neutron activity .............
Reactor-coolant pressure .............
Reactor-coolant outlet temperature ...
Containment pressure .................
Circulator speed (rate of increase) ..
Main feedwater pressure ..............
Main feedwater flow ..................
Condenser pressure ...................
Essential bus voltage ................
Two-main-loop trouble ................
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
High
High
High/low
High
High
High/ low
High
High
High
Low
Low
High
Low
. . .. .. .. ..
. . . ... .. ..
. .. 0. ... . .. . ... ..... .
. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .
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of this system are described in Figure 2.4, however, a more
detailed schematic flow diagram for the secondary coolant
system is presented in Figure 2.13.
The steam/water flow path for the normal operation of
the system is defined by the heavy lines. The entire amount
of steam leaving the steam generator passes to the control
valves for the main loop helium circulator drive turbine.
At a point just prior to these valves, some steam is diverted
to drive the bearing-water pump-turbine for the main circu-
lator water bearings. The remainder passes through the
circulator-turbine control valves to drive the helium cir-
culator. The location of the steam take-off to the bearing-
water pump-turbine ensures it of a continuous supply of
steam.
The arrangement of the circulator-turbine control valves
is very important. There are two valves arranged in parallel;
these are the circulator-turbine large control valve (CT large
CV) and the circulator-turbine small control valve (CT small CV).
The CT large CV is designed for full steam flow and it is used
for the control of the circulator-turbine during normal opera-
tion. The CT small CV is sized to pass only 12 percent of
the normal full load steam flow. It is fully open during the
normal operation of the reactor.
After being exhausted from the circulator-turbine, the
steam is then returned to the steam generator module where
From the Other Two Main Loops
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FIGURE 2.13 A Schematic Flow Diagram of the Secondary Coolant
Normal Operating Mode.
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it is resuperheated. This resuperheated steam combines with
the steam from the other two main loops, after it leaves the
containment building, to drive the main turbine-generator
set. The main turbine exhaust-steam is condensed in the main
condenser, and the condensate collected in the hotwell is
pumped through a condensate demineralizer and three stages
of feedwater heating by the condensate pumps. The main
boiler feed pumps, which are turbine-driven by extraction
steam from the main turbine, direct the feedwater through
three more stages of heaters before it enters the steam
generators. After the condensate demineralizer, the feed-
water flows through two separate, parallel trains, each of
which contains three low pressure feed water heaters, a
feedwater pump, and three high pressure feedwater heaters.
2.3-2 Shutdown Cooling Operation
The main cooling loops are designed to provide con-
tinuous core cooling during a reactor shutdown. This is
accomplished by continuing operation of the main helium
circulators using the steam generated by the decay heat to
drive the helium circulator-turbine.
The plant protection system is designed such that the
same signal which scrams the reactor (called the reactor
shutdown initiation signal) also trips the main turbine
throttle valve closed. The closing of the main turbine
throttle initiates a signal causing the resuperheater
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bypass valve to open. This valve regulates the circulator-
turbine exhaust pressure and directs this steam flow to the
main condenser. However, failure of this valve either to
open or to regulate properly may not be crucial; both safety
and relief valves in the system will provide adequate turbine
exhaust should the regulating valve fail. Figure 2.14 is a
flow diagram for the shutdown cooling operations.
Notice that the closing of the turbine throttle elimi-
nates the steam supply for the main feed pump turbines. The
shutdown initiation signal, coupled with an additional signal
from the plant protection system which verifies the fact that
the reactor has actually shut down, causes the rapid closure
of the CT large CV. This action is necessary to prevent the
rapid depletion of the inventory of steam/water in the steam
generator. The steam flow to drive the circulator-turbine is
maintained by the CT small CV, and the shutdown control system
regulates this valve to maintain the helium temperature within
acceptable limits.
The operation of the plant at this point is limited by
the depletion of the steam generators, which occurs in about
thirty minutes if all three loops are operating. However,
the shutdown initiation signal also starts the shutdown
boiler feed pumps. These are electrically driven pumps which
are designed to deliver two percent of the normal feedwater
flow. There are three individual pumps; one for each of the
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FIGURE 2.14 A Schematic Flow Diagram of the Secondary Coolant
Shutdown Cooling Operating Mode.
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main loops. These pumps draw from a common suction header
which is connected directly to the condenser hotwell. The
start-up of these pumps is not critical to the initial
operation of the main loops. However, the feedwater they
supply to the steam generators will prevent depletion of
the steam/water inventory.
The operation of the main loops, in this operating
state, is limited only by the quality of the steam produced
in the steam generators. After 40 to 50 minutes, the
quantity of steam produced is no longer sufficient to drive
the circulator-turbines, and a secondary source of steam
is needed to continue core cooling with the main loops.
Note that the bearing water pump is supplied with steam
as long as there is steam to drive the circulator-turbine.
2.3-3 Decay Heat Removal Operation
To provide for continued shutdown cooling operation
of the main loops, oil-fired boilers are provided to supply
the necessary steam to drive the main helium circulator
turbines. These boilers are maintained in a hot standby
condition,while the reactor is operating,by steam heating
coils, and there are three independent boiler units. Each
unit is aligned with a single main loop, and by opening the
correct combination of valves, the unit will supply steam
to drive both the circulator-turbine and the bearing-water
pump-turbine. These boilers will be designed to achieve
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FIGURE 2.15 A Schematic Flow Diagram of the Secondary Coolant
Decay-heat-removal Operating Mode.
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their full-rated steaming condition twenty minutes after
receipt of the shutdown signal. Figure 2.15 is the flow
diagram for the decay heat removal operation.
The operation of these boilers will allow continued
helium circulation with the main loops. However, to con-
tinue heat removal with the main loops, water must be
continuously circulated through the steam generator. This
is accomplished by the continued operation of the shutdown
feed pumps and by the alternate discharge path provided to
direct the steam/water exhaust from the steam generator to
the main condenser. If the main condenser is unavailable
or if the alternate discharge path regulating valve should
fail to open, relief valves are provided to assure adequate
flow. The operation of the main loops can now continue
indefinitely, assuming the correct functioning of all
equipment. However, if the main condenser is unavailable,
then the main loop operation is dependent upon back-up
supplies of feedwater.
2.3-4 Main Loop Shutdown Performance
Figure 2.16 indicates the main loop cooling system
response to a reactor trip in which the reactor shutdown
systems function normally. Shown in the figure are the
core outlet temperature, maximum clad hot-spot temperature,
helium flow rate, and the steam generator outlet pressure
and percent of inventory for the first thirty minutes
following the shutdown.
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With the insertion of the control rods and shutdown
rods, the reactor power decreases rapidly to the decay heat
level. The helium flow rate decreases more slowly due to
the closure rate of the CT large CV (~-"3 seconds), and the
helium circulator-turbine inertia. This causes a temporary
overcooling of the core. After this, a mild temperature
transient is observed. This results from the CT small CV
controller action. Should the CT small CV throttle rapidly
in the initial period following the shutdown, a lower helium
flow rate and higher core temperatures will result. However,
the steam generator inventory will be conserved, and main
loop operation can be extended. If the CT small CV throttles
slowly, lower core temperatures result, but steam generator
inventory depletion occurs sooner. The design of the shut-
down controllers has not yet been finalized, and so the
results shown in Figure 2.16 are only preliminary.
2.3-5 CACS Operation
If at any time during the shutdown cooling operations
the main loops fail to provide adequate helium circulation,
the CACS is available to immediately take over core cooling.
The major components of the primary and secondary sides of
this system are described in Figure 2.13, and a detailed
schematic flow diagram is provided in Figure 2.17. During
normal reactor operation, the auxiliary helium circulator is
stopped and the auxiliary loop isolation valve closed. The
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FIGURE 2.17 A Schematic Flow Diagram of the Core Auxiliary Cooling Water System. 10
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The auxiliary circulating pump provides a small flow of
pressurized water through the heat exchanger to maintain
acceptable tube temperatures and to prevent thermal shock
when the system is started in order to provide emergency
cooling. This small heat loss from the reactor is
rejected to the atmosphere by natural draft in the auxil-
iary loop cooler.
Upon receipt of the shutdown initiation signal, the
CACS is brought to a ready condition. The auxiliary helium
circulator is started and run at idle speed and is available
to begin circulating helium at any time thereafter that the
main loops fail.
2.3-6 Cooling System Arrangement
The intent of the design of the three main cooling
loops is to make the loops as independent as possible so as
to minimize the possibility of common mode failure elimi-
nating all the loops. Thus, each main loop has its own
separate support system for the helium circulator, its own
shutdown boiler feed pump, and its own auxiliary boiler.
In addition, all of the essential equipment for each of the
loops, except for the auxiliary boiler, are supplied from a
separate electrical bus. In the present design, the auxil-
iary boilers are supplied from the plant's non-essential
electrical bus. These and some other cooling system charac-
teristics are summarized in Table 2-VI.
Readiness for Shut
Number of Loops Re
Electric Power Req
Seismic Capability
Support Systems
Table 2-VI
A Summary of the Shutdown Cooling Operating Characteristics
Main Cooling System Auxiliary Cooling System
down Operation Continues Can Start Heat Removal At
Approx. 10 Sec.
quired 2 of 3 for DBDA 2 of 3 Equals Decay Heat At
1 of 3 for Other Events 2 Min; 1 of 3 After 15 Min
uired Not Essential for 15 Min Yes
Category I for 30 Min Category I
(Limited by Feed Water
Supply System)
Separate Shutdown FW Pump. Separate Pressurized Water
and Auxiliary Boiler for Loop and Air Cooler for
Each Loop Each Loop
Separate Circulator Service Separate Circulator Service
Modules for Each Loop Modules for Each Loop
Each Loop Fed by Different Each Loop Fed by Different
Essential Bus Essential Bus
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RESERVE AUX. TRANS.
UNIT AUX. TRANS.
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REACTOR PLANT COOLING WATER PUMP A
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INSTRUMENT AIR COMPRESSOR A
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FIGURE 2.18 Plant electrical system single line diagram
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TABLE 2-VII
DISTRIBUTION OF REDUNDANT LOADS AMONG ESSENTIAL BUSES
Units Fed from Connected hp Bus
Load Bus A Bus B Bus C per Unita Voltage
Core main cooling system
Circulator standby bearing water pumps A B C 180 480
Essential instrumentation and control A B C (b) 120 uninter.
Core auxiliary cooling system
Helium circulators A B C 500 4160
Main circulating water pumps A B C 15 480
Auxiliary circulating water pumps A B C 1 480
Makeup water pumps A B C (b) 480
Heat dump fans A B C 30 480
Instrumentation and control A B C (b) 120 uninter.
Service-water system
Pumps A B C 150 480
Cooling tower fans A B 200 4160
Reactor plant cooling water system
Pumps A BD C 125 480
Instrument and service air system
Compressors A B C 125 480
Ventilation systems
Containment supply fans A B 7.5 480
Containment cooling fans A B C 40 480
Containment exhaust fans A B 40 480
Containment cleanup fans A B C 15 480
Control room emergency system A B CD 10 480
Emergency lighting and communication systems (Redundant loads will be distributed among
buses A. B and C)
bTentative estimates subject to change as the design proceeds beyond the conceptual stage.bNo estimate available at this early stage.
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The essential electrical loads are supplied from the
three essential buses as described above. Each of the
essential buses is fed from both the main turbine generator
unit of the plant through the unit transformer, and an
offsite power source. Also, each bus is equipped with its
own separate diesel generator to supply the essential loads
when the two primary sources of power are lost. Figure 2.18
is a schematic single line diagram of the plant AC electrical
system. It indicates both the essential electrical buses and
the non-essential buses, and a listing of the major component
loads carried by each of the electrical buses is provided
in Table 2-VII.
2.4 Shutdown Cooling System Capabilities
2.4-1 Main Loop Shutdown Cooling System Capabilities
There are two general heat removal periods following
a reactor shutdown. First is the shutdown-heat-removal
phase in which the cooling system must reduce the plant
heat load to the decay heat level, and second is the decay-
heat-removal phase. The initial phase lasts the first
twenty to thirty minutes, and during this period, the
design intent is to keep the main loops operating (main-
taining acceptable core temperatures) long enough to get
the auxiliary boilers to their rated steaming condition.
If all three of the main loops function as designed, then
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the time margin available for firing up the auxiliary boilers
is quite large (40 to 50 minutes).
The correct operation of each main loop depends upon the
functioning of each of its separate subsystems. Furthermore,
the overall core cooling capability of the main loop cooling
system is dependent on both the number of main loops operating
and the state of operation of those loops. This last point
can be illustrated by considering the operation of the three
pieces of equipment most important to correct main loop
operation. These are the CT large CV, the CT small CV, and
the shutdown feed pump. If the CT large CV for a particular
loop fails to close, the steam generator inventory for that
loop will be quickly depleted within one or two minutes, and
the loop will no longer provide any shutdown heat removal.
The core cooling process will continue with two main loops,
which is well within the design margin. However, these two
loops individually will have to circulate more helium than
they normally would have had all three loops been operating.
The failure of a CT small CV to throttle down will also
cause the steam generator inventory for the loop to deplete,
but this will occur over a longer time period than results
from failure of the CT large CV. The failure of a
shutdown feed pump to deliver feedwater will also limit
the availability of the main loop by allowing the steam
generator inventory to deplete. However, more importantly,
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the shutdown feed pump is essential to the operation of the
auxiliary boiler in the decay heat removal phase. Thus,
failure of the pump eliminates the possibility of providing
decay heat removal with the main loop irrespective of whether
the auxiliary boiler is available or not.
One more item in the operation of the main loops needs
mention. That is the main loop isolation valves. Whenever
steam generator depletion occurs, and a main circulator
stops, the operation of the other circulators should cause
the self-actuating isolation valve on the failed loop to
close. If the valve fails to close, some helium flow
bypassing the core through the shutdown loop will result.
The actual amount of bypass flow is small, and the effect
on core temperatures is not significant. This is because
the bypass flow reduces the total flow resistance causing
the helium circulators to speed up and compensate for the
small bypass flow loss. However, this also causes them to
use more steam; thus hastening the depletion of their
steam generator inventories. Table 2-VIII lists the steam
generator inventory depletion times as a function of the
operating state of the main loop cooling system. The
operating states are defined by the number of main loops
operating (i.e., the number of loops without failed CT
large CVs or CT small CVs), the number of operating loops
supplied with feedwater, and the number of failed main
loops allowing core-flow bypass. The values listed in the
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table are the author's best estimates based on the present
steam generator inventories and main helium circulator-
turbine steam requirements following reactor shutdown.
In the event a PCRV depressurization occurs, the
reactor shutdown cooling operations will be somewhat differ-
ent. The correct operation of all three of the main loops
will allow about thirty minutes to fire-up the auxiliary
boilers before steam generator inventory depletion occurs.
However, if one of the circulator-turbine control valves
fails to function properly, its circulator will speed up to
the overspeed trip point. Thus the circulator for that loop
is eliminated almost immediately, and the cooling operations
must proceed with two main loops. The failure of a shutdown
feed pump or a main loop isolation valve will have a similar
effect to that described for the pressurized reactor shut-
downs. The steam generator inventory depletion times for
shutdowns where the reactor is depressurized are listed in
Table 2-IX. The design basis for the main loop shutdown
cooling system following a depressurization accident is at
least two main loops operating as opposed to only one for
pressurized shutdowns. The operation of only a single main
loop following a depressurization accident is limited to only
a few minutes by the overspeed trip point of the circulator.
The values listed in the table are the author's best estimates
except where otherwise noted.
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Table 2-VIII
A List of Steam Generator Depletion Times
for Various Main Loop Operating States
with the Reactor Pressurized
Number of Condition of Number of Main Loop System
Main Loops Unavailable Loops with Operating Time
Available Main Loops Feedwater (minutes)
No Loop 1 Loop 2 Loop
Bypass Bypass Bypass
3 >30 - -
3 -- 2 >30 - -
1 >30 - -
0 n-30 - -
1 main loop 2 >30 25 -
shutdown, or with 1 25 20 -
failed CT large CV
2 0 17 15 -
1 main loop 2 >30 27 -
failed CT small CV 1 27 22 -
0 19 17 -
2 main loops 1 12 8 6
failed CT large CVs 0 8 6 5
1 main loop failed 1 14 10 8
1 CT large CV, 1 main
loop failed CT small 0 10 8 7
CV
2 main loops failed 1 17 13 11
CT small CVs 0 13 11 10
3 main loop failed - 2 - -
CT large CVs
0 3 main loops failed - 10 - -
CT small CVs
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Table 2-IX
A List of Main Loop Operating Times
for Reactor Shutdowns
Following a Depressurization Accident
Main Loop Operating Times
Number of Number of (minutes)
Main Loops Available Containment Containment
Available Loops with Equalization Equalization
Feedwater Pressure 1.8 Atm. Pressure 1.0 Atm,
3 >30 30
3 2 >30 25
1 >30 20
0 30 15
2 25
2 1 20 4*
0 15
1 -4* 2*
0 2 2
* limited by speed increase to the overspeed trip -setpoint
of the main circulators (Reference 6)
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There is an additional complexity to be considered in
the depressurized shutdown cooling operations. This is the
effect of the containment equalization pressure. During a
PCRV depressurization accident, the helium at 1300 psi will
expand into the containment building volume and reach an
equilibrium pressure in both the PCRV and the containment
building. The present design is for an equalization pressure
of 1.8 atmospheres. If the equalization pressure were lower
the helium circulators would speed up due to the decreased
helium density. The mass flow of helium through the core
would also decrease due to this effect, although this would
be counteracted somewhat by the increase in circulator speed.
Table 2-IX also lists the steam generator inventory
depletion times (or main loop operation times) for shutdown
cooling operations with an equalization pressure of one
atmosphere. In all cases except where all three main loops
operate, the main loop cooling system operation is limited
by the overspeeding of the helium circulators.
In both the pressurized reactor shutdown cooling opera-
tions and the depressurized reactor shutdown cooling operations,
decay heat removal will continue with the main loop cooling
system only if the system has lasted at least twenty minutes,
and also if those functioning auxiliary boilers correspond
to the functioning main loops.
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2.4-2 Core Auxiliary Cooling System Capabilities
If at any time after a reactor shutdown the main loop
cooling system fails, the CACS is available to rapidly take
over the shutdown or decay heat removal operations. Each
CACS loop is sized to remove two percent of the full power
heat load (for steady state operation), and the nuclear
decay-heat level decreases such that at two minutes after
the shutdown it is roughly four percent of the full power
level. Two CACS loops are then fully capable of removing
this decay heat and maintaining acceptable core temperatures.
At fifteen minutes after the shutdown, the decay heat level
is down to two percent of full power and only one CACS loop
is then fully capable of core cooling.
The auxiliary circulators are driven by squirrel cage
induction motors powered by a variable frequency power
supply to allow variable speed operation over a large range.
This is needed to account for the different design condi-
tions of pressurized and depressurized operation. The design
basis for the auxiliary circulator is actually determined by
the operating requirements shortly after a design basis de-
pressurization accident. This occurs about four minutes
after initiation of the accident when the containment
equalization pressure of 26.7 psia is reached.
Because of the depressurized design requirements, the
helium circulation capability of the auxiliary circulators
is quite large when the reactor is pressurized, and failures
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of the main loop isolation values to close do not signifi-
cantly affect the CACS performance 6). However, during a
depressurization accident, failure of the main loop isolation
valves has a definite degrading effect on the CACS heat
removal capabilities. Table 2-X lists the number of CACS
loops capable of providing adequate decay heat removal, for
various time intervals after imitiation of the shutdown, and
as a function of the number of main loop isolation valves
failing to open. These valves are based on the work in
Reference 6.
The containment equalization pressure also has a sig-
nificant effect on the CACS operation for depressurized
reactor shutdowns. Table 2-X also lists the CACS capabil-
ities for shutdowns in which the containment pressure
equalizes at one atmosphere. These latter valves are the
author's best estimates of CACS performance based on extrapo-
lation and information from Reference 7.
1o4
Table 2-X
Core Auxiliary Cooling System Shutdown Cooling Capabilities
PRESSURIZED REACTOR SHUTDOWNS
o In Shutdown Number of Main Loop CACS Loops Capable
during which Main Isolation Valves of Full Decay Heat
Loop Failure Occurs Allowing Bypass-flow Removal
before 15 minutes 0, 1, 2, 3 3, 2
after 15 minutes 0, 1, 2, 3 3, 2, 1
DEPRESSURIZED REACTOR SHUTDOWNS
Time Interval Number of Main Loop CACS Loops Capable
following Shutdown Isolation Valves of Full Decay Heat
Loop Failure Occurs Allowing Bypass-flow Removal
CEP =* CEP *
1.8 Atm 1.0 Atm
before 5 minutes 0 3, 2 3
1 3, 2 -
2 3
3 - -
5 to 15 minutes 0 3, 2 3
1 3, 2 3
2 3, 2 -
3 3
15 to 20 minutes 0 3, 2, 1 3
1 3, 2 3
2 3, 2 -
3 3
after 20 minutes 0 3, 2, 1 3, 2
1 3, 2 3
2 3, 2 3
3 3, 2 -
* CEP = Containment Equalization Pressure
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Chapter 3
Methodology
3.1 Introduction
The major thrust of this research project has been
directed at the analysis of the potential GCFR core-melt
accident sequences following reactor shutdowns. The
potential core-melt accident sequences following failure
of the reactor to shutdown were not analyzed.
The accident analysis methodology of the RSS was
utilized in the process of modelling the accident sequences
following reactor shutdowns.Cl) Because the GCFR is designed
such that the main loop cooling system continues its heat
removal functions from normal operation, through a reactor
shutdown, to the shutdown and decay heat removal operations,
the modelling of the shutdown event sequences was somewhat
simplified. The shutdown cooling system response to the
initiation of a reactor shutdown signal is identical in
almost all cases whether it is a normal shutdown or a shut-
down resulting from an anticipated plant transient. Thus, a
single large modelling diagram of the reactor shutdown cooling
operations was constructed for the majority of the types of
reactor shutdown initiating events. In effect, one diagram
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was used to model the shutdown cooling and decay heat remo-
val operations when the reactor remains pressurized. Enough
variation was included in the modelling to account for the
slight differences in the plant response to different types
of initiating events.
For initiating events which lead to a PCRV depressuriza-
tion, a separate modelling diagram of the shutdown cooling
operations was needed. This diagram accounted for the
different design operating capabilities of the plant shutdown
cooling systems following a PCRV depressurization accident.
This chapter presents the methodology used to model the
events following the initiation of a reactor shutdown signal.
Section 3.2 lays the foundation for the construction of the
event sequence diagram (ESD), which is the model of the
GCFR shutdown operations. The specific diagrams for the
pressurized reactor shutdowns and for depressurization accidents
are described in sections 3.3 and 3.4 respectively. Section
3.5 discusses how the inditidual event sequences were handled.
3.2 Event Sequence Modelling
3.2-1 Event Tree Modelling
To develop an initial understanding of the plant
responses which were modelled, consider the simplified event
tree shown in Figure 3.1. This event tree depicts the basic
overall plant functions following the initiation of a reactor
shutdown signal. The diagram indicates the initiating event
Initiating
Event
Reactor
Shutdown
Electric
Power
Main Loop
Cooling
System
Core Auxiliary
Cooling
System
- ft - f
Available Available
Not
Available
Available
Not
Available
Not
Available
Available
Not
Available
- p
Available Available
Not Available
Not Available
Core Cooling Provided by
Main Loops
Core Cooling Provided by
the CACS
Core Meltdown Occurs
Limited Main Loop Operation
Core Meltdown Occurs unless
Electric Power Restored
Core Meltdown Occurs
Possible Core Cooling by Main
Loops, Otherwise Core
Meltdown Occurs
Core Meltdown Occurs
Core Meltdown Occurs
FIGURE 3.1 An Event Tree of the GCFR Shutdown Heat Removal Systems
Occurs
Fails to
H-
0)
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followed by the two possibilities: reactor shutdown either
occurs, or fails. It then considers the availability of
electric power, which is necessary for CACS operation, and
for extended operation of the main loops. The availability
of either the main cooling loops or the CACS then dictate
whether or not core meltdown will occur.
While this diagram helps in the understanding of the
basic modelling approach, its usefulness in analyzing the
plant operations is limited. This is basically because it
does not allow a detailed description of the main loop cool-
ing system capabilities, and because it does not allow consid-
eration of the different successful CACS operating states.
The main loop cooling system operations need to be
described in more detail so that the actual main loop cooling
capabilities, for different operating states, can be reflec-
ted in the model. Figure 3.2 is an event tree diagram which
describes how the shutdown cooling operations were modelled
for a single main cooling loop. The diagram also shows the
effect of the various shutdown cooling system components on
the availability of a main loop. Given that a reactor
shutdown occurs, failure of the resuperheater bypass discharge
path was assumed to degrade the main circulator performance
and result in the elimination of the loop. Failure of the
CT large CV to close will cause the steam generator inventory
to be exhausted in a few minutes, and this eliminates the loop.
Failure of the CT small CV to throttle will also cause the
Circulator-
turbine
Large
Control
Valve
Closes
Circulator
turbine
Small
Control
Valve
Throttles
Essential
Electrical
Power
Available
Shutdown
Feedpump
Starts
Auxiliary
Boiler
Available
Not Available
Fails to Start
Not Available
[ Fails to Throttle
Fails to Close
Fails to Open
Resuper-
heater
Bypass
Control
Valve
FIGURE 3.2 An Event Tree Diagram of the Shutdown Cooling Operations of a Single Main Cooling Loop
\0
Reactor
Shutdown
Occurs
Extended Main Loop Operation
Main Loop Operation Limited
by Steam Quality
Main Loop Operation Limited
by Steam Generator Depletion
Main Loop Operation Limited
by Steam Generator Depletion
Main Loop Operation Limited
by Steam Generator Depletion
Main Loop Operation Limited
by Steam Generator Depletion
Degraded Main Loop Performance
Opens
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steam generator inventory to be exhausted sooner than desired,
but it would allow operation of the loop for a considerably
longer period of time compared to the case where the large
valve is open. The availability of AC electric power is not
considered until this point because the previous valve opera-
tions do not require it directly. The operation of the shut-
down feedpumps actually has a small effect on the steam genera-
tor inventory depletion time, but more importantly its opera-
tion, along with that of the auxiliary boiler, is necessary for
extended main loop decay heat removal operation.
Figure 3.2 describes the shutdown cooling operations of
one main loop only. The GCFR, however, has three main loops
in its main cooling system, and there is a very important
dependence between the main loops with regard to the overall
core cooling capability of the system. These capabilities were
described in Chapter 2 for the various main loop cooling system
operating states.
3.2-2 Event Sequence Diagram
In order to describe explicitly the main loop cooling
system operating states, the simple event tree of Figure 3.2
was expanded considerably. This expanded event tree is called
an event sequence diagram (ESD). It describes the same events
contained in the event tree but in much finer detail. Also,
it conserves as much as possible of the correct sequential
occurrence of these events.
There are some very specific reasons why the ESD was
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developed. The GCFR consists of identical and basically
independent main loops. However, as discussed, there is
a very strong dependence between the main loop operating
states and the overall core heat removal. This dependence
is reflected in both the ability to cool the core, and in
the duration for which the main loops provide heat removal
capability during the shutdown heat removal phase.
The event tree describes the overall system success or
failure, but does not detail the different degrees of success
or failure which exist in the GCFR. The reason for this is
basically that the event tree methodology, as developed in
the reactor safety study (RSS), was aimed at describing
system availabilities toward the goal of determining accident
sequence probabilities to be used in an overall risk evalua-
tion. In describing a particular system, a decision as to
what to call available and what to call unavailable had to
be made. This approach in some systems ignored partial
success modes, but the impact on the analysis was not
thought to be critical for the types of systems being analyzed.
Also, it was always in a conservative direction.
However, in the GCFR, these various success modes are
quite important and need to be included. Also, the goal of
this research project is not to do a risk evaluation, but
to do a detailed analysis of the accident sequences in order
to provide insights into the design and to determine the sens-
itivity toward the plant safety of the reliability values of the
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various system and components in the design. Thus,
detailed modelling of these systems and components is
necessary.
In this regard, some advantages of the ESD are:
1) it allows the detailed modelling of the indepen-
dent items of all three of the main cooling loops;
2) it allows for the correct combination of those
items which affect the main loop availability,
and thus determine the number of main loops
operable, and also what length of time they remain
operable;
3) it provides a detailed description of the actual
accident sequences; and
4) the information from the accident sequences will
provide detailed input for the calculation of the
possible accident sequence consequences.
3.2-3 ESD Symbology
The symbols which are used to construct the event
sequence diagram are described below.
System Action Block 1I
Y
E
This rectangular symbol, called, a system action block,
A/O
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represents the functioning of a specific system. The
correct functioning of the system (as stated in the block)
is always represented by a line leaving the right side of
the block (marked YES), and the failure of the system to per-
form this function is always represented by a line leaving
the bottom of the block (marked NO). While the block shown
here is marked "YES" and "NO", those in the actual diagram
are not.
The system action block is simply a decision point and
it is depicted on an event tree as such.
YES
NO
Each sub-system or component function described by a system
action block is coded with an index number which appears in
a small square above the left hand corner of the block. When-
ever one of the subsystems which consists of three identi-
cal, redundant components is modelled, its operation is
described as is shown below for the operation of the emergency
diesel generations.
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The subsystem index number is 119"?, and the triangles repre-
sent transfer symbols to direct the flow of the event
sequences. The number inside the triangle represents the
index name for a specific operating state of the system being
described. 9.1 represents the operating state of the system
with all three diesel generations available. 9.2 may occur
if 9.1 does not, and it represents only two of the diesel
generators being available. Similarly, 9.3 is only one diesel
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generator available, and 9.4 is none available.
In some instances in the ESD modelling, it was necessary
to know the specific main loop (or loops) to which the opera-
ting equipment corresponded. In these cases, the various
combinations of operating equipment were given specific index
names. See the shutdown feedwater system (subsystem 6) on
Figure 3.3 for an example. The various combinations of
available equipment on the main loops are assumed to occur
randomly. Thus each combination is as equally likely to occur
as the next.
Hexagon
The hexagonal symbols represent branching points in the
flow of the event sequences. This symbol is also similar to
a decision point on an event tree, however, there may be as
many as four or five paths leaving a single branch point.
Also, whereas the system action blocks describe the availability
of specific subsystems, the branch points create alternate
event paths as determined by the different availability states
of the subsystem being considered. Usually, the availability
of the particular subsystem will have been described elsewhere
by system action blocks. The branching ratio is decided by
the index numbers which are located within the different por-
tions of the hexagon.
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Each event sequence at the end of the diagram is given
an index name in a special triangular symbol drawn below:
A summary of these symbols is given in Table 3-I.
3.3 EDS Description - Pressurized Reactor Shutdowns
The ESD is actually a detailed extension of the event
tree, and there are specific parallels between the two types
of diagrams. In describing the ESD, specific mention will be
made of the event tree in Figure 3.2 in order to point out
these parallels and to aid in the understanding of the ESD.
3.3-2 ESD Structure
The ESD models the reactor shutdown cooling operations
in two segments. The first segment includes those plant
operations which are initiated simultaneously with the reac-
tor shutdown initiation signal and essentially occur within
the first two minutes following the shutdown. This segment
is called Phase One of the ESD and is included completely on
Figure 3.3 At the end of Phase One, the event sequences
modelled there correspond to the various operating states in
which the main loop cooling system may begin shutdown heat
removal.
In Phase Two of the ESD, the shutdown heat removal pro-
cess is modelled for each of these operating states. The
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Table 3-I
A DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS USED IN THE EVENT SEQUENCE DIAGRAM
D
~~~1~~~~
SYSTEM ACTION BLOCK represents system
and component actions. The output from
a block is always YES to the right, and
NO to the bottom. Each system is coded
with a number which appears in a small
square above the block in the diagram.
The HEXAGON is a branching point in the
operation sequence. The branching is
directed by the numbers inside the
hexagon.
HOUSES (large and small) are used to
provide descriptive information concern-
ing the operating condition of a system,
or a particular shutdown path.
TRIANGLES are used as transfer signals.
The numbers inside the triangle serve
to direct both the coordination of
output and input triangles, and the
branching of the operation sequences
through the hexagons. The output from
the system action blocks is numbered
according to the system number. The
output from branching points (hexa-
gons) is coded with a letter to
correspond to different reactor shut-
down operation conditions.
SPECIFIC EVENT SEQUENCE PATH
INDICATORS
L440 -3 3 CAwallfraA All 9
17 Atth
Acl
zPL/4 rz
G.32
~ C/~$~to* 4.z ~car.e 5 ,VV
4#dde' ~d/~Es
Fll
~pec Z
C3 f7
/2-2L ~ /2
1252-Z
c ON
6.1 
CO&
o,,e
ApIllfle
,q
6-Z 6.y
- 6
-4rll46 4.:p
X-5
ow
6.2 6-If
-4.8
"",We
7-",07'rl 
ff
(D
6-V "T
47"
I
.73 -Z 
-Z
e-7
4.0
6
0 rAl?,07-7zee-
Jf 0 CZ0.3 4-
FIGUKE 3.3 Z-VZ-NT 5EQUENC -,OIAWAAI PIIA- E aU
L 2/Me
7'cWAIM-
MEMN
I f "41 % I- F - I I I -- - - I - - - -- l.l.. I I 1 11 - - -- -- v-lr
d
119
Table 3-I
A List of ESD Subsystem Indexes
Item 1
Item 2
Subsystem
Subsystem
Subsystem
Subsystem
Subsystem
Subsystem
Subsystem
Subsystem
Item 11
Subsystem
ITEM
Item
NUMBE
15
Item 16
Item 17
The Initiating Event
The Reactor Shutdown Initiation Signal
3 The Reactor Shutdown Systems
4 The Circulator-Turbine Large Control Valves
5 The Circulator-Turbine Small Control Valves
6 The Shutdown Feedwater System
7 The Auxiliary Steam Supply
8 Main Loop Transfer to Decay Heat
Removal Operation
9 The Emergency Electrical Supply
10 The Core Auxiliary Cooling System
Turbine Trip
12 The Resuperheater Bypass Control Valves
RS 13 and 14 WERE NOT USED
The Combination of Available Auxiliary
Boilers and Available Main Loops
The Probability of Restarting Initially
Failed Shutdown Feedpumps or Diesel Genera-
tors During the Shutdown Cooling Process
Main Loop Isolation Valve Operation: Closed
to Open, and Main Circulator Availability
After Imbalance Conditions
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Table 3-II
(continued)
Item 18 Main Loop Isolation Valve Operation
and Open to Closed During an Imbalance
Condition
Item 19 Main Loop Support Systems
Item A The Number of Main Loops Initially
Available
Item B The Availability of Offsite Power
Item 20 The Restoration of Offsite Power
Item 21 The Containment Equalization Pressure
Range following a PCRV Depressurization
Accident
Item 22 CACS operating states following a PCRV
Depressurization Accident
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main loop cooling system availability is described in
detail along with the processes leading to eventual decay
heat removal with either the main cooling loop system or the
CACS.
To aid in the understanding of the ESD, a list of the
subsystem and other indexes is provided in Table 3-II.
3.3-3 ESD - Phase One
Phase One of the ESD is included as Figure 3.3. The
modelling begins with the initiation of a reactor shutdown
signal and next considers whether or not the reactor scram
actually occurs. The shutdown initiation signal also initiates
a number of other system operations which are described expli-
citly in the ESD. These operations occur simultaneously with
the shutdown of the nuclear reaction. They are:
1) Main turbine generator throttle trip, and the
subsequent initiation of the resuperheater by-pass
system;
2) The start-up of the emergency diesel generators;
3) The start-up of the shutdown feedwater pumps;
4) The start-up of the auxiliary boilers; and
5) The initiation of the CACS into its stand-by mode
of operation.
Notice that the path leading to the latter three systems con-
tains a branch point. The operation of these subsystems
requires the availability of AC electrical power. With off-
site power available (output BI of the branch point) all of
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the components of each subsystem are capable of functioning.
Off-site power is necessary because the reactor shutdown
signal also initiates a turbine-trip. If off-site power is
not available, (output G2,of the branch point) then only
those subsystems powered from the essential buses will be
available. Furthermore, because each of the essential buses
is supplied by one of the emergency diesel generators, only
those buses on which the diesel has started will be energized.
Thus the number of shutdown feedpumps and CACS loops capable
of functioning is limited by the number of diesel generators
starting. This is modelled on the ESD with branch point C,
and the additional output operating states for subsystems 6
(the shutdown feedpumps) and 10 (the CACS) are shown in
Figure 3.4b. Note that subsystem 7 (the auxiliary boilers)
is not supplied from the essential buses. Also, the operation
of the resuperheater by-bass system (subsystem 12) is modelled
following the main turbine-trip becaue the initiation signal for
this subsystem results from the turbine throttle closure and not
the reactor shutdown initiation. Note that in the event tree of
Figure 3.2, the operation of these subsystems is not described
explicitly. Instead it is included implicitly in the diagram
when the availability of these subsystems is considered.
Following the occurrence of a reactor shutdown, the
event sequence path leads to branch point A. The purpose of
this branch point is to include on the same diagram the
modelling of those reactor shutdowns which begin with the main
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loop cooling system either fully available, or with only
two of the three main loops available. Therefore, the
analysis of those initiating events which eliminate one main
cooling loop (see Chapter 4 for a discussion of initiating
events) can also be performed with this diagram.
Following branch point A are branch points J. These
determine the number of main loops which are operable depen-
ding upon the availability of the resuperheater by-pass system
for each loop. The operation of the CT large CV is next
considered on the event sequence paths, and here one can see
the parallels of the ESD to the event tree of Figure 3.2.
The failure of the resuperheater by-pass system for one loop
eliminates that loop leaving only two main loops available.
Thus the CT large CV operation is considered for only those
two available main loops. Branch point Jl leads to the system
action block (3 CT large CVs close) while J2 leads to the
block (2 CT large CVs close). In a similar fashion, the
failure of a CT large CV to close for a specific main loop
causes the steam generator inventory for that loop to be
quickly depleted. This makes the correct functioning of the
CT small CV for that loop unimportant, and it is not included
in the modelling.
The next items considered in the ESD are the avail-
ability states of the essential electrical supply and the
shutdown feedpumps. For those main loops in which a
previous loop failure has occurred (either resuperheater by-
pass sytem, CT large CV, or CT small CV), the operation of
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the shutdown feedpump is not considered. Particular care
was taken to correctly couple the available shutdown feed-
pumps to the available main loops. Yet, before the shutdown
feedpump availability states can be combined with the avail-
able main loops, the availability of the electrical supply
must be determined. The operation of subsystem 3, 12, 4 and
5 does not depend on the availability of electric power, and
the main loop availability states up to the consideration of
the CT small CVs may occur for any availability state of the
electrical supply.
Phase one of the ESD ends by describing the specific
shutdown heat removal operating states of the main loop cool-
ing system. These are determined by the combinations of the
available main loops and the available shutdown feedpumps for
each availability state of the essential electrical supply.
Figure 3.3 describes the main loop shutdown heat removal
operating states with all three of the essential buses ener-
gized, and the operating states corresponding to the other
availability states of the essential buses are described in
Figure 3.4c.
Main loop operating states Dl through D4 correspond to
the four operating states of the three shutdown feedpumps
combined with three fully available main loops (output state
5.1) when all three essential buses are energized. Operating
states D5 through D7 result whenever all three main loops are
available but only two of the essential buses are energized.
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The main loop operating states resulting from the combination
of output state 5.2 (two main loops available, one main loop
with a failed CT small CV) and the shutdown feedpump operating
states are labeled E; those from output state 5.3 (one main loop
available, two main loops with failed CT small CVs) one labeled
F; those from output states 5.5, 5.6 and 5.8 are labeled
G, H, and I respectively. Table 3-111 lists the various main
loop operating states and describes them briefly. The output
states 5.4, 5.7, 5.9 and 4.4 are not combined with the shutdown
feedpump operating states because these correspond to different
failed states of all three main loops. However, there are four
separate main loop operating states for each of these outputs
which correspond to the different availability states of the
essential electrical buses. These main loop operating states
are labeled 54, 57, 59 and 44 respectively.
3.3-4 ESD - Phase Two
The shutdown heat removal operating states of the main
loop cooling system, which are the output states from phase
one of the ESD, constitute the input states for phase two of
the ESD. In phase two, the shutdown heat removal operation
for each main loop operating states is described. The diagram
of the shutdown event sequences for phase two is shown in
Figures 3.4 a,b,c,d,e and f.
The detailed information concerning the main loop cooling
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Table 3-III
ESD - Phase One Output States
Main Loop Number of Number of Final Event
Operating States Main Loops Main Loops Sequence
Index and With Essential With Shutdown Index
Description AC Power Feedwater
Available
D: 3 Main loops
available.
Output state 5.1
D1 3 3 K
D2 3 2 L
D3 3 1 M
D4 3 0 N
D5 2 2 L
D6 2 1 M
D7 2 0 N
D8 1 1 M
D9 1 0 N
DIO 0 0 N
E: 2 Main loops
available;
1 main loop
failed CT small CV.
Output state 5.2
El, E4, E7 3 2 0
E3, E6, E9 3 1 P
E2, E5, E8 3 0 Q
E10, E19, E27 2 2 0
E11, E20, E28 2 1 P
E12, E21, E29
E13, E22, E30 0 QE14, E23, E31i
E15, E24, E32 1 P
E16, E25, E33 0 QE17, E26, E34
E18 0 0 Q
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Table 3-III continued
Main Loop Number of Number of Final Event
Operating States Main Loops Main Loops Sequence
Index and With Essential With Shutdown Index
Description AC Power Feedwater
Available
F: 1 Main loop
available.
2 Main loops
failed CT
small CVs.
Output state 5.3
F1, F3, F5 3 1 R
F2, F4, F6 3 0 S
F7, F15, F22 2 1 R
F8, F16, F23
F9, F17, F24 2 0 S
F10, F18, F25
Fll, F19, F26 1 1 R
F12, F20, F27 1 0 SF13, F21, F28
F14 0 0 S
G: 2 Main loops
available.
1 Main loop
failed CT large CV,
or shutdown.
Output state 5.5
G1, G4, G7 3 2 W
G3, G6, G9 3 1 X
G2, G5, G8 3 0 y
G10, G19, G27 2 2 W
G11, G20, G28. 2 1 X
G12, G21, G29
G13, G22, G30 2 0 Y
G14, G23, G31
G15, G24, G32 1 1 X
G16, G25, G33 1 0 Y
G17, G26, G34
G18 0 0 Y
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Table 3-111 continued
Main Loop Number of Number of Final Event
Operating States Main Loops Main Loops Sequence
Index and With Essential With Shutdown Index
Description AC Power Feedwater
Available
H: 1 Main loop
available;
1 main loop
failed CT small CV;
1 main loop
failed CT large CV,
or shutdown.
Output state 5.6
H1, H3, H5 3 1 Z
H2, H4, H6 3 0 AA
H7, H15, H22 2 1 Z
H8, H16, H23
H9, H17, H24 2 0 AA
H10, H18, H25
HL, H19, H26 1 1Z
H12, H20, H27 1 0 AA
H13, H21, H28
H14 0 0 AA
I: 1 Main loop
available;
1 main loop
failed CT large CV;
1 main loop
failed CT large CV,
or shutdown.
Output state 5.8
11, 13, 15 3 1 CC
12, 14, 16 3 0 DD
17, 115, 122 2 1 CC
18, 116, 123
19, 117, 124 2 0 DD
110, 118, 125
111, 119, 126 1 1 CC
112, 120, 127 1 0 DD
113, 121, 128?
114 0 0 CC
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Table 3-III continued
Main Loop Number of Main Loops Final Event
Operating States With Essential AC Sequence
Index and Power; Shutdown Index
Description Feedwater Not
Considered
44: All 3 CT large CVs failed
to close. Output state 4.4
44.1 3
44.2 2 V
44.3 1
44.4 0
54: All 3 CT small CVs failed
to throttle. Output
state 5.4
54.1 3
54.2 2 T54.3 1
54.4 0
57: 2 Main loops failed CT small
CVs; 1 main loop failed CT
large CV, or shutdown.
Output state 5.7
57.1 3
57.2 2 BB57.3 1
57.4 0
59: 1 Main loop failed CT large
CV; 1 main loop failed CT
small CV; 1 main loop failed
CT large CV, or shutdown.
Output state 5.9
59.1 3
59.2 2 U
59.3 1
59.4 0
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system capabilities, discussed in section 2.4, was utilized
to model the shutdown event sequences. For each main loop
operating state it was determined whether the main loops would
be available for a sufficient time to allow the auxiliary boil-
ers to reach their rated operating conditions. The available
main loops were then correctly combined with the available
auxiliary boilers. Also, it was determined when main loop
failure actually would occur so that the number of CACS loops
required for adequate core cooling was known. The actual main
loop operating times utilized in the ESD modelling are listed
in Table 3-IV. These times based on this author's best evalu-
ation of the main loop cooling system operation, and they
correspond to the worst condition of main loop isolation valve
by-pass. The operation of the CACS was assumed to occur (if
required) at the times listed, and if CACS failure occurred,
core meltdown was assumed to occur immediately.
Subsystem 8 represents the transfer of a main cooling
loop to decay heat removal operation using auxiliary boiler
steam. This process requires an available auxiliary boiler
and a number of valve operations. The correct combinations of
available auxiliary boilers and available main loops is accom-
plished by item 15. The branch points containing index 15
describe event sequences ending in main loop decay heat re-
moval operation. The CACS availability is described by branch
points containing index 10. These branch points end those
event sequences leading to either successful CACS operation
or to core meltdown.
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Table 3-IV
A List of the Main Loop Operating Times Used in the
ESD for Pressurized Shutdowns
Number of Conditions of Number of Main Loop
Main Loops Unavailable Available Operating Time
Available Main Loops Main Loops Used in ESD
With Feedwater (minutes)
3 30
3 2 30
1 30
0 30
1 Main loop failed 2 25
CT large CV, 1 20
or shutdown 0 15
2 1 Main loop failed 2 27
CT large CV 1 22
0 17
2 Main loops failed 1 6
CT large CVs 0 5
1 Main loop failed
1 CT large CV, 1 8
1 Main loop failed 0 7
CT small CV
1 Main loop available
following CT -- 5
imbalance condition
3 Main loops failed 
-- 10
CT small CVs
0 3 Main loops failed 
2
CT large CVs
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All those individual event sequences resulting from a
specific main loop operating state are given a similar index
name. For example, event sequences Kl through K6 correspond
to main loop operating state Dl. Those event sequences re-
sulting from main loop operating state D2 are labeled L.
These event sequence indexes are given in Table 3-III.
3.3-5 ESD Additional Items
The auxiliary boiler availability, and the CACS avail-
ability complete the parallel of the ESD and the event tree
of Figure 3.2. However, the ESD considers additional items
not contained in the event tree. These are:
1) Main Loop isolation valve operations,
2) Main Loop cooling system dependence on
support systems,
3) The possibility of starting initially failed
shutdown feedpumps or diesel generators during
the shutdown operations, and
4) The probability that off-site power is restored
in those event sequence paths which begin
without off-site power available.
These items are described briefly below. For- a more
detailed description, see Appendix A.
3.3-5-1 Main Loop Isolation Valve Operations
In the ESD modelling, main loop isolation valve
operations were considered for their possible effects on the
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core heat removal and on the main loop availability.
Failure to Close Resulting in Core By-Pass Flow
In the modelling of the reactor shutdown cooling operations,
a main loop failure eventually causes the helium circulator of that
main loop to cease functioning. If the isolation valve of this
main loop fails to close, the pressure rise created by the opera-
tion of the other circulators will cause a backflow of helium
through this failed main loop.
In a pressurized reactor shutdown, the amount of this by-pass
flow (which is diverted from the reactor core) is not large,
and it is compensated for slightly by an increase in the speed of
the operable circulators due to the decreased overall helium flow
resistance. In addition, the shutdown controllers on the operating
loops function to maintain acceptable helium temperatures by
increasing the circulator speed and thus the helium flow. These
effects tend to minimize any temperature transient due to the
isolation valve failure. However, the higher circulator speeds
will result in shorter steam generator inventory depletion times,
especially if no shutdown feedwater is provided.
The effect of main loop isolation valve failures on the main
loop cooling system performance was analyzed in reference 2, and
the resulting steam generator inventory depletion times are
summarized in Table 2-VIII.
Instead of modelling a number of parallel event paths
which were largely identical except for these main loop isola-
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tion valve failures, a single path was drawn, and the steam
generator inventory depletion time for the path was chosen
to include those cases where main loop isolation valve
failures occurred.
Main Loop Circulator Imbalance Conditions
During the shutdown cooling operations, a circulator-
turbine control valve failure will cause an out-of-balance
condition between the three main loop circulators. The circu-
lator with the failed control valve will quickly be operating
at a higher speed than the others because their control valves
are acting to reduce their speed in accordance with the de-
creased heat lead following a shutdown. This may cause the
loop isolation valves in the correctly functioning loops to
close, or it may result in the circulators being overpowered
or even reversed if their loop isolation valves fail to close.
Therefore, if the isolation valve in an operable loop
closes, it must re-open after the out-of-balance condition if
the loop is to remain operable. Also, the circulator and
its drive turbine must not be damaged due to the period of
operation behind the closed isolation valve. If the isolation
valve fails to close, during the out-of-balance condition,
then the circulator and drive turbine must remain operable
after the condition is past.
These isolation valve operations (and the main circula-
tor availabilities) are modelled on the appropriate event
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sequence paths by the branch points containing the index 17.
Both items 18 and 17 are combined to determine the number
of main loops that remain operable following an out-of-balance
condition.
3.3-5-2 Main Loop Support Systems
The continued operation of the main loop cooling
system is dependent upon correct functioning of a number of
support systems. These include the main circulator service
systems, the service water system, the reactor plant cooling
water system, and the instrument and service air system.
Main loop cooling system failures due to support system faults
are modelled in the event sequences by the branch points
containing the index 19.
3.3.-5-3 The Restoration of Initially Failed Shutdown
Feedpumps or Emergency Diesel Generators
In many event sequence paths, the operation of the
main loop cooling system may continue for at least thirty
minutes. In this interval, neither the availability of elec-
trical power to the main loop, nor the operation of the
shutdown feedpump are critical. In this time period, it
was felt that the potential existed for corrective action
which might start an initially failed shutdown feedpump, or
where the emergency electrical supply is necessary, start
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an initially failed diesel generator. The possible
occurrence of this corrective action is included in those
event paths where sufficient time exists (at least ten
minutes) by the branch points containing index 16.
3.3-5-4 The Restoration of Off-site Power
The availability of off-site power was included
in item B of the ESD. According to reference 3, there is
a rather high likelihood of restoration of a lost off-
site power source within the first thirty minutes of the
loss. Therefore, for those accident sequences which last
at least five minutes, the possibility of off-site power
being restored was included.
The likelihood of off-site power being restored was
estimated for six time intervals following the reactor shut-
down. (In all cases where off-site power is lost, it was
assumed lost concurrent with the reactor shutdown.) These
are: 1) within 30 minutes, 2) within 25 minutes, 3) within
20 minutes, 4) within 15 minutes, 5) within 10 minutes, and
6) within 5 minutes.
The branch points containing index 20 allow the consid-
eration of the restoration of off-site power. These are
placed in the event paths just before main loop failure occurs.
The restoration of off-site power could occur at any time
during the period of main loop operation, but this was
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assumed to make no difference to the main loop performance. Only
the availability of the CACS was altered by the restoration of
off-site power.
Because the auxiliary boilers are not powered from the
essential buses, restoration of off-site power only affects the
main loop performance if it occurs shortly after the reactor shut-
down. It was assumed that twenty minutes of main loop operation
following the restoration of off-site power was required to allow
the boilers to reach their rated conditions. These possible event
sequences were not modelled explicitly on the ESD, but they were
considered in the final analysis. The manner in which they were
included is discussed in Chapter 5. Powering the auxiliary boil-
ers from the essential buses is a potential design option which
was investigated. Therefore, for those accident sequences follow-
ing the loss of off-site power, the auxiliary boilers were mode-
lled so that they could be treated as being powered from either
the non-essential bus or from the essential buses, and
many of these event sequence paths contain branch points with the
index 15.
3.3-6 ESD Outcome Categories - Pressurized Shutdowns
Each event sequence path ends with an index name for that
path, and those event sequences which lead to similar outcomes are
grouped into specific categories. These outcome categories
describe the operating state of the shutdown cooling systems for
decay heat removal operation. Specifically, for the pressurized
reactor shutdowns, there are nine different outcome categories.
Table 3-V summarizes these outcome categories.
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Table 3-V
ESD Outcome Categories for the Pressurized Reactor Case
System Success
Category 1.
Category 2.
Adequate decay heat removal is provided indefinitely
by the main loop cooling system.
Adequate decay heat removal is provided indefinitely
by the CACS at 15 minutes or more after the shutdown.
Category 3. Adequate decay heat removal is provided indefinitely
by the CACS starting in the interval between 2 and 15
minutes after shutdown.
System Failure
Category 4.
Category 5.
Category 6.
Category 7.
Category 8.
Category 9.
Forced circulation provided by only one CACS loop
in the interval between 2 and 15 minutes after the
shutdown.
Loss of adequate decay heat removal in the interval
between 20 and 30 minutes after the shutdown,
Loss of adequate decay heat removal in the interval
between 15 and 20 minutes after the shutdown,
Loss of adequate decay heat removal in the interval
between 10 and 15 minutes after the shutdown,
Loss of adequate decay heat removal in the interval
between 5 and 10 minutes after the shutdown, and
Loss of adequate decay heat removal within 5 minutes
after the shutdown.
145
Three of the categories combine those event sequences which
result in the successful decay heat removal operation of one of
the shutdown cooling systems. Decay heat removal can be provided
by either the main loop cooling system, two CACS loops before 15
minutes following the shutdown, or only one CACS loop after this
time.
If only one CACS loop is available prior to 15 minutes
following the shutdown, a core meltdown was assumed to occur.
Present analyses by GA indicate that adequate helium circulation
can be provided by a single auxiliary circulator, but the heat
removal capability of one auxiliary heat exchanger is not suffi-
cient to prevent core meltdown. All the event sequences leading
to this outcome were combined into a single category.
Those event sequences leading to a complete loss of decay
heat removal were grouped into categories depending upon the
time interval in which cooling system failure was assumed to
occur. These are mostly five minute intervals for the pressurized
shutdowns.
A complete listing of the event sequences which comprise each
outcome category is provided in Table 3-VI. It should be noted,
that while outcome category 9 consists of core-melt accident
sequences which occur within five minutes of the shutdown, no core
meltdowns occur before two minutes. This can be seen from Table
3-IV. None of the failures modelled in the ESD eliminate the
main loop cooling system in less than two minutes.
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Table 3-VI
A List of the Categorization of the Individual
Event Sequences for Pressurzied Shutdowns
Category 1. Adequate decay heat removal is provided indefinitely
by the main loop cooling system.
Kl
Ll, L6
Ml, M6, M13
01, 012
P1, P8, P17, P26
W1, W12
X1, X8, X17, X26
Category 2. Adequate decay heat removal is provided indefinitely
by the CACS at 15 minutes or more after the shutdown.
K2
L2, L7, L9
M2, M7, M9, M14, M16
N1, N5, N7, Nll, N13, N20
02, 013, 015
P2, P9, P11, P18, P20, P27, P29, P35, P37
Ql, Q7, Q9, Q15, Q17, Q23, Q25, Q38
W2, W13, W15
X2, X9, X1l, X18, X20, X27, X29
Yl, Y7, Y9, Y15, Y17, Y23, Y25, Y31, Y33
Category 3. Adequate decay heat removal is provided indefinitely
by the CACS starting in the interval between 2 and
15 minutes after shutdown.
K4
L14, Lll
M4, Mll
N3, N9
o4, 06, o8, 010, 017, 019, 021, 023, 037, 040
P4, P6, P13, P15, P31, P33, P39, P41
Q3, Q5, Q11, Q13, Q42
Rl, R3, R5, R7, R9, Rll, R13, R15
Sl, S3, S5, S7, S9, Sl, S13, S15, S17, 319, S21, S23,
S31, 354
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T1, T3, T5, T7, T18, T21, T24
Ul, U3, U5, U7
V1, V3
W4, W6, W8, W10, W17, W19
X4, x6, X13, X15, X22, X24, X35, X37, X47
Y3, Y5, Yll, Y13, Y19, Y21, Y52, Y56, Y60
Zl, Z3, Z5, Z7, Z9, Zll, Z13, Z15, Z17, Z19, Z21,
Z23, Z25, Z27, Z39, Z41, Z63, Z66
AAl, AA3, AA5, AA7, AA9, AAll, AA13, AA15, AA17,
AA19, AA21, AA23, AA25, AA27, AA29, AA31, AA33,
AA35, AA47, AA83, AA87
BB1, BB3, BB5, BB7, BB9, BB11, BB13, BB15
CC1, CC3, C05, 007, 009, 0011, 0013, 0015
DD1, DD3, DD5, DD7, DD9, DDll, DD13, DD15, DD17, DD19,
DD21, DD23, DD31, DD54
Category 4. Forced circulation provided by only one CACS loop in
the interval between 2 and 15 minutes after shutdown.
K5
L5, L12
M5, M12, M18
N4, N10, N15
05, 07, 09 oil, oi8, 020, 022, 024, 025, 027, 038, o41
P5, P7, Pl4, P16, P22, P214, P32, P34, P4o, P42
Q4, Q6, Q12, Q14, Q19, Q21, Q27, A29, Q43
R2, R4, R6, R8, R10 R12, R14, R16, R17, R19, R21
S2, S4, S6, S8, 310, S12, S14, Sl6, S18, S20, 322, S24,
S25, S27, S29, S32, 333, S35, 337, 355
T2, T4, T6, T8, T9, Tll, T19, T22, T25
U2, u4, u6, u8, U9, Ull
V2, V4, V5
W5, W7, W9, Wli, W18, W20
X5, X7, X14, X16, X23, X25, X31, X33, X36, X38, X48
Y4, Y6, Y12, Y14, Y20, Y22, Y27, Y29, Y35, Y37, Y39, Y41,
Y53, Y57, Y61
Z2, Z4, Z6, z8, Z10, Z12, Zl4, z16, Z18, Z20, Z22, Z24, Z26,
Z28, Z29, Z31, Z33, Z35, Z37, Z4o, z42, Z43, Z45, z64,
Z67
AA2, AA4, AA6, AA8, AA10, AA12, AA14, AAl6, AAl8, AA20,
AA22, AA24, AA26, AA28, AA30, AA32, AA34, AA36, AA37,
AA39, AA41, AA43, AA45, AA48, AA49, AA51, AA53, AA55,
AA57, AA84, AA88
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BB2, BB4,
BB19,
CC2, CC4,
CC19,
DD2, DD4,
DD20,0
DD35,
Category 5.
Category 6.
Category 7.
Category 8.
BB6, BB8, BB10, BB12, BBl4, BB16, BB17,
BB21, BB23
CC6, CC8, CC10, CC12, CCl4, cC16, CC17,
CC21
DD6, DD8, DD10, DD12, DD14, DD16, DD18,
DD22, DD24, DD25, DD27, DD29, DD32, DD33,
DD37, DD55
Loss of adequate decay heat removal in the interval
between 20 and 30 minutes after the shutdown.
K3
L3, L8, L10
M3, M8, M10, M15, M17
N2, N6, N8, N12, N14
03, 014, 016
P3, P10, P12, P19, P21, P28, P30, P36, P38
W3, wl4, w16
X3, X10, X12, X19, X21, X28, X30
Loss of adequate decay heat removal in the interval
between 15 and 20 minutes after the shutdown.
N21, N22
Q2, Q8, Ql0, Q16, Q18, Q24, Q26
Y2, Y8, Y10, Y16, Y18, Y24, Y26, Y32, Y34
Loss of adequate decay heat removal in the interval
between 10 and 15 minutes after the shutdown.
Q39, Q40
R18, R23, R26, R27, R30
S26, S34, S41, S4, S45, S48, S49, S52, S53
Y54, Y55
Loss of adequate decay heat removal in the interval
between 5 and 10 minutes after the shutdown.
K6
L13, L1 4
M19, M20, M21
N16, N17, N18, N19
026, 028, 029, 030, 031, 032, 033, 034, 035, 039, 042
P23, P43, P44, P45, P47, P49
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Table 3-VI cont.
Q20, Q28, Q31, Q33, Q34, Q35, Q36, Q44, Q45
R20, R24, R25, R28
S28, S36, S39, S42, S43, S46, S50, S56, S57
T10, T12, T13, T14, T15, T16, T17, T20, T23, T26, T27
U10, Ul3, U17
W21, W23, W24, W25
X32, X39, X41, X42, X43, X45, X49
Y28, Y36, Y40, Y42, Y43, Y45, Y46, Y48, Y50, Y58, Y59
Y62
Z30, Z32, Z44, Z46, Z47, z48, Z50, Z51, Z54, Z55, Z56
Z61, Z62, Z65, Z68
AA38, AA40, AA42, AA44, AA46, AA50, AA52, AA59, AA63,
AA64, AA65, AA69, AA70, AA71, AA75, AA76, AA77,
AA81, AA82, AA85, AA86, AA89, AA90
BB19, BB20, BB25, BB28, BB29, BB33, BB34
CC18, CC20, CC23, CC24, CC26, CC27, CC28, CC30
DD26, DD28, DD34, DD36, DD39, DD41, DD42, DD44, DD45
DD46, DD48, DD49, DD50, DD52, DD53, DD56, DD57
, Z60,
Category 9. Loss of adequate decay heat removal
within 5 minutes after the shutdown.
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P25, P46, P48, P50
Q22, Q30, Q32, Q37
R22, R29
S30, S38, s4O, S47, S51
U12, U14, Ul5, U16, U18
v6, V7, v8, V9
W22, W26
X34, X40, X47, X49, X51
Y38, Y40, Y47, Y49, Y51
Z34, Z36, Z38, Z49, Z52, Z53, Z57, Z58, Z59
AA54, AA56, AA58, AA6o, AA61, AA62, AA66, AA67, AA68, AA72
AA73, AA74, AA78, AA79, AA8o
BB22, BB24, BB26, BB26, BB30, BB31, BB32, BB35
CC22, CC25, 0029
DD30, DD38, DD40, DD43, DD47, DD51
,
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3.4 ESD Modelling - Shutdowns Following a Depressurization
Accident
3.4-1 Introduction
Failure of a PCRV penetration closure seal will result
in the rapid depressurization of the reactor primary coolant.
Because helium is a single phase fluid, it cannot be completely
expulsed from the reactor. The high pressure helium inside
the PCRV will expand into the containment volume, which
contains air at atmospheric pressure, and an equilibrium
pressure will be reached in the combined primary coolant and
containment volumes.
The decrease in the helium density which occurs due to
the depressurization has a large effect on the performance of
the reactor cooling systems. A reactor shutdown is required,
because the main circulators can no longer circulate a suffi-
ciently large mass flow of helium. The main loop shutdown
cooling capabilities and the CACS operating performance are
both affected by the decrease in the helium density.
In order to account for the changes in the shutdown cooling
system capabilities, a separate ESD was constructed which
modelled the reactor shutdown cooling operations following a
depressurization accident.
3.4-2 ESD - Phase One
For reactor shutdowns initiated by a PCRV depressuriza-
tion accident, the initial shutdown operations, which are
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modelled as Phase One of the ESD (Figure 3.3), are essen-
tially the same as those resulting from any pressurized
shutdown initiating event.
A single main cooling loop is not capable of providing
adequate decay heat removal in the initial period following
a depressurization accident. Thus, those operating states
with only a single main loop available need not be combined
with available shutdown feedpumps,. and the main loop opera-
ting states F, H and I from the pressurized shutdowns do not
exist. The output states with only a single main loop
available (5.3, 5.6 and 5.8) each lead to only four shutdown
cooling states which correspond to the number of essential
buses energized. Table 3-VII describes only these three
main loop operating states which differ from the pressurized
shutdowns.
The depressurized accident sequences were all given index
names similar to those in the pressurized shutdowns, but with
a D prefix. For example, main loop operating state Dl leads
to depressurized accident sequences labeled DK.
3.4-3 ESD - Phase Two
The modelling of the shutdown heat removal process in
phase two of the ESD for the depressurized shutdowns follows
the same logic used in the pressurized shutdowns. This
modelling is shown in Figures 3.5 a,b and c. However, there
are some major differences which will be described.
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Table 3-VII
ESD Depressurized Phase I Output States Which Differ
from the Pressurized Shutdowns
Main Loop Operating Number of Main Loops With Depressurized
States Index and Essential AC Power; Accident
Description Shutdown Feedwater Not Sequence Index
Considered
53: 1 Main Loop
Available;
2 Main Loops
Failed CT
Small CV's.
From output
state 5.3
53.1 3
53.2 2 DR
53.3 1
53.4 0
56: 1 Main Loop
Available;
1 Main Loop
Failed CT
Large CV, or
Shutdown.
From output
state 5.6
56.1 3
56.2 2 DZ
56.3 1
56.4 0
58: 1 Main Loop
Available;
1 Main Loop
Failed CT
Large CV, or
Shutdown.
From output
state 5.8
58.1 3
58.2 2 DC
58.3 1
58.4 0
22. ~
224
POL
/ZOV, ,~dh'e2 2.~ ' 22/
~V2V~ P22/ 2009 ,',liZep '~f t  22.2
229
22/h
P74
22.5- r
22.
22.2 22.3
4dIN lOP ~ O~L #-' Pv
PMPro
f/UE3. £sa jk' p E4UA/E 9,61',9Af A',9-5E 7,010'S," ,/2r/Af ~C~IR-47-
153
L---4p.e-6->
AF3
154
di 2 
AC A
21./ nilA/2A'AIN 2V J,,
7', p'W, ow '
Z0.L 224z Coof 'Id-J
,4c/OO',< ..k ZA19-/6
PuVZ
L2,1 AWzq
22.24
AC 54163 pA/A-
2 ,ap.,cVO
2 YIA/A/ 14091
.4AZeA'OoWFC4
2223
140,- .0 fC21A'2
"lOAF .4A 0.
/ 4/A/00f25 0,0
/2o9p/ .0P
S'V32C ./M V-5 
.2
/ ,V,V /00,0w
AdA"-:f vo
3OFA/Z6
/ A/'40zr-'
YA4,- v AEAS 47:.2
/Zw 
0
40o
2J
~ P734' ,t',Spro
p4 532 C-S, 2104.3i1
q A,4c 0
AC ,00.4007
22Z
"0'a ep 2336
Avo'0 AC ,'A Pq
2 ~'v 3/2.0
SAl '644 24V
~4'0 Acul'w6
532I IA
2AfClAl 40-*^
e~fA b2.21
1.9f~l-62ZP42 MA/A' Z 0i3%
,~~ 4z6,/4' 2 ~ 01
P3,2o ow<2
2s"Iv -, ap,
X-14ACPaE 4'
/;RE . §c- EVEA/T SEiu/EA/CE 2/#9M -- //ASE 7/4/2;
//v/7/6Z L X' t/919/Z 6.gZg
155
2A4A .la fc
A .'A/AP219Y
7" /52qfo 4/5YAC
7Y 7 ' ,46
156
3.4-3-1 Containment Equalization Pressure
The operating capabilities of both the main loop
cooling system and the CACS are affected by the containment
equalization pressure. Three ranges of containment equaliza-
tion pressure were selected. The event sequence paths were
branched according to the specific containment equalization
pressure range, and the main loop capabilities and CACS
capabilities could then be modelled accordingly.
Figure 3.6 (4 )shows the variation in the maximum clad
hot-spot temperature during a depressurization accident as a
function of the PCRV leak size. Notice that over a large range
of leak sizes, there is only a few hundred degree rise in the
clad temperature. Plotted in the figure are curves for three
main loops operating and for two main loops operating at
a number of containment equalization pressures. Points off
this figure were used to construct the lines on Figure 3.7.
This latter.figure shows the variation in the maximum clad
hot-spot temperature as a function of the containment equaliza-
tion pressure. Lines are plotted for three loop and for
two loop operation and for 50 in2 and 100 in2 leak sizes.
From Figure 3.7, three ranges of the containment equali-
zation pressure were chosen. These are:
1) greater than 1.50 atmosphere
2) between 1.25 and 1.50 atmospheres, and
3) less than 1.25 atmospheres.
2600
MAXIMUM CLADDING HOT-SPOT TEMPERATURE
2400 - DURING DEPRESSURIZATION ACCIDENT
3 LOOPS, 1.0 ATM B.P.
2200 ---- - -
2 LOOPS, 1.68 ATM B.P.
* 2000- 2 LOOPS, 1.87 ATM B.P.
1800 -3 LOOPS, 1.68 ATM B.P.
1600- 16oo -3 LOOPS, 1.87 ATM B.P.
1400 - 130% CIRCULATOR SPEED
+ 20% DECAY-HEAT MARGIN
1200
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200
LEAK AREA (IN. 2
FIGURE 3.6 Parametric survey of depressurization accidents beyond the design basis
1.25 1.50 1.75 2.0
Containment Equalization Pressure (atmospheres)
Figure 3.7
V-
Maximum Clad Temperature Following a Depressurization
Accident as a Function of the Containment Equalization
Pressure
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11400
1200
0
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These were based upon the following considerations.
1) For a leak size greater than 50 in 2, the clad melting
temperature (2500 F) is exceeded if only two main loops are
operating and the containment equalization pressure is less
than 1.25 atmospheres.
2) In the range between 1.25 and 1.50 atmospheres two main
loops may be able to prevent gross core melting, but because
the circulators would most likely be operating near the over-
speed trip setpoint, the operation of the circulator overspeed
protection device becomes an important consideration.
3) Three main loops are adequate at any containment equalization
pressure, however, below 1.25 atmospheres the circulator
speed may approach the overspeed trip setpoint, and the
possible operation of the overspeed protection device is
considered.
The branching of the accident sequence paths according to
the containment equalization pressure was accomplished in the ESD
by those branch points containing index 21.
3 .4-3-2 Main Loop Operating Capabilities
Table 2-IX summarized the steam generator inventory
depletion times for main loop operation following a depressuri-
zation accident. It listed these times for the design contain-
ment equalization pressure of 1.8 atmospheres, and for a pressure
of 1.0 atmospheres. In the ESD modelling, the accident paths
with a containment equalization pressure greater than 1.5 were
modelled using the depletion times corresponding to the design
case. The depletion times for those accident paths in the
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pressure range of 1.5 to 1.25 atmospheres were arbitrarily reduced
by five minutes, and those paths with a pressure below 1.25
atmospheres were modelled using the values corresponding to 1.0
atmospheres.
These values are summarized in Table 3-VIII.
3.4-3-3 CACS Cooling Capabilities
The CACS cooling capabilities used in the modelling of
the depressurization shutdown sequences are listed in Table 3-IX.
For a containment equalization pressure greater than 1.50 atmos-
pheres, the CACS capabilities at the design pressure of 1.8
atmospheres were used. These were taken from reference 2, which
compared the CACS core flow capabilities against that core flow
required to maintain a maximum clad temperature at or below
2200 0 F. The information in this reference was also used to extra-
polate the CACS cooling capabilities at lower containment equali-
zation pressures. Because the clad melting temperature is
2500 F, these core flow requirements give somewhat conservative
results.
Figure 3.8 is a plot of the helium mass-flow through the
core required to maintain the maximum clad temperature at or
below 2200UF.(2) At 1.8 atmospheres, each CACS loop is capable of
generating 11 lb/sec of helium flow. Between 1.50 and 1.25
atmospheres, a helium flow of 8 lb/sec per CACS loop was used,
and below 1.25 atmospheres, a value of 6 lb/sec was employed.
These values were based on the assumption that the auxiliary cir-
culators are constant volume machines operating at a constant
speed, and that the helium mass flow will decrease in direct
proportion to the decrease in the helium density.
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Table 3-VIII
Main Loop Operating Times Used in the ESD
Modelling of Shutdowns Following a Depressurization Accident
Number of Number of Main Loop Operating Time (minutes)
Main Loops Available
Available Main Loops CEP 1.50-
With Feedwater CEP>1.50atm. 1.25atm. CEP<1.25atm.
3 30 30 30
2 30 30 25
1 30 25 20
0 30 20 15
2 25 20
2 1 20 15 4
0 15 10
1 -- 4 3 2
0 -- 2 2 2
CEP = containment equalization pressure
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At the design containment equalization pressure, core-flow-
bypass ratios were calculated from the core flows given in refer-
ence 2. These same ratios were used at the lower equalization
pressures to generate the CACS capabilities in Table 3-IX a and b.
Table 3-IXa gives the number of CACS loops capable of maintaining
adequate core flow as a function of the time interval during which
main loop failure occurs, the number of main loop isolation valves
failed to open (allowing core-bypass flow), and the containment
equalization pressure. Table 3-IXb lists the CACS capabilities
given one CACS loop has failed and its loop isolation valve is
open allowing core-bypass flow. Note that for this particular
situation, the two remaining CACS loops are not capable of core
cooling before 30 minutes if the containment equalization pressure
is below 1.25 atmospheres.
The CACS availability for the various time intervals con-
tainment equalization pressures, and main loop isolation valve
failures was determined separately and is modelled in the ESD by
the hexagons containing the index 22. Appendix B contains a
description of how these availabilities were modelled.
3.4-3-4 Main Loop Isolation Valve Operations
As in the pressurized shutdowns, the effect of core-
flow-bypass, due to loop isolation valve failures, on the main
loop cooling system performance was not explicitly modelled
in the ESD. This effect was incorporated in the steam generator
inventory depletion times used.
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Table 3-IXa
CACS Cooling Capabilities Following a
Depressurization Accident
Time Interval Number of Main Number of CACS Loops
Following Shutdown Loop Isolation Capable of Core Cooling
During Which Main Valves Bypassing
Loop Failure Occurs CEP> CEP 1.50- CEP<
1.50atm. 1.25atm. 1.25atm.
Before 0 3,2 3 3
2 minutes 1 3 3 --
2
3 -- -- --
2 to 5 0 3,2 3,2 3
minutes 1 3,2 3 --
2 3 -- --
3 -- -- --
5 to 10 0 3,2 3,2 3
minutes 1 3,2 3 3
2 3 3 --
3 3 -- --
10 to 15 0 3,2 3,2 3
minutes 1 3,2 3,2 3
2 3,2 3 --
3 3
15 to 20 0 3,2,1 3,2 3
minutes 1 3,2 3,2 3
2 3,2 3 --
3 3 3 --
20 to 25 0 3,2,1 3,2 3,2
minutes 1 3,2 3,2 3
2 3,2 3 3
3 3 3 --
25 to 30 0 3,2,1 3,2 3,2
minutes 1 3,2 3,2 3
2 3,2 3,2 3
3 3,2 3 --
CEP = containment equalization pressure
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Table 3-IXb
CACS Cooling Capabilities Following a
Depressurization Accident
One Auxiliary Circulator Failed
and its Loop Isolation Valve Open Allowing Core Bypass Flow
Time Interval Number of Main Number of CACS Loops
Following Shutdown Loop Isolation Capable of Core Cooling
During Which Main Valves Bypassing
Loop Failure Occurs CEP 1.50atm. CEP 1.50-1.25atm.
O to 10 0 -- --
minutes 1-- --
2 -- --
3 -- --
10 tol15 0 2 --
minutes 1-- --
2 -- --
3 -- --
15 to 20 0 2 --
minutes 12 --
2 -- --
3 -- --
20 to 25 0 2 2
minutes 12 --
2 -- --
3 -- --
25 to 30 0 2 2
minutes 12 --
2 2 --
3 -- --
IMI 2
CEP = containment equalization pressure
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Circulator-turbine imbalance conditions were not
modelled for shutdowns following a depressurization accident.
Following any circulator-turbine control valve failure, the
circulator was assumed to quickly overspeed and be tripped by
the circulator overspeed protection device.
The effect of main loop isolation valve failures on the
performance of the CACS was specifically incorporated into the
CACS availability as described in the previous section.
3.4-3-5 Restart of Initially Failed Shutdown Feedpumps
The possibility of restarting initially failed shutdown feed-
pumps was not considered in the shutdown operations following a
depressurization accident. The time available for such actions
is somewhat shorter in this case, but more importantly, the
results from the pressurized shutdowns indicated that the effect
of restart operations on the probability of a core meltdown was
small. Therefore the modelling effort for the depressurization
shutdowns was not felt to be justified.
3 .4.-3-6 Main Loop Support Systems
Main loop cooling system failures due to support system
faults were modelled exactly as in the pressurized shutdown
sequences by branch points containing the index 19. As
in the pressurized shutdowns, the operation on the support
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systems is dependent upon essential AC electrical power.
However, the depressurization accident was felt to present
an additional likelihood of main loop cooling system failure.
This is especially important due to potential effects related
to main circulators operating at speeds near their overspeed
set point. Thus, for three main loops operating below a
containment equalization pressure of 1.25 atmospheres, and
for two main loops operating between 1.50 and 1.25 atmospheres,
an additional term was included in the main loop cooling system
failure probability. This is evidenced by the fact that the
branch points for these event paths contain different index
values. This term could then be varied to investigate the
effect on the probability of a core meltdown of reduced circu-
lator reliability when operating at or near the overspeed setpoint.
3.4-3-7 Additional Concerns
Of significant concern during a PCRV depressuriza-
tion, is the effect of the depressurization forces on the PCRV
internals. Both the main loop and auxiliary loop components,
such as diffuser vanes, steam generator and heat exchanger
shrouds, and loop isolation valves and valve structural
supports are to be designed to withstand the depressurization
forces due to a DBDA. The probability that the PCRV inter-
nals would remain intact following a DBDA was considered to
be high. These failures were, therefore, not modelled in
the ESD. However, because of this assumption, the ESD cannot
be completely valid for depressuization accidents greater
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than the DBDA.
3.4-4 PCRV Depressurization Leak Size
Depressurization accidents are assumed to result from
failures of PCRV penetrations or penetration closures. These
penetrations range in size from small instrument line connec-
tions to the reactor-cavity and steam-generator-cavity clo-
sures. Table 3-X is a list of the PCRV penetrations and
the potential flow area through each penetration.
The present design basis depressurization accident (DBDA)
is assumed to be initiated by the failure of the primary
holddown mechanism of either the reactor-cavity closure, or
one of the steam-generator-cavity closures. The arrangement
of these two types of closures is shown in Figures 3.9 and
3.10. The primary holddown mechanism consists of a bolt and
toggle arrangement. The secondary holddown is provided by
the breech-lock arrangement of the closure and penetration
which requires the rotation of the closure for engagement or
disengagement. Each holddown system transfers the pressure
load of the closure to a different portion of the PCRV.
With the failure of the primary holddown device, the
closure plug will shift slightly but will remain essentially
in place due to the secondary holddown mechanism. The closure
seal is assumed broken and helium is free to escape along the
annular passage between the penetration liner and closure plug.
A piston-ring type of flow restrictor is provided in this
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Table 3-X
A List of PCRV Penetrations and
Potential Flow Areas
Penetration Potential 2
Flow Area (in2
Steam Generator
Seal weld failure 8.9
Flow through seal rings 25.0
One superheater tube sheet 1.2
One resuperheater tube sheet 1.3
Circulator flow restrictor 4.1
Central Cavity
Seal weld failure 7.5
Flow through seal rings 21.0
One control rod penetration 1.6
Auxiliary Heat Exchanger
Flow restrictor 3.8
PCRV Bottom
Fuel-handling machine 1.3
Fuel service machine 0.65
Fuel loading 0.33
Fuel unloading 0.33
Feedwater 1.4
Relief Valve
One tube, 5 in. diameter
and 40 ft. long 20
' FLOW RESTRICTOR
PENETRATION
SHEAR ANCHORS
-BAYONET LOCK
(BACK UP HOLDOWN LOCKING SYSTEM)
-THERMAL BARRIER
FIGURE 3.9 A Cross-section of the PCRV Central Cavity Closure
CD
TENDONS
10 FT
SHIELDING
TENDONS
HELIUM CIRCULATOR
STEAM PIPING
FIGURE 3.10 A Cross-section of a Steam Generator Cavity Closure
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annular passage which is designed to limit the leak area
for the depressurization. The present DBDA leak size of
25 in2 requires a flow restrictor clearance around the
12 foot diameter penetrations of roughly 0.05 inches.
However, a 100 in2 leak size would require a clearance of
over 3/16 of an inch around the entire circumference.
Large Leak Sizes
The ESD of the reactor shutdown operations following
a depressurization accident was developed using information
2based on a PCRV leak size of 25 in2. For this leak size,
the depressurization is complete in approximately four min-
utes, and the bulk of the shutdown heat removal operations
are carried out at the containment equalization pressure.
However, the present modelling of the shutdown operations
should be acceptable if a larger DBDA leak size, up to
100 in 2, is chosen. This is based on the following reason-
ing.
1) As shown in Figure 3.6, the increase in the maxi-
mum clad temperature with increasing leak size, for the
acceptable main loop operating states is below the damage
limit. Acceptable core temperatures can thus be maintained
at these larger leak sizes.
2) The required main loop pumping power will increase
slightly with the leak size, however, this effect on the
steam generator inventory depletion times should be less than
the present uncertainties in these values due to potential
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shutdown controller design trade-offs.
3) CACS operating performance is affected through the
increase in air ingress with larger leak sizes. Air in-
gress into the PCRV, due primarily to natural convection
forces, increases the reactor coolant molecular
weight and decreases its specific heat and thermal
(5)
conductivity. However, the effects of air ingress will be
required to be fully considered in the design basis of the
CACS. 6) Also, the modelling of the CACS only states the
number of loops capable of core cooling. The present auxi-
liary cooling loop design bases may be changed to account
for such effects as air ingress, but this should not greatly
affect the modelling.
Intermediate Leak Sizes
PCRV leak sizes in the range between 1 in2 and 25 in2
will result in depressurizations which occur, to a varying
extent, during the initial reactor shutdown heat removal
operations. The PCRV depressurization time as a function of
leak sizes in this range is shown in Figure 3.11.
The varying reactor coolant pressure results in an
additional complexity in any attempt to model the reactor
shutdown and decay heat removal operations. This modelling
was not undertaken, and these leak sizes were conservatively
analyzed using the ESD developed for the large PCRV leak sizes.
Small Leak Sizes
For leak sizes less than 1 in 2, the PCRV depressurization
1000
%0 100 -
100
10-
0.1 10 100
PCRV Leak Area (in 2
Figure 3.11 PCRV Depressurization Time as a Function of Leak Size
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time is greater than 100 minutes. The initial shutdown and
decay heat removal operations will occur in a partially
pressurized reactor, and the main loop cooling system per-
formance should not be greatly affected in at least the
first 20 to 30 minutes. This range of PCRV leaks was not
felt to cause any appreciable degradation of the main loop
or CACS performance, and so no special modelling of these
reactor shutdown sequences was done.
3.4-5 ESD Outcome Categories - Depressurized Case
The final event sequences for the depressurized shut-
downs are grouped into 7 outcome categories. These are
3 system success categories and 4 system failure categories.
These categories are summarized in Table 3-XI.
Table 3-XII lists the individual accident sequences,
by their ESD index, for each of the outcome categories. As
with ouctome category 9 for pressurized accident sequences,
outcome category D7 does not contain core-melt accident
sequences which occur before two minutes. This is because
in the ESD modelling no main loop failures occur before this
time.
.3.5 Event Sequence Categories
As described in the previous sections, the final event
sequences were all collapsed into a few outcome categories
which describe the overall plant status. Lists of these
categories are given in Tables 3-V and 3-XI. The event
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sequences combined in these outcome categories lead to either
success or failure of the shutdown cooling systems. Thus, the
ESD results in the same general conclusions as the event tree of
Figure 3.1, but in much greater detail.
The sum of the probability of all the system failure
categories (categories 4 through 9 for the pressurized case,
and categories D4 through D7 for the depressurized case) re-
presents the probability that the shutdown cooling systems fail
to provide adequate decay heat removal. The analysis of the
shutdown and decay heat removal operations focused primarily on
these events.
However, the event sequences which lead to the success of
the main loop cooling system were also felt to be of signifi-
cance. Unreliability of the main loop cooling system places
greater importance on the reliability of the CACS. Therefore,
outcome category 1 was watched closely in the analysis of the
shutdown and decay heat removal operations.
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Table 3-XI
ESD Outcome Categories for the Depressurized Reactor Case
System Success
Category Dl.
Category D2.
Category D3.
Adequate decay heat removal provided indefinitely
by the main loop cooling system.
Adequate decay heat removal provided indefinitely
by the CACS, main loop failure occurs after 15
minutes of the shutdown,
Adequate decay heat removal provided indefinitely
by the CACS, main loop failure occurs between 2 and
15 minutes of the shutdown.
System Failure
Category D4.
Category D5.
Category D6.
Loss of adequate decay heat removal in the interval
between 20 and 30 minutes of the shutdown,
Loss of adequate decay heat removal in the interval
between 10 and 20 minutes of the shutdown,
Loss of adequate decay heat removal in the interval
between 5 and 10 minutes of the shutdown, and
Category D7. Loss of adequate decay heat removal within 5
minutes after the shutdown
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Table 3-XII
A List of the Individual Shutdown Event
Sequence Following a Depressurization Accident
Category Dl. Adequate decay heat removal provided indefinitely
by the main loop cooling system.
DK1, DK4
DLl, DL4, DLll, DL16
DM1, DM4, DM11, DM16, DM24, DM29
D01, D04, DOll, D016
DPi, DP10, DP23
DW1, DW4, DWl1, DW16
DX1, DX10, DX23
Category D2. Adequate decay heat removal provided indefinitely
by the CACS, main loop failure occurs after 15
minutes of the shutdown.
DK2,
DL2,
DM2,
DN1,
D02,
DP2,
DQl,
DW2,
DX2,
DYl,
Category D3.
DK5
DL5,
DM5,
DN3,
D05,
DP4,
DQ3,
DW5,
DX4,
DY3,
DL12, DLl4, DLl7, DL19
DM12, DM14, DM17, DM19, DM25, DM27, DM30
DN9, DNl1, DN13, DN15, DN20, DN22, DN24
D012, D014, D017, D019
DPll, DP13, DP15, DP17, DP24, DP26, DP28
DQl2, DQ14, DQl6, DQ18, DQ24, DQ26, DQ27
DW12, DW14, DW17, DW19
DX11, DX13, DX15, DX17, DX24, DX26, DX28
DY12, DYl4, DY16, DYl8, DY24, DY26, DY27
Adequate decay heat removal provided indefinitely
by the CACS, main loop failure occurs between 2
and 15 minutes of the shutdown.
DK9, DKll
DL9, DL21, DL24, DL26
DM9, DM21, DM35, DM37
DN7, DN17, DN29, DN30, DN32, DN35, DN37
D09, D021, D023
DP8, DP19, DP21
DQ7, DQ9, DQ20, DQ22, DQ32, DQ36, DQ38
DR3, DR5, DR7, DR9
DT3, DT5, DT7
DU3, DU5, DU7
DV3, DV5, DV7
DK7,
DL7,
DM7,
DN5,
D07,
DP6,
DQ5,
DR1,
DT1,
DUl,
DV1,
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Table 3-XII cont.
DW7, DW9, DW21, DW23
DX6, DX9, DX19, DX21
DY5, DY7, DY9, DY20, DY22, DY32, DY36, DY38
DZl, DZ3, DZ5, DZ7, DZ9
DB1, DB3, DB5, DB7
DCl, DC3, DC5, DC7, DC9
Category D4. Loss of adequate decay heat removal in the interval
between 20 and 30 minutes of the shutdown.
DK3, DK6
DL3, DL6, DL13, DL15, DL18, DL20
DM3, DM6, DM13, DM15, DM18, DM20, DM26, DM28, DM31,
DM32
DN2, DN4, DN10, DN12, DN14, DN16, DN21, DN23, DN25,
DN26
D03, DO6, D013, D015, D018, D020
DP3, DP12, DP14, DP25, DP27
DW3, DW6, DW13, DW15, DWl8, DW20
DX3, DX12, DX14, DX25, DX27
Category D5. Loss of adequate decay heat removal in the interval
between 10 and 20 minutes of the shutdown.
DP5, DP16, DP18, DP29, DP30
DQ2, DQ4, DQll, DQ13, DQ15, DQ17, DQ19, DQ25, DQ28
DQ29
DX5, DX16, DX18, DX29, DX30
DY2, DY4, DYll, DYl3, DYl5, DYl7, DYl9, DY25, DY28,
DY29
Category D6. Loss of adequate decay heat removal in the interval
between 5 and 10 minutes of the shutdown.
DK8, DK10, DK12
DL8, DL10, DL22, DL23, DL25, DL27
DM8, DM10, DM22, DM23, DM33, DM34, DM36, DM38
DN6, DN8 DN18 DN19, DN27, DN28, DN31, DN33, DN34,
DN31, DN34, DN39
D08, D010, D022, D024
DP7, DP9, DP20, DP22, DP31, DP32
DQ6, DQ8, DQ21, DQ23, DQ30, DQ31, DQ35, DQ37, DQ39,
DQ40
DW8, DW10, DW22, DW24
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Table 3-XII cont.
DX7, DX9, DX20, DX22, DX31, DX32
DY6, DY8, DY21, DY23, DY30, DY31, DY35, DY37, DY39,
DY40
Category D7. Loss of adequate decay heat removal
within 5 minutes after the shutdown.
DQ10, DQ34
DR2, DR4, DR6,
DT2, DT4, DT6,
DU2, DU4, DU6,
DV2, DV4, DV6,
DYl0, DY34
DZ2, DZ4, DZ6,
DB2, DB4, DB6,
DC2, DC4, DC6,
DR8,
DT8,
DU8,
DV8,
DZ8,
DB8,
DC8,
DR10, DRll, DR12
DT9, DT10
DU9, DUl0
DV9, DV10.
DZl0, DZll, DZl2
DB9, DB10
DC10, DCll, DCl2
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Chapter 4
Initiating Events and Accident Sequence Analysis Inputs
4.1 Introduction
The ESD is a generalized modelling of the reactor
shutdown operations. It is the addition of the initiating
event which changes these shutdown event sequences into accident
sequences. The potential GCFR core-melt accidents were classified
into two general types: 1) those resulting from severe power
to heat removal imbalances following a reactor shutdown, and 2)
those resulting from severe power to heat removal imbalances
during power operation. This research has been mainly concerned
with the first general class of accidents. These may result
from losses of either adequate forced helium circulation or
adequate decay heat removal following a reactor shutdown.
The second class of accidents may result either from losses
of adequate helium circulation without reactor shutdown, or from
reactor overpower transients. These accidents involve failure
of the reactor to shutdown, and due to the high reliability that
is expected for the reactor shutdown systems these accidents were
not investigated in detail. Failure of the reactor shutdown systems
does not automatically result in a core meltdown. Adequate
core cooling may be maintained by the main loops following
certain reactor shutdown initiating events. The probability of
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a core meltdown due to the failure of the reactor to shutdown
should then be less than the failure probability of the reactor
shutdown systems. However, in this study, the failure of the
reactor to shutdown was conservatively assumed to lead to a
core meltdown, and the total core melt probability for a given
initiating event can be described by the following equation:
P= (PS + PF IE, where
P. is the total probability of a core meltdown
for a given initiating event;
P is the conditional probability of a meltdown
following reactor shutdown, given the initiating
event;
PF is the conditional probability of a meltdown 
due
to failure of the reactor shutdown systems, given
the initiating event; and
PIE is the probability or frequency of occurrence 
of
the event requiring a reactor shutdown.
The initiating events for a possible core melt accident
then become all events which can initiate a reactor shutdown.
This includes innocuous shutdowns, shutdowns resulting from
anticipated transcents, and shutdowns resulting from various
accident initiating events.
The specific reactivity effects of different anticipated
transients or accidents were not given special consideration
(1)
based upon the results of a study by Torri and Driscoll.
The study analyzed the GCFR reactivity insertion mechanisms
for the demonstration plant design. Their conclusion was
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that the influence of reactivity effects on the normal opera-
ting and transient behavior of the GCFR design was mild. Their
analyses included normal and anticipated operating occurrences,
and a number of accident conditions including: steam inleakage;
reactor coolant depressurization; control rod withdrawal; and
earthquake induced core vibrations. The reactivity insertion
accidents were included along with the other events requiring
a reactor shutdown, and the reactor shutdown cooling operations
were considered to be unaffected by reactivity induced effects.
This chapter includes a detailed discussion of the
various reactor shutdown initiating events. It also discusses
the manner in which the accident sequence probability calcula-
tions were performed, and it summarizes the failure date and
other information used to establish the subsystem reliability
valves and other probability inputs employed in the overall
analysis.
4.2 Reactor Shutdown Initiating Event Categories
4.2-1 Introduction
In order to analyze the ability of the GCFR demonstra-
tion plant to provide adequate core cooling during the reactor
shutdown and decay heat removal operations, appropriate
reactor shutdown initiating events must be determined.
Yet, a reactor shutdown may be initiated by many different
types of events ranging from innocuous reactor trips to a
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design basis type accident. Because of the large number
of possible initiating events, the entire range of indivi-
dual shutdown initiating events was divided into separate
initiating event categories. Specifically, because the
GCFR has two shutdown cooling systems (the main loop
cooling system and the CACS), it was convenient to combine
the initiating events according to their effect upon either
shutdown cooling system. Those initiating events which do
not affect the shutdown cooling performance of either system
were combined into category I. Category II initiating
events are those which degrade the shutdown cooling perfor-
mance of the main loop cooling system but do not affect the
performance of the CACS. Those initiating events which
commonly degrade the shutdown heat removal capability of
both the main loop cooling system and the CACS are combined
in Category III. Table 4-I lists these categories along
with their major subcategories.
4.2-2 Initiating Events not Affecting the Performance of
Either Shutdown Cooling System
Category I initiating events are those events which
lead to a reactor shutdown but do not affect the heat remo-
val capability of either the main loop shutdown cooling
system or the CACS. There are two subcategories associated
with this category, and Table 4-II lists the most common
events in each subcategory.
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Table 4-I
Reactor Shutdown Initiating Event Categories
Category I:
Subcategory
Subcategory
A:
B:
Category II:
Subcategory A:
Subcategory B:
Category III:
Subcategory
Subcategory
Subcategory
A:
B:
C:
Initiating events not affecting the per-
formance of either shutdown cooling system.
Innocuous trips
Failures in systems unrelated to the shutdown
cooling system performance.
Initiating events degrading the main loop
shutdown cooling performance.
Initiating events affecting only a single
main cooling loop.
Initiating events commonly affecting more
than one main cooling loop.
Initiating events commonly degrading the
performance of both the shutdown cooling
systems.
External events
Internal events
Support system failures
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Table 4-II
Initiating Events Not Affecting the Performance of
Either Shutdown Cooling System
(Initiating Event Category I)
Subcategory A:
o Innocuous Trips
Subcategory B:
o Loss of offsite power and external load
o Turbine trip
o Loss of one main feed pump
o Inadvertent control rod withdrawal at power
o Small helium leak
o Loss of both main feed pumps
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Figure 411
Initiating Events not Affecting the Performance of
Either Shutdown Cooling System
Subcategory A.
1
Subcategory B.
Innocuous Trips
Reactor
Power
Reduced to
Safe Level
Failures in systems unrelated to the
shutdown cooling system performance
Reactor
Shutdown
Initiated
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Subcategory A includes those reactor shutdowns known as
innocuous or spurious trips. Essentially, these are inadvert-
ent. forced reactor shutdowns which are initiated by such events
as malfunctions in the reactor shutdown system, operator errors,
or as the result of failures in portions of the plant unrelated
to the reactor cooling systems. For this subcategory, the
initiation of the reactor shutdown signal is assumed to be the
initiating event, and a block diagram modelling of this event
is shown in Figure 4.1.
Subcategory B includes those anticipated operating
transients which do not directly affect the performance of the
shutdown cooling systems. Typical events included in this sub-
category are listed in Table 4-I. In all but one of the
events listed (loss of both main feedpumps) the operational
protection system (OPS) is designed to take corrective action
which eliminates the need for a reactor shutdown. A block
diagram modelling of these events is also included in Figure 4.1.
The design of the OPS is not yet final, and so no evalution of
its failure probability was made. A failure rate of 1 x 10-2
per demand was assumed. This value was felt to be very conser-
vative for an operating control system.
In the event that OPS failure occurs and a reactor
shutdown is initiated, the response of the shutdown cooling
systems was considered to be identical to those following an
innocuous trip. The plant response to these anticipated tran-
sients will be required to be well within the design margin
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of the plant, and therefore, the shutdown and decay heat
removal process should not be significantly affected.
The last event listed in Table 4-II is an example
of more unlikely events which may require immediate reactor
shutdowns but do not affect either shutdown cooling system.
Plant outages which result from an orderly shutdown
of the reactor are considered in this category of initiating
events, but they were not felt to be as significant as forced
reactor shutdowns. These orderly shutdowns may be either
scheduled or unscheduled, but they are essentially different
from forced shutdowns. During an orderly reactor shutdown,
both the reduction in reactor power level and the transi-
tion of the main cooling loops from their normal operating
mode to the shutdown cooling mode are performed under the
control and direction of the reactor operators. The relia-
bility of the plant equipment to perform under these condi-
tions would be auite high. Also, the operators would have
more freedom during the shutdown process to either correct
or counteract the faulty operation of some equipment. There-
fore, orderly shutdowns were not included in the determina-
tion of the initiating event frequency of this category.
A study of the availability of the 19 nuclear power
plants operating in the United States during 1972 (2 indicated
a total of 211 plant outages. Of these total outages, 167
involved shutdown of the reactor from an operating state,
and only 91 of these involved a forced reactor shutdown
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(scram or reactor trip). This represents an average of
5 reactor trips per year. The major causes of these reac-
tor trips included failures of the primary and secondary
coolant system equipment, the control rod system, the reac-
tor protection instrumentation, the electrical generation
and distribution systems, and operator errors. An investi-
gation of these reactor trips indicated that for roughly
half of these incidents, had they occurred in the GCFR, the
OPS would have acted to prevent a forced reactor shutdown.
Based on this information, an average of 3 forced reactor
shutdowns per year was assumed to occur due to incidents of
the type included in Category I.A. A similar frequency
of occurrence was assumed for the more likely initiating
events of Category I.B. However, due to the OPS, these
events lead to a forced shutdown with a frequency of only
0.03 per year. Therefore, an average of 3 forced shutdowns
per year was assumed due to all Category I initiating events.
Those events in subcategory I.B which require immedi-
ate reactor shutdown are unlikely to significantly increase
the initiating event frequency for this category. For
example, loss of both main feedpumps has a probability of
occurrence of about 10- 2per year.
4.2-3 Initiating Events Degrading the Performance of the
Main Loop Shutdown Cooling System
There are two specific subcategories for those events
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which degrade the main loop cooling system performance but
do not affect the CACS capabilities. The first subcategory
combines all the events which independently affect the opera-
tion of only a single main cooling loop. The most common of
these occurrences are listed in Table 4-III, and the ESD
modelling for this subcategory is shown in Figure 4.2. For
these occurrences the OPS acts both to shutdown that main
loop in which the failure has occurred, and to initiate a
programmed load reduction to 60% of full reactor power. This
action allows the reactor to continue operating on only two
main loops until either corrective action on the failed loop
is taken, or an orderly reactor shutdown is performed.
The programmed load reduction is accomplished by the
powered insertion of a set of three control rods, and the
loop isolation is accomplished by closing the feedwater inlet
valve, the resuperheater outlet valve and circulator-turbine
large control valve for the loop. This stops the helium cir-
culator and allows the loop isolation valves to close.
Failure of the OPS to perform either function was assumed to
initiate a reactor shutdown signal, and a failure rate for
the OPS of 1 x 10-2 per demand was assumed.
Reference 2 indicated that approximately 20% of the
total reactor trips were initiated by failures of primary
coolant system equipment. This is a frequency of 1 event
per year, and while this particular number cannot be totally
applicable to the GCFR, it is indicative of the order of
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Table 4-III
Initiating Events Leading to the Loss of a Single
Main Cooling Loop (Initiating Event Category II.A)
1. Inadvertent closure of a feedwater control valve
2. Inadvertent full opening of a feedwater control valve
3. Inadvertent closure of a CT large CV
4. Inadvertent full opening of a CT large CV
5. Inadvertent opening of a resuperheater bypass control
valve
6. Inadvertent opening of a relief or safety valve
7. Steam generator tube leak
8. Main circulator failure
9. Loop controller failure
10. Inadvertent loop isolation due to operator error or
spurious protective system action
11. Steam line or feedwater are ruptured inside the
containment building
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Figure 4.2
Initiating Events Degrading the Performance
of the Main Loop Shutdown Cooling System
wf
Reactor
Power
Reduced to
Safe Level
Subcategory A:
Subcategory B:
Events leading to the loss of a single
main loop
Events commonly degrading the shutdown
performance of the main cooling loops
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magnitude of the frequency of these events.
The last event listed in Table 4-III would require
an immediate reactor shutdown with only two main loops
available. However, the probability of a large pipe rup-
ture inside the containment is on the order of 1 x 10-3 per
year, and it does not significantly affect the total reac-
tor shutdown initiation probability for this category which
is about 1 x 10-2 per year.
The second subcategory includes those events which
have a common effect on the shutdown heat removal perfor-
mance of the main loop cooling system, but do not degrade
the CACS performance. A block diagram modelling of this
subcategory of events is also included in Figure 4.2. The
main cooling loops are designed to be as independent as
possible, however there are four areas in which they share
some common dependence. These areas are described below:
1. Common Control Systems
Potential failures of the main loop cooling sys-
tem might arise from control system faults,
however none were found in this analysis. While
the plant regulator provides a common control of
the main loop during normal operation, each main
cooling loop has its own independent shutdown
controller.
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2. Common Heat Sink
The three main cooling loops share a common heat
sink, which is the main condenser. However, if
the condenser is unavailable, independent relief
valves are provided in the exhaust path of each
circulator-turbine to maintain steam flow and to
allow heat rejection directly to the atmosphere.
The overall effect on initial main loop operation
is negligible, but the long term main loop opera-
tion may be limited by the condensate storage supply
if the emergency feedwater supply is not available.
3. Common Feedwater Supply
Those items of the shutdown feedwater supply
which are common to the main cooling loops are
the condenser hotwell, the condensate storage
tank and the piping on the suction side of the
shutdown feedwater pumps. However, the effect
of the loss of any one of these items is small,
and even the loss of all feedwater does not
immediately eliminate the main loops because of
the stored inventory available in the steam
generators.
4. Common Support Systems
The three support systems which are common to the
main loop cooling system are the service water
system, the instrument air system and the reactor
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plant cooling water system. (The essential
electrical supply is not considered here
because it also affects the CACS.)
The reactor plant cooling water system
provides cooling for the main circulator bear-
ing water supplies. While the circulator
bearing heat load is quite high during full
power operation, the bearing friction during
the reactor shutdown cooling operations is
quite small. This is due to the significant
decrease in circulator speed during the ini-
tial shutdown heat removal operations. The
actual extent of the affect on main loop shut-
down cooling, following a failure of the reac-
tor plant cooling water supply is not pre-
cisely known, however, the time period before
main loop failure occurs should be significant-
ly long enough to allow for either remedial
action on the cooling water supply, or an or-
derly transfer to the CACS.
The instrument air system provides clean,
dry air for essential valve and control system
operations. The system is equipped with air
accumulator tanks which can supply all essential
instrument air needs for about five minutes
following failure of all the compressors.
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These essential operations include closing the
CT large CV's and any containment isolation
valves as required by the plant protection sys-
tem. However, the operation of the CT small
CV's requires a continuous supply of instrument
air. The accumulator air supply was assumed
sufficient to initially throttle the CT small
CV's, but main loop operation was limited to a
maximum of 15 minutes operation before steam
generator inventory depletion occurred due to
incomplete throttling of the CT small CV's.
The service water system provides the
ultimate heat rejection for a number of systems.
The most important of these are the reactor
plant cooling water system and the instrument
and service air compressor jacket cooling system.
Thus, failure of the service water system will
eventually eliminate these two other systems,
but on a longer time scale. The time scale for
main loop failure will be determined by the
failure of the instrument and service air com-
pressors due to the loss of the jacket water
coolAnt circulation. The time-scale for this
failure was assumed to be on the order of 15
minutes, thus allowing a maximum of 30 minutes
of main loop shutdown cooling operation.
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There are some potential serious service
water system dependencies which need to be
discussed, but which have not been included in
the modelling because it is assumed that they
will be eliminated in the final demonstration
plant design. These are the cooling water
requirements for the emergency diesel genera-
tors and the auxiliary circulator motor units.
The diesel generators require a jacket cooling
water system to maintain appropriate cylinder
wall temperatures, and the auxiliary circula-
tor motor units require both stator cooling
systems and bearing cooling units. To supply
these cooling requirements with the service
water system unnecessarily couples both the main
loop cooling system and the CACS. A number of
potential solutions to this problem have been
suggested.(3) For the emergency diesel genera-
tors, the most practical solution would appear
to be individual shaft-driven, circulating water
pumps with natural or forced draft air heat
exchangers. For the CACS, individual auxiliary
circulator motor and bearing cooling water
systems may be necessary, or it may be possible
to simply direct cooling water from the core
auxiliary cooling water system.
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4.2-4 Initiating Events Commonly Degrading the Performance
of Both Shutdown Cooling Systems
This last category of initiating events contains
three specific subcategories. Figure 4.3 is the block
diagram modelling for these events, and Table 4-IV lists the
most typical events associated with each subcategory.
Subcategory A includes external events which can
potentially affect both the main loop cooling system and
the CACS. These events may be earthquakes, tornadoes, floods,
aircraft impacts, or other similar events. Some of these
events are discussed specifically below.
Earthquakes:
Commercial nuclear power plants must be designed to
safely withstand the effects of the largest magnitude earth-
quake which may be expected based upon geological and his-
torical evidence of the site and its surrounding area. This
earthquake is designated the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE).
The engineered safety systems required to safely shutdown
the plant must be designed to withstand the stresses created
by the ground motion of this earthquake.and still rem&in
operable. In addition, the plant must be able to remain
in a safe operating condition during an earthquake which
produces ground accelerations no smaller than half that of
the SSE. This earthquake is designated the operating basis
earthquake (OBE).
The Reactor Safety Study gives an estimated proba-
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Figure 4.3
Initiating Events Degrading the Performance of
Both Shutdown Cooling Systems
El Pfl
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Table 4-IV
Initiating Events Commonly Degrading the Performance
of Both Shutdown Cooling Systems (Initiating
Event Category III)
Subcategory A. External Events
o Earthquakes
o Tornadoes
o Floods
o Aircraft Impact
Subcategory B. Internal Events
o PCRV Depressurization Accidents
o Core Flow Blockages
o Internally Generated Missiles
Subcategory C. Support System Failures
o Loss of Offsite Power Following a Reactor Trip
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bility range of 10~ to 10-6 per year of an earthquake
producing 0.2 g ground acceleration for sites in the
eastern U.S. This is roughly the SSE for many of the
nuclear power plants in the eastern U.S., and the RSS fur-
ther estimated that, based on an analysis of the seismic
design of safety systems, the probability of survival of a
system without mishap would be greater than 0.9.
It is reasonable to assume that the seismic design
of GCFR subsystems will be at least as good as that for LWR
systems. The likelihood of an SSE causing system failures
leading to a core meltdown in the GCFR should be less than
0.01. The probability of a core meltdown due to the occur-
rence of an SSE is -then in the range of 10~ to 10~ per
year.
Were the GCFR to be located in a region of known
seismic activity, it would be required to be designed to
withstand larger magnitude earthquakes. For some regions
of California, the SSE design acceleration may be as high
as 0.67 g. The likelihood of an earthquake of this magni-
tude is low even for these regions, and the contribution to
the probability of a core meltdown due to the occurrence of
an SSE should be in about the same range as for less seis-
mically active regions.
Tornadoes:
The GCFR, as with other U.S. nuclear power plants,
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will be designed to withstand the effects of sizeable tornadoes.
The typical design basis tornado for most of the U.S. is assumed
to have wind speeds of 300 m.p.h. and a velocity of 60 m.p.h.
All vital reactor systems must not only be designed to withstand
the wind forces and pressure loadings due to the tornado, but
they must also be protected from any missiles generated by the
tornado. The probability of such a tornado striking a U.S.
nuclear power plant was calculated to be less than 5 x 10-6 per
year.
Those structures in the GCFR considered to be most vul-
nerable to tornado effects are the auxiliary loop forced-air
coolers and the service water system cooling towers. The auxi-
liary loop forced-air coolers are located in separate, shielded
enclosures on the roof of the Reactor Auxiliary Building. These
will be specifically designed as engineered safety features, and
they will be required to withstand the effects of the design
basis tornado. The likelihood of all the coolers failing due
to tornado effects was felt to be less than 0.01. The service
water cooling towers will also be designed to withstand tornado
effects, however, their failure will only affect the main loop
cooling system, and not the CACS performance.
The diesel generator building was also investigated with
regard to possible tornado damage, and it is the author's opin-
ion that adequate consideration has been taken in regard to po-
tential missile damage to both the doors and the air intake vents.
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The probability of a core meltdown initiated by a tornado
is therefore considered to be quite small in comparison to
other potential core melt accidents.
Other Events:
Events such as floods, aircraft impacts, turbine
missiles and other events were considered in the RSS. All
of these events were assessed, for light water reactors, to
have a negligible contribution to the probability of a core
meltdown. The impact of these events on a GCFR should be
basically the same and it is reasonable to assume that they
will also be negligible contributors to the probability of
a core meltdown for the GCFR.
Subcategory B includes those events internal to the
plant which can degrade the main loop and CACS performance.
These events may involve the primary coolant circuit shared
by the two cooling systems, their common function of circu-
lating helium through the reactor core, or their common
location within the PCRV and reactor containment. Specific
events would be a PCRV depressurization accident, a severe
core flow blockage, or damage due to internally generated
missiles.
The reactor shutdown cooling operations following
a PCRV depressurization accident were modelled in detail.
The likelihood of such an accident will, in general, depend
upon the size and location of the postulated PCRV failure.
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Penetration closures are generally felt to be the weakest part
of the PCRV structure, and Table 3-X listed the potential leak
areas for the PCRV penetrations. Failure of either the central
cavity closure or one of the steam generator cavity closures
leads to the largest leak areas. However, these closures are
fixed in place with two independent and redundant means of hold-
down, and they are not removed except for major equipment re-
pairs. The reliability of these closures should then approach
that of a pressure vessel. The probability of failure of one
of these major penetration closures was assumed to be less than
10-6 per year. This is the upper limit of pressure vessel fail-
ures probability given in the RSS. For the many smaller PCRV
penetrations, such as the fuel handling penetration closures,
the probability of failure was assumed to be in the range of
10 to 10~ per year. This is equivalent to the probability
of pipe ruptures leading to a small loss of coolant accident in
an LWR given in the RSS. The large penetration closure failure
was assumed to occur in the steam generator cavity closure, and
due to uncertainty concerning the operation of the helium cir-
culator located in the closure, that main cooling loop was con-
servatively assumed to be eliminated. This leads to a reactor
shutdown with only two main loops initially available.
Core flow .blockages resulting in gross core meltdown
were judged to be extremely unlikely. Local flow blockages
leading to melting of one or two sub-assemblies may be
possible, however these were also judged to be extremely unlike-
ly. If a local flow blockage were to occur, the initiation of fuel
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damage would trigger a reactor shutdown. Even in the event
that a shutdown was not initiated, present analyses 5)
show that propagation of any fuel damage would be very
unlikely. The melting of a few fuel assemblies while a
serious enough event was not considered in the same class
as gross core meltdown events.
The important GCFR safety equipment will be required
to be adequately shielded from both internally and exter-
nally generated missiles. Considering this fact the physi-
cal separation of the important subsystem equipment, the
potential damage due to missiles was assumed to be an insig-
nificant contributor leading to core meltdown.
Subcategory C initiating events are possible failures
of support systems which are common to both the main loop
cooling system and the CACS. In section 4.2-3, the potential
service water dependencies were discussed, and some possible
solutions were outlined. It was assumed that knowledge of
this potential common mode failure will allow it to be
completely eliminated from the final design. The instrument
air system is potentially another means of common mode failure
of the main loops and CACS. The design of the auxiliary cir-
culator support systems is not yet detailed enough to deter-
mine if instrument air requirements are necessary. However,
there is no apparent reason why these requirements cannot
either be eliminated or the equipment designed to "fail-safe"
upon loss of instrument air.
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The system which does tie the main loops and CACS toge-
gether is the emergency electrical supply. Those initiating
events which result in a simultaneous loss of offsite power and
turbine trip require that both the main cooling loop and the
CACS performance be dependent upon either proper operation of
their corresponding diesel generators or the restoration of
offsite power. A loss of offsite power may actually occur in
two different ways. The loss of the plant offsite power source
and external load will result in a turbine trip and forced re-
actor shutdown if the turbine load-reject mechanism fails to
prevent the turbine trip. Alternatively, the turbine trip which
accompanies any forced reactor shutdownmay cause a transient in
the electrical network which, if it exceeds the stability limit
of the grid, will result in the loss of offsite power.
The probability of an interruption in the plant offsite
power supply and external load is 0.1 per year.(6) The failure
probability of the turbine load-reject mechanism was assumed to
be 0.1 per demand. Therefore, the probability that this
event leads to a forced reactor shutdown is 1 x 10-2 per year.
The probability that a turbine trip would result in the loss of
the electrical network was determined to be 10-3 per event for
(7)
a 1000 MW(e) plant, The 300 MW(e) GCFR will have less of an
impact on the stability of an electrical network, and therefore
such an event was not considered to be an important contributor
to this initiating event.
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4.3 ESD Computer Calculations
4.3-1 Introduction
Two computer codes were developed to perform the calc-
ulations of the accident sequence probabilities. One code
performed the calculation of the event sequence probabilities
modelled in the ESD for the pressurized reactors shutdowns,
and the other code performed the same function for the
depressurized accident sequences. Each of these codes per-
formed four specific operations:
1) the calculation of the individual accident sequence
probabilities,
2) the grouping of the individual accident sequences
into the appropriate outcome categories, and the
required bookkeeping to allow proper identifica-
tion of each accident sequence,
3) the ordering of the individual accident sequence
within each outcome category (in a descending
array according to the accident sequence proba-
bilities), and calculating the sum of the acci-
dent sequence probabilities for each outcome
category and for all of the system failure out-
come categories, and
4) the sequencing of the input variables in a predeter-
mined fashion for use in the sensitivity analyses.
These codes are on file in the M.I.T Nuclear
Engineering Department computer library.
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This section includes a description of how the ESD's were
converted into probability equations for the computer cal-
culations. It also includes a short discussion of the
failure data used in this study.
4.3-2 Calculation of the Individual Accident Sequence Probabilities
The modelling of the ESD's was used directly to create
the probability equations for the computer calculations. For
this transformation, the ESD symbology corresponds to specific
probabilistic operators. These are described below.
System Action Block
3 items with
a priori P reliability R success
event probability A r probability
Q failure
probability
The system action blocks essentially correspond to the
conditional probability of a specific operating mode of a
system. The inputs to the block are the conditioning events
for the individual system reliability value, and each block
performs a specific operation on this value, which along with
the probability of the conditioning event, gives the success
and failure probability outputs for the block. For example,
given the a priori event with probability PA, the individual
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items of a system may have a reliability of r . If the number
of items in the system is three, then the probability that all
three items function correctly, given the initiating event is
R = PA r , and the probability of less than three
functioning is
Q = PA(l r3)
Branch Point
ASS 
--- 
. S2
A 2
S3
Branch points correspond to the specific states of avail-
ibility of a particular system. The values pertaining to each
hexagon are also conditional probabilities, and the sum of these
probabilities must always be unity. The numbers located in
each hexagon are the variable names of the conditional output
states for the particular system, and those variables which
correspond to "success" or "failure" are conditioned further
by the events preceding the branch point. For example, if the
event sequence probability preceeding the branch point is Si,
and the availability and unavailability for system A, given
that particular event path, are respectively A1 and A2, then
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two event paths are now created leaving the branch point.
These are
S2 = S * A , and S3 =S * A2
S2 and S3 are separate event paths which differ only by the
availability of system A.
These two symbols along with the transfer triangle com-
prise the entire ESD's. The subsystem names and event
sequence names in the ESD correspond directly to the variable
names and event sequence names used in the computer codes.
For example, the reliability input for subsystem 4, the CT
large CV, is P(4), and the output from the system action blocks
for this subsystem (4.1, 4.2 etc.) is labeled PR4(1), PR4(2),
etc. In the same way, the final event sequences Kl, etc., are
labeled PRK(l), etc.
4.3-3 Intra-System Common Mode Failures
In the GCFR, redundancy in threes runs throughout the
design. The essential electrical supply, the main loop cooling
system, and the CACS all consist of three independent items.
If complete independence of the individual system items is as-
sumed, then the reliability of the system is greatly increased
over the reliability of the single item. Experience, however,
has shown that despite attempts to design completely independ-
ent redundant units, failure modes occur which violate the goal
of independent failures.
In general, these types of dependent failures are known
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as common mode failures, but to distinguish these dependent fail-
ures of identical redundant items of a single subsystem from other
types of common mode failures (such as those occurring between
otherwise unrelated subsystems), the term intrasystem common mode
failures will be used. Examples of some mechanisms which can result
in these intra-system common mode failures are: undetected design
errors, manufacturing or installation related errors, maintenance
or operator errors, and failures caused by the failure of un-
related equipment or by unforseen environmental effects.
In order to prevent serious overestimation of the subsystem
reliability values through the assumption of independent failures,
a method of considering intra-system common mode failures was
incorporated into the ESD computer codes. The logic of this
method is described by Figures 4.4 and 4.5.
Independent, random failures of three items of a single
subsystem can be described by a three trial Bernoulli process,(8 )
where the probability of success of a single trial (the reliability
of a single item of the redundant system) is p . The probability
of exactly k successes in the system is then described by the
equation
P(k) = 3! k 3-k
k! 3 - k)! p
which is a binomial probability.distribution function. This is
graphically shown by the logic tree of Figure 4.4.
In order to include common mode failures, it was assumed
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Figure 4.4
A Logic Diagram of Subsystem Availability States
with Random Failures of 3 Identical Items
No. Of Items
Available
3
2
2
1
2
1
1
0
Probability Of
Availability
State
3
p
p2
p( 1 -p)2
p2
p(1-p) 2
p (1-p) 2
(1-P) 3
p = Individual system or component reliability
p
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that the subsystems have two separate failure modes, either
independent or common mode. The common mode failure probability
is defined by z, and the logic tree can be modified as is shown
in Figure 4.5. Essentially, if a common mode failure does not
occur (probability 1-z), then independent, random failures can
occur. The probability of success of exactly k items is then
given by
P(k) = 3! 3k (1 - ) k(1-z)
k! (3 - k)!
where k = 3, 2, or 1, and for k = 0 by
P(0) = (1 - p) 3 (1 - z) + z
A value of z for each redundant subsystem was then included in
the computer calculation of the accident sequence probabilities.
This same line of reasoning was followed independently by
Fleming (9) in which a term $ (the beta-fact-) was defined as the
fraction of total unit failures which were common mode.
Fleming used the beta factor to determine the common mode failure
probability of redundant components. However, the concept can
also be applied to redundant units (containing a number of
components) of a particular subsystem. The common mode failure
probability is then the probability of a single unit failure times
the fraction of those failures which are common mode.
z = 3 (1 
- p)
This equation is a convenient method of determing the common mode
failure probability. However, it is based upon an emperical
relationship and not any fundamental understanding of common mode
failures. Fleming applies the beta factor only at the component
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A Logic Diagram of Subsystem Availability States With
Random and Common Mode Failures of Three Identical Items
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3
2
P
P
1
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z
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Availability
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p2 (1-p)(1-z)
p(1-p)2 (1-z)
p 2 (1-p )(1-z )
p (1-p) 2 (1-z)
p(1-p) (1-z )
(-p) 3(1-z)
z
p -Individual System or Component Reliability
z - Probability of a Common Mode Failure
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level where failure data is generally applicable on a generic
basis. In applying this relationship to the system level, caution
must be used. Specifically, in this application to the GCFR sub-
system, neither any possible functional relationships between
3 and p, nor the possible effects of design on the value of 3 are
known. Therefore, 0 is presently assumed to be a constant with a
sufficiently conversative value.
4.3-4 Equipment Unavailabilities Due to Test or Maintenance
In redundant systems, the unavailability of one unit for either
test or maintenance purposes may have a significant effect on the
re-liability of the subsystem. Assuming that the probability of one
unit of a redundant system being unavailable at the time its
operation is required is T and that only one unit of the system will
be undergoing maintenance at any one time, then for a three unit
system, the probability equations for successful operation of a given
number of units become
P(3) = p (1 - z) (1 - 3T)
P(2) = 3p 2 (l - p)(1 - z)(1 - 3T) + 3Tp 2 (l - z)
P(l) = 3p(l - p) 2 (l - z)(1 - 3T) + 6Tp(l - p)(1 - z)
P(O) = (1 - p) 3 (l - z)(1 - 3T) + 3T(l - p) 2 (l - z) + z
Given all three units are available (probability 1 - 3T), the
system availability states are determined by the random fail-
ures of three items and the common mode failure probability.
Given any one of the three units is unavailable (probability 3T),
the system availability states are determined by the random failure
of two items and the common mode failure probability.
Figure 4.6 shows the logic diagrams for this situation.
Figure 4.6
Logic Diagrams of the Subsystem Availability States With
Random Failures, Common Mode Failures, and Test and
Maintenance Unavailability for Three Identical Items
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In a situation in which only two items of the system are
available for operation due to the previous failure of a
related system, the probability of the system availability
states are given by
P(2) = p2 1 - z)(1 - 2T)
P(l) = 2p(l - p)(l - z)(1 - 2T) + 2TP
P(O) = (1 - p) 2(1 - z)(1 - 2T) + 2T(l - p) + z(1-2T).
An example of this situation is the availability of the
shutdown feedwater loops which, during a loss of offsite power,
are dependent upon correct operation of their corresponding
emergency diesel generator. If one diesel fails then only
two shutdown feedpumps are available to start.
In these equations, the probability of a common mode
failure is assumed to be the same whether two units or three
units are available. This may be a conservative assumption,
however there is not yet enough quantitative information con-
cerning common mode failures to justify treating these potential
common mode failure situations differently.
The above equations assume that only one redundant unit
of a system may be unavailable at any one time without shutting
down the reactor. During the construction of the ESD, the
assumption was also made that test or maintenance would not
be performed simultaneously on more than one main loop subsystem
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if the units which would be unavailable corresponded to dif-
ferent shutdown cooling loops. For example, maintenance would
not be performed simultaneously on both shutdown feed pump A
and auxiliary boiler B.
4.3-5 Failure Data
In this study, three contributions to the subsystem
failure probabilities were considered. These are hardware
failures, test and maintenance equipment unavailabilities, and
common mode failure contributions.
Generic component failure data from Appendix III of
WASH-1400( , the RSS, was employed for the hardware failure
contributions. This data base includes U. S. nuclear power
plant operating experience and equipment failure data from
other related industries. The data should therefore be appli-
cable to similar GCFR components. Table 4-V lists the median
failure probabilities and the error factor for both mechanical
and electrical components. The error factor represents the
uncertainty in the data, and it is the ratio of the upper bound
to the median failure probabilities.
Equipment outages for either test or maintenance purposes
can have a significant effect on the subsystem failure proba-
bility. At present, test and maintenance requirements for GCFR
subsystems are unknown. Therefore, equipment unavailabilities
were considered on a generic basis, and maintenance acts were
felt to be the major contributor to these unavailabilities.
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Table 4-V
Basic Failure Data
MECHANICAL COMPONENTS
DEVICE FAILURE MEDIAN FAILURE ERROR
MODE PROBABILITY * FACTOR
Air-Operated
Valve
Motor-Operated
Valve
Manuel Valve
Check Valve
Relief Valve
Valve(general)
Pump
Diesel System
Failure to
operate
Failure to
remain open
Failure to
operate
Failure to
remain open
Failure
operate
Failure
open
Failure
open
to
to
to
Open
Prematurely
Failure to
remain open
Failure to
start
Failure to run
given start
Failure to
start
Failure to run
given start
3 143 x 10 /d
1 x 10-3 /d
1 x 10~ /d
1 x 10~ /d
1 x 10~4 /d
1 x 10- /d
1 x 10-5 /d
1 x 10~ /hr
1 x 10-3/d
3 x 10-5/hr
3 x 10-2/d
3 x 10-3/hr
* /d indicates probability per demand
/hr indicates probability per hour
t Not taken from WASH-1400
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Table 4-V cont.
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
DEVICE FAILURE MEDIAN FAILURE ERROR
MODE PROBABILITY * FACTOR
Motors Failure to 3 x 10 /d 3
start
Failure to run 1 x 10- 5 /hr 3
given start
Circuit breakers Failure to 1 x 10- 3 /d 3
operate
Premature open 1 x 10-6 /hr 3
Pressure switch Failure to 1 x 10~ /d 3
operate
Transformer Opens or Shorts 1 x 10-6/hr 10
Solid State Failure to 3 x 10 /hr 3
Device function
Battery Power Failure of 3 x 10 /hr 3
Supply proper output
Simple Control Failure to 1 x 10 /d 10
System (1) operate 3 x 10 /hr 10
Complex Control Failure to 3 x 10 3 /d 10
System (2) operate 1 x 10 5 /hr 10
* /d indicates probability per demand
/hr indicates probability per hour
(1) Performs a simple "on-off" function
(2) Performs a continuous control function
t Not taken from WASH-1400
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Table 4-VI
Basic Component Unavailabilities
Average UnavailabilityComponent
Pumps
Valves
Diesels
Instrumentation
2
2
6
2
x
x
x
x
10-3
10-3
10-3
10-3
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Table 4-VI lists these generic equipment unavailabilities,
which are taken from Reference 7, page 118.
These unavailability values were applied to the major
components of those subsystems which are not functioning dur-
ing normal reactor operation. For each of these subsystems,
only one of the redundant units was assumed to be down for
test or maintenance purposes at any one time while the reactor
was operating.
The probability of an intra-system common mode failure
is related to the failure probability of one redundant unit
of the subsystem.
z =$ q =0 (1 - p)
where z is the probability of an intra-system common mode
failure,
q is the failure rate of one unit of the subsystem, and
0, the beta factor, is the fraction of total unit
failures which are common mode failures.
In order to determine an estimate of the likely range of the
beta factor for the GCFR subsystems, two types of data were
investigated. The first was component failure data in which
the fraction of multiple component failures for each component
type was calculated. These results are shown in Table 4-VII.
The second type of data was the actual common mode failure
contributions to system failure calculated in WASH-14000)
These common mode failure contributions are
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Table 4-VII
Common Mode Failure Fractions
From Component. Failure Data
Number of Number of Fraction
Total Common Mode of Common
Component Failures Failures Mode Failures(,e)
Pumps 24 0 .042
(Ref. 4)
Valves 102 6 .059
(Ref. 4)
Diesel 87 5 .058
Systems
(Ref. 11)
Instrumen- 203 28 .138
tation
(Refs. 4,12)
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Random Failure Probability
(1) Single failures dominate failure probability
(2) Double failures domonate random failure probability
(3) Diesel generator failure for one specific event
(see. text)
(From Tables II-1 and 11-2, Reference 10)
Figure 4.7 A Plot of LWR Subsystem Common Mode Failure
Contributions Versus the Total Random Failure
Contributions
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plotted as a function of the total random failure probability
in Figure 4.7. Also shown on the figure are solid lines cor-
responding to beta factors, for a doubly redundant system, of
0.1, 0.03 and 0.1. Notice that the majority of the points lie
between beta values of 0.01 and 0.1. This is also the range
suggested by the component failure data. The only point
significantly greater than 0.1 concerns failure of the diesel
generators following a simultaneous loss of coolant accident
and loss of offsite power for the PWR analyzed in the RSS.
The potential common mode failure results from the inrush of
current due to essential electrical loads which must be
assumed upon starting. The likelihood that a common mode
failure results is greater for the PWR due to the larger
essential electrical loads required in this event. The beta
factor for the diesel system of the BWR analyzed in the RSS is
0.03 for this event. In the GCFR demonstration plant design,
the diesel generators are not required to assume large loads
upon starting due to the capability of initially continuing
main loop operation independent of the electrical supply.
Therefore, this potential common mode failure should not be of
significant concern.
None of.this data was considered to be specific enough
to apply to individual GCFR subsystems, however, it was felt to
adequately establish a general range for the beta factor. This
range was 0.01 to 0.1 and it was assumed to be the same for all
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GCFR subsystems. Assuming a log-normal distribution for
the beta factor range, the median beta factor value is 0.03.
This median value was used for all the GCFR subsystems.
It needs to be emphasized, that most of the common mode
failure data available pertains to doubly redundant systems.
Because there is no evidence to the contrary, it was assumed
that those common mode failures leading to the failure of
both items of a doubly redundant system would also lead to
the failure of all items of a triply redundant system. Thus
the beta factors are taken to be the same. However, this
may very well not be true; especially if potential common
mode failures are given serious attention in the design
of the system. Consider some potential common mode failure
causes:
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1) Maintenance related failures. The majority
of common mode failures calculated in the
RSS were due to human maintenance errors.
For example, following test or maintenance,
valves on all redundant units of a system
are placed in a failed condition. For this
type of event, if the failure is repeated
twice, it will be most likely to be repeated
three times. However, as the number of re-
dundant units increases, it is less likely
that a single person is responsible for work
on all of the units. This reduces the likeli-
hood of this type of common mode failure.
Also, staggered test and maintenance schedules
for redundant equipment also reduce this common
mode failure possibility.
2) Design and Equipment related failures. It seems
unlikely that design errors leading to common mode
failures would have less of an impact in triply
redundant systems. Certain types of equipment
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failures would, however, tend to be less significant
as the number of redundant items increases. For
example, a common manufacturing defect can lead to
premature failure of a certain piece of equipment.
The greater the number of items, the less likely it
is that a simultaneous (or near simutaneous) failure
will occur.
3) Environment related failures. Greater physical
separation is possible in a triply redundant system,
and common mode failure of the system may be less
likely for certain environmental effects. However,
this is clearly dependent on the specific system
involved, and no general judgment can be made.
4.4 Shutdown Event Sequence Analysis Variables
4.4-1 Introduction
In this section, the input variables to the ESD computer
codes are presented. These essentially consist of 1) the sub-
system unit reliability values, 2) the intra-system common mode
failure values as determined by the beta factor, and 3) the
probability values for the other occurrences modelled in the
ESDs. These inputs are summarized in the following section,
and a brief description of each of the inputs is included in
the last section. A more detailed discussion of these items
is included in Appendix A.
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4.4-2 Summary of ESD Inputs
The eight major GCFR subsystems involved in the shut-
down cooling and decay heat romoval operations each have three
input variables. The first of the values is the reliability
of one unit of these three-independent-unit subsystems. This
is refered to as the subsystem unit reliability value. These
values are median point estimates, and they are the compliment
of the subsystem unit failure probabilities developed in
Appendix A using the failure data presented in Section 4.3-5.
The values are presented in Table 4-VIII along with the relia-
bility ranges for each subsystem that were used in the sensi-
tivity analysis. These sensitivity ranges correspond roughly
to one order of magnitude changes in the subsystem unit fail-
ure probability on either side of the median value. For
example, the median reliability value of .9987 for the CT
large CV corresponds to a median point estimate of the failure
probability of 1.3 x 10~ per demand. The sensitivity range of
.99 to .9999 corresponds to a failure probability range of
1 x 10-2 to 1 x 10~ per demand.
The second input variable is the beta factor for the sub-
system. The beta factor relates the common mode failure prob-
ability and the subsystem unit reliability value by the follow-
ing equation.
z = S(1 
- p)
The median value of the beta factor assumed for each subsystem
are also listed in Table 4-VIII.
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Table 4-VIII
GCFR Subsystem Unit Reliability
Values and Beta Factors
Subsystem Index Subsystem Unit Common Mode
and Name Reliability Failure Fraction
(Beta Factor)
Range for
Median Sensitivity Median
Value Analysis Value Range
4: CT Large .9987 .99 - .9999 0.03 0.01-0.1
CV's
5: CT Small .9967 .97 - .9997 0.03 0.01-0.1
CV's
6: Shutdown .9974 .96 - .9996 0.03 0.01-0.1
Feedwater
System
7: Auxiliary .9919 .875- .999 0.03 0.01-0.1
Boilers
8: Main Loop .9938 .93 - .9993 0.03 0.01-0.1
Decay Heat
Removal
Operation
9: Emergency .97 .9 - .997 0.03 0.01-0.1
Electrical
Supply
10: Core Auxiliary .9917 .9 - .999 0.03 0.01-0.1
Cooling
System
12: Resuperheater .9986 .99 - .9999 0.03 0.01-0.1
Bypass con-
trol Valves
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The unavailabilities for each unit of those subsystems
not functioning during normal full-power operation are listed
in Table 4-IX. These are based upon the average component una-
vailabilities presented in Section 4.3-5. No sensitivity
range is listed for these unavailability values. In the sen-
sitivity analysis, the total contribution to the probability
of core meltdown of the test and maintenance unavailabilities
was investigated.
Table 4-X lists the median reliability values and the
sensitivity range assumed for main loop isolation value oper-
ations and for main circulator performance during and follow-
ing circulator-turbine imbalance conditions.
Table 4-XI lists the nominal probability values and the
sensitivity range assumed for the restarting of initially
failed shutdown feed pumps and emergency diesel generators.
Table 4-XII lists the upper and lower bounds assumed for
the probability of a main loop support system failure leading
to a main loop cooling system failure following a reactor
shutdown. Note that for failures of the service water system
leading to main loop failures in the 15 to 30 minute time
interval, the values .333 and .667 are artificial failure
probabilities. They are not the probabilities of system
failure; they are the probabilities of failing to successfully
combine the available essential buses with the operating
service water system components. A more complete discussion of
these values is included in Appendix A.
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Table 4-IX
Subsystem Test and Maintenance Unavailabilities
Subsystem Index
and Name
6: Shutdown Feedwater
Loop
7: Auxiliary Boiler
8: Main Loop Transfer
to Decay Heat
Rbmoval Operation
9: Emergency Diesel
Generator Set
10: Core Auxiliary
Cooling Loop
12: Resuperheater
Bypass Control Valve
2
Test and
Maintenance
Unavailability
4 x 10-3
1.2 x 10-2
4 x 10-3
6 x 10-3
1.2 x 10-2
2 x 103
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Table 4-X
Main Loop Isolation Valve Operating Reliability
and Main Circulator Reliability During and Following
Circulator-Turbine Imbalance Conditions
Main Loop Isolation Median
Valve and Circulator Reliability Sehsitivity
Operation Value Range
P18: Main Loop
Isolation Valve
Closes due to a
Circulator Imbalance
Condition Caused by
a failed
CT Large CV .995 .9995 - .95
CT Small CV .975 .999 - .9
P17: Main Loop
Isolation Valve Opens
Following a Circulator
Imbalance Condition .999 .9999 - .99
P17: Main Circulator
Remains Operable
Following an Imbalance
Condition (with loop
isolation valve open)
Caused by a Failed
CT Large CV .50 .95 - .10
CT Small CV .95 .995 - .75
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Table 4-XI
Probability Values for Restarting Initially Failed
Shutdown Feedpumps and Emergency Diesel Generators
P16: Restoration of Nominal Sensitivity
Initially Failed Values Range
Feedpumps or Diesels
Given at least 15 minutes:
Start 1 of 3 failed
feedpumps 0.0 1.0 - .75 - .25
Start 1 of 2 failed 0.0 1.0 - .60 - .20
feedpumps
start 1 of 1 failed
feedpump 0.0 1.0 - .30 - .10
Given at least 10 minutes:
Start 1 Of 3 failed
diesels 0.0 1.0 - .75 - .25
Start 1 of 2 failed
diesels 0.0 1.0 - .60 - .20
Start 1 of 1 failed
diesel 0.0 1.0 - .30 - .10
Feedpump associated with a
restarted diesel starts .99 -------
Table 4-XII
Probability of a Main Loop Support System Failure
Leading to a Main Loop Failure Following a Reactor Shutdown
P19: Main Loop Support Main Loop Failure Main Loop Failure
System Failure in the Interval in the Interval
5 to 15 Minutes 15 to 30 Minutes
Following Shutdown Following Shutdown
Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound
3 Buses Energized 1x10 7  - 1x10- 5  lxlO _ x10-3
2 Buses Energized 1x10- 6 - 1x10 4  1x10- 3  - .333
1 Bus Energized lxlO - 1x10-2  .333 - .667
Due to Instrument Air Due to Service Water
System Failure System Failure Leading to
Instrument Air
Compressor Failure
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Table 4-XIII
Probability of Restoration of Offsite Power
P20: Restoration Nominal Sensitivity
of Offsite Power Values Range
o Within 30 minutes .75 1.0 - 0.0
o Within 25 minutes .70 1.0 - 0.0
o Within 20 minutes .68 1.0 - 0.0
o Within 15 minutes .65 1.0 - 0.0
o Within 10 minutes .60 1.0 - 0.0
o Within 5 minutes .35 1.0 - 0.0
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Table 4-XIV
Probability Inputs for Reactor Shutdowns Following
a PCRV Depressurization Accident
Isolation Valve Common Mode Failure
Reliability Fraction (beta factor)
Median Sensitivity Median Range
Range
D18: Main Loop
Isolation .999 .99 - .9999 0.03 0.01 - 0.1Valve
Closes
P21: Containment Equali- Probability of a
zation Pressure (CEP) Given CEP Range Occuring
Following a Depressuri-
zation Accident Nominal Value Sensitivity Range
CEP 1.50atm. .999 .9999 - .99
CEP 1.25atm. 1x10- 3  lxl0 - lx10- 2
Nominal Value Sensitivity Range
P23: Auxiliary Loop
Isolation Valve 
-3 
-4 -2
Remains Open on a lx10 lxl0 - lx10
Failed Auxiliary
Loop
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Table 4-XIII lists the probability of restoration of off-
site power following a simultaneous reactor trip and loss of off-
site power. The nominal values are taken directly from Ref-
erence 7, and they were assumed to apply both to the case in
which the loss of offsite power is the initiating event, and
to the case in which the loss of offsite power is initiated
by the turbine trip which accompanies all forced reactor
shutdowns.
Table 4-XIV lists those inputs which pertain only to re-
actor shutdowns following a PCRV depresurization accident.
These include the reliability of the main loop isolation valves
to close following a loop failure, the probability that the
containment equalization pressure is within a given range,
and the probability of an auxiliary loop isolation valve
failure.
4.4-3 Description of ESD Input Variables
Subsystem 4. The circulator-turbine large control valves
P(4) is the reliability of a circulator-turbine
large control valve to close upon receipt of the
shutdown initiation signal and the shutdown ver-
ification signal.
z(4) is the probability that a common mode failure
causes all three valves to fail to close.
Subsystem 5. The circulator-turbine small control valves
P(5) is the reliability of a circulator-turbine
small control valve to correctly throttle during
Subsystem 6.
Subsystem 7.
Subsystem 8.
240
the shutdown heat removal operation.
z(5) is the probability that all three circulator
turbine small control valves fail to throttle
correctly, during the shutdown heat removal
operation, due to a common mode failure.
The shutdown feedwater system
P(6) is the reliability of a shutdown feedwater
pump to deliver feedwater to its steam generator
during the shutdown and decay heat removal oper-
ations, given essential electrical power is
available.
z(6) is the probability of a common mode failure
which eliminates the shutdown feedwater system.
The auxiliary boilers
P(7) is the reliability of an auxiliary boiler
to start and reach its rated steaming conditions in
twenty minutes, given offsite power is available.
z(7) is the probability of a common mode failure
which prevents all three boilers from starting or
reaching rated conditions within twenty minutes.
Main loop transfer to the decay heat removal
operating mode.
P(8) is the reliability of a main loop to perform
the transfer to the decay heat removal operating
mode and to provide long-term decay heat removal,
given the auxiliary boiler is available.
z(8) is the probability that a common mode failure
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Subsystem 9.
Subsystem 10
Subsystem 11.
prevents all three main loops from performing
this function.
The emergency electrical supply
P(9) is the reliability of a single emergency
diesel-generator to start and assume load, given
the loss of offsite power.
z(9) is the probability of a common mode failure
which causes all three diesel-generators to fail
to start or to assume load.
The core auxiliary cooling system (CACS)
P(10) is the reliability of a single CACS loop
to provide core cooling in the event of a main
loop cooling system failure.
z(10) is the probability of a common mode
failure which eliminates the core cooling
capability of the entire CACS.
Turbine trip.
P(ll) is the reliability of the turbine trip
mechanism to close the main turbine throttle
valve given a reactor shutdown initiation sig-
nal. The closing of the turbine throttle is the
initiating signal to the resuperheater bypass
control system. A failure in the turbine
throttle mechanism which prevents the resuper-
heater bypass initiation signal is a common mode
.failure input for the resuperheater bypass system.
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Subsystem 12.
As such, it was not directly evaluated; but it
was considered to be accounted for in the beta
factor valve of Subsystem 12.
The resuperheater bypass control valve
P(12) is the reliability of this control valve
to open and properly regulate the circulator-
turbine exhaust pressure during shutdown and
decay heat removal operations.
z(12) is the probability of a common mode
failure which causes all three resuperheater
bypass control valves to fail to open.
ITEM A. The number of loops in the main loop cooling system
initially available to provide shutdown heat removal.
PRl(l) is the probability that all three of the main
cooling loops are initially available for shut-
down and decay heat removal.
PR1(2) is the probability that only two main cooling
loops are initially available for shutdown and
decay heat removal. The other loop is assumed
to be shutdown and isolated.
ITEM B. The availability of offsite power
PR1(3) is the probability that offsite power is
available following the reactor shutdown and
turbine trip.
ITEM 20. The restoration of offsite power.
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Given that the loss of offsite power either initiates
the reactor shutdown, or occurs simultaneously with
the shutdown:
P20(l) is the probability that offsite power is
restored within 30 minutes after the shutdown.
P20(2) is the probability that offsite power is re-
stored within 25 minutes after the shutdown.
P20(3) is the probability that offsite power is
restored within 20 minutes after the shutdown.
P20(4) is the probability that offsite power is
restored within 15 minutes after the shutdown.
P20(5) as the probability that offsite power is
restored within 10 minutes after the shutdown.
P20(6) is the probability that offsite power is
restored within 5 minutes after the shutdown.
In the sensitivity analyses, these valves were
varied as a set.
The above list of variables is common to the computer codes
of both the pressurized reactor shutdowns and the depressuriza-
tion accident shutdowns. The following list of variables pertains
only to the computer code for the pressurized reactor shutdowns.
ITEM 18. Main loop isolation valve operation: open to shut.
These isolation valve operations are the result of
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imbalance forces during the shutdown heat removal
operations arising from circulator-turbine control
valve failures. (See Appendix A, Section A.17 for
a more detailed explanation.).
P18(l) is the probability that a main loop isolation
valve will close due to the imbalance force
created by the failure of a CT small CV in one
of the other loops.
P18(2) is the probability that a main loop isolation
valve will close due to the imbalance force
created by the failure of a CT large CV in
one of the other loops.
ITEM 17. Main loop isolation valve operation: shut to open,
and circulator-turbine operability.
These inputs also pertain to the imbalance condi-
tion mentioned in ITEM 18.
P17(l) is the probability that a main loop isolation
valve in a normally function loop opens after
being closed during an imbalance condition.
This includes the probability that the circulator-
turbine does not fail during the period of oper-
ation behind the shut valve.
P17(2) is the probability that a main loop isolation
valve, in a loop with a CT small CV failed,
opens after being closed due to an imbalance
created by the CT large CV in another loop.
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ITEM 16.
This includes the probability that the circulator-
turbine does not fail during the period of oper-
ation behind the shut valve.
P17(3) is the probability that a circulator-turbine
remains operable in a loop in which the isolation
valve failed to close during an imbalance condi-
tion created by the failure of a CT large CV in
one of the other loops.
P17(4) is the probability that a circulator turbine
remains operable in a loop in which the isolation
value failed to close during an imbalance condi-
tion created by the failure of a CT small CV in
one of the other loops.
The restoration of initially failed shutdown feed-
pumps or diesel generators.
P16(l) is the probability that given three initially
failed shutdown feedpumps, one can be started
within twenty minutes after the shutdown.
P16(2) is the probability that given two initially
failed shutdown feedpumps, that one can be
started within twenty minutes after the shutdown.
P16(3) is the probability that a single initially
failed shutdown feed pump can be started within
twenty minutes after the shutdown.
P16(4) is the probability that a single initially
failed emergency diesel generator can be started
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within fifteen minutes after the shutdown.
P16(5) with probability that given two initially
failed emergency diesel generators, one can be
started within fifteen minutes after the shutdown.
P16(6) is the reliability of the shutdown feed pump
associated with a restarted diesel generator to
deliver feedwater to its steam generator.
P16(7) is the probability that given all three emer-
gency diesel generators have initially failed
to start, one can be started within fifteen
minutes after the shutdown.
These values were varied as a set in the sensi-
tivity analyses.
The following variables pertain only to the computer code
for the depressurized accident sequences.
ITEM D18. Main loop isolation valve operation: open to shut.
DP18 is the reliability of the main loop isolation valve
to closes, during the shutdown heat removal oper-
ation, after main loop failure occurs.
Dzl8 is the probability of a common mode failure
that prevents all the main loop isolation valves
from closing, given that all the main loops
have failed.
ITEM 21. Containment isolation following a depressurization
accident.
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P21(l) is the probability that the containment
equilazation pressure, following a depresur-
ization accident, is greater than 1.50 atmospheres.
P21(2) is the probability that the containment
equalization pressure, following a depresur-
ization accident, is less than 1.25 atmospherees.
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Chapter 5
Sensitivity Analyses
5.1 Introduction
5.1-1 Contributors to the Accident Probability
This chapter contains the results of the sensitivity
analyses performed for each of the initiating event categories.
A median valve for the probability of a core meltdown per
reactor shutdown was determined for each category, and the
sensitivity of this valve to changes in the three contributors
to the subsystem failure rate was investigated in detail. The
median core-melt probabilities are based on median point cal-
culations, and they were determined utilizing the median sub-
system reliability values, the test and maintenance unavail-
abilities, and the median beta factor value of 0.03. The sen-
sitivity analysis results for each initiating event category
are presented according to these three contributors:
1) the sensitivity to the shutdown cooling subsystem
reliability values;
2) the sensitivity to the fraction of intra-system
common mode failures, the beta factor; and
3) the contribution of the subsystem test and mainten-
ance unavailabilities.
A simplified model of the reactor shutdown cooling opera-
tions is also provided as a guide to the basic shutdown cooling
event sequences for each initiating event category.
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The sensitivity to the subsystem unit reliability values
was determined by varying these values between the high and low
ends of the sensitivity ranges presented in Table 4-VIII. These
sensitivity ranges should not be taken as an indication of the
uncertainty in the subsystem unit reliability values. Large
sensitivity ranges were specifically chosen for the purpose of
determining the variation of the probability of a core melt-
down over a wide range of subsystem unit reliability values. Also,
the choice of large sensitivity ranges magnified the sensitivity
values to allow easier comparison. The results are presented
in both tables and plots. The latter allow easy extrapolation
of the effect of possible changes in the subsystem unit relia-
bilities.
The change in the probability of a core meltdown for each
initiating event category was investigated for different beta
factor values. The beta factor value was assumed to be the
same for all subsystems, however, the contribution to the core-
melt probability due to common mode failures of the individual
subsystems was also calculated.
The overall contribution to the probability of a loss of
decay heat removal of equipment unavailabilities for test or
maintenance purposes was determined for each reactor shutdown
initiating event category. The contribution of the individual
subsystem unavailabilities was also determined.
The effect of potential design changes is discussed through-
out the chapter, and the effect of changes in the main loop
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operating times is discussed in the last section.
5.1-2 Dominant Accident Sequence Inditification Code
For each initiating event category, the dominant acci-
dent sequences are presented and discussed. These dominant
accident sequences are those with the highest probabilities
of occurrence and they constitute the major contributors to
the total core meltdown probability for the particular initia-
ting event category.
An identification code was utilized to facilitate the
discussion of the dominant accident sequences. In addition
to its ESD name, each dominant sequence is identified by a
short series of characters which represents the operating state
of the main loops and the important failures involved in the
accident sequence.
A: This represents a main loop in a fully available
operating state. This character is preceeded by a
number which indicates how many main loops are fully
available. The number 1 is understood in this code.
A main lcop failure is represented by the following characters
with primes.
L' represents the failure of the CT large CV to close.
It also represents failures of the resuperheater bypass
control valve to open.
S' represents the failure of the CT small CV to throttle.
F' represents the failure of the shutdown feedwater supply
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I' represents the failure of a main loop as the result
of a circulator-turbine imbalance condition
X': This represents the failure of the main loop cooling system
to provide long term decay heat removal. It includes
failure of the auxiliary boilers and failure to transfer
the main loops to their auxiliary steam supply.
B': For accident sequences in which offsite power is lost,
this represents the failure of the diesel generator for
one of the essential buses.
R: This represents offsite power. R denotes offsite power
restoration and R' represents failure to restore offsite
power. The time interval within which offsite power is
either restored or not restored is indicated after the R.
For example, R10' is failure to restore offsite power
within 10 minutes. R30 is the restoration offsite power
within 30 minutes.
SS': This represents a failure in a support system for the main
loop cooling system that results in main loop failure.
C: This represents the CACS. C2' and C3' are different CACS
failure modes. For pressurized accident sequences, C2'
represents failure of two CACS loops in the interval 0 to
15 minutes after the shutdown, and C3' represents the
failure of all three of the CACS loops. For depressurization
accident sequences, C3' represents failure of the CACS
to provide adequate decay heat removal following shutdown.
CP: For depressurized accident sequences only, this represents
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the containment equalization pressure (CEP) range.
CPl signifies CEP > 1.50 atm.
CP2 signifies 1.25 atm. < CEP < 1.50 atm.
CP3 signifies CEP < 1.25 atm.
A few examples of accident sequences leading to core
meltdown are given to familiarize the reader with this identi-
fication code.
K3(3A-X'-C3'). For this accident sequence, all three main loops
are fully available, but main loop transition to long term
decay heat removal fails, and all three of the CACS loops
also fail.
CC2(A-2L'-C3'). One main loop is fully available, but two main
loops have failed CT large CVs. The failure of the CACS
loops ends the sequence. (One main loop cannot operate
long enough to allow the auxiliary boilers to start.
Therefore, their failure is not included in the identifi-
cation code.)
N9(A-L'-I'-C2'). For this accident sequence, one main loop is
fully available, one main loop has a failed CT large CV,
and one main loop has failed due to the circulator-turbine
imbalance condition which followed the failure of the CT
large CV. Core meltdown occurs due to only one CACS loop
operating prior to 15 minutes after the shutdown.
M17(3A-2B'-R30'-C3'). This sequence involves the loss of offsite
power. Three main loops are available, but with two
diesels failed, two loops have no feedwater. Offsite power
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is not restored within the main loop operational period, and
the single available CACS loop fails.
L8(3A-B'-R30-C3'). Three main loops are available, and one
diesel generator has failed. Offsite power is restored
within the main loop operating time, and thus all three
CACS loops are available but fail to start.
DK3(3A-CPl-X'-C3'). Following a depressurization accident,
three main loops are available, the containment equali-
zation pressure is greater than 1.50 atm., and both the
auxiliary boilers and the CACS fail resulting in a core
meltdown.
DK8(3A-CP3-SS'-C3'). For this depressurization accident se-
quence, three main loops are available, but the contain-
ment equalization pressure is below 1.25 atm. Failure of
a main loop support system eliminates the main loops, and
a core meltdown occurs due to failure of the CACS.
5.2 Initiating Events Not Affecting the Performance of Either
Shutdown Cooling System.
5.2-1 Model of Events
Figure 5.1 is a simple diagram of the reactor shutdown
cooling operations following an initiating event which does
not degrade the performance of either shutdown cooling system.
.The shutdown cooling process begins with all three main loops
available. Individual failures in subsystems 4,5,6 or 12 will
eliminate the main loop in which they occur. Each of these
RESUPERHEATER C.T. C.T. SHUTDOWN LONG TERM
BYPASS LARGE SMALL FEEDWATER MAIN LOOP
VALVES CVs CVs SUPLY OPERATION
SUBSYSTEM
SUESYSTEM SUBSYSTEM SUBSYSTEM SUBSYSTEM 8
12 4 5 6 >2o
A1Vrr6 At Least
Ma In Main Loop
A OPENS CLOSES THROTTLES AVAILABLE MAIN LOOP Available
loo-- OPERATION y
FOR. AT LEAST
20 MINUTES
Main
pB OPEiS CLOSES THROTTLES AVAILABLE REC.UIRED cc
Loop TO ALLOW cc
AUXILIARY St
Ca OPS C S T E ALER U2P
Loop C OPENS t- CLOSES THROTTLES 4 AVAILABLE STf.T-UP hi
FIGURE 5.1 A Simple Diagram of a Reactor Shutdown Initiated .r-
By an Event Not Affecting the Performance of
Elther 8butdown Cooling I'yaten.
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failures has a different effect on the main loop shutdown
cooling performance as was discussed in Chapter 2. If main
loop operation continues for at least twenty minutes, those
auxiliary boilers which have started are assumed to be
available to begin supplying steam to drive the main helium
circulator-turbines. The correct combination of at least one
available main loop and one auxiliary boiler is necessary for
long term main loop operation. If at least one main loop is
not available for long term decay heat removal, or if the main
loops fail prior to twenty minutes, transfer to the core auxiliary
cooling system will occur.
Two of the three CACS loops are necessary prior to fifteen
minutes following the shutdown and only one of the three is
necessary after this time. If both the main loops and the CACS
fail, then a core meltdown is assumed to occur.
5.2-2 Sensitivity to the Subsystem Unit Reliability Values
The median probability of or loss of adequate decay heat
removal determined for this initiating event category is 7 X 107
per shutdown. Table 5-I lists the change in this value as the
unit reliability of a given subsystem is changed to the low or
high end of its sensitivity range. The factor change indicated
in the table represents the ratio of the category I core-melt
probability calculated at the indicated reliability value to
the median category I core-melt probability. For example, a
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TABLE 5-I.
Core Meltdown Sensitivity to Subsystem Unit Reliability
Values for Reactor Shutdowns Resulting from
Category I Initiating Events
Subsystem Unit Relia- Factor Change in the
Subsystem Index bility Sensitivity Probability of a Loss
and Name Range (Low, High) of Decay Heat Removal*
4: CT Large CV's 99 2.7
.9999 0.82
5: CT Small CV's .97 0.62
6: Shutdown Feed- .96 1.8
water System .9996 0.95
7: Auxiliary .875 3.8
Boilers .999 0.90
8: Main Loop
Transfer to .93 2.1
Decay Heat .9993 0.93Removal
Operation
10:Core Auxiliary .9 31.6
Cooling System .999 0.10
12:Resuper- 
.99 2.7heater Bypass .9999 0.81
Control Valves
*Based on the median reliability value5, the probability of a
loss of decay heat removal is 7 x 10 per shutdown.
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CT large CV reliability of .99 will result in a core-melt
probability that is 2.7 times the median value. Increasing
the CT large CV reliability to .9999 results in a core-melt
probability that is 82% of the median value.
Notice that the reliability value of the CACS is by far
the most sensitive. This is partly due to the fact that the
vast majority of core meltdowns occur in the time interval in
which two CACS loops are required. Table 5-11 lists the per-
centage of the category I core-melt probability due to accident
sequences which occur in the various EDS outcome categories.
Just over 78% of the core-melt probability is due to accident
sequences which occur prior to fifteen minutes following the
shutdown, and of these accident sequences the largest part
(over 58% of the total core-melt probability) occur with one
CACS loop operating. This indicates that significant decreases
in the core-melt probability for this category can be made by
both increasing the CACS reliability, and by increasing the
heat removal capability of the CACS loops.
Table 5-111 lists the dominant accident sequences for this
initiating event category. Those accident sequences in which
only one CACS loop operates prior to fifteen minutes following
the shutdown (ESD outcome category 4), are W9, T2, V2, Z2, CC2,
09 and R2. If one CACS loop were capable of adequate core
cooling at 10 minutes following the shutdown, T2 and R2 would
not lead to a core meltdown, and the probability of a meltdown
decreases to 6 X 10 per shutdown. If one CACS loop were
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TABLE 5-II.
A List of the Calculated Percent of Core Meltdowns
Occurring in Different Time Intervals Following Reactor
Shutdowns Due to Initiating Event Category I
ESD Time Interval in Which
Outcome Meltdown is Assumed Percent of Core
Category to Occur Meltdowns
0-15 minutes - only
one auxiliary loop
available
20-30 minutes
of decay heat
- loss
removal
15-20 minutes - loss
decay heat removal
10-15 minutes - loss
of decay heat removal
5-10 minutes - loss
of decay heat removal
within 5 minutes-loss
decay heat removal
of
58.6
22.1
0.1
1.2
14.8
3.29
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TABLE 5-III.
A List of Dominant Accident Sequences For
Reactor Shutdowns Due to Category I Initiating Events
Probability of a Loss
Accident ESD Outcome of Decay Heat Removal
Sequence Category Per Shutdown
K3(3A-X'-C3') 5 1 x 10~
W9(A-L'-I'-C2') 4 8 x 10-8
T2(3S'-C2') 4 8 x 10-8
V2(3L'-C2') 4 7 x 10- 8
Z2(A-L'-S'-C2') 4 7 x 10-8
CC2(A-2L'-C2') 4 4 x 10-8
09(A-S'-I'-C2') 4 3 x 10~8
T14(3S'-C3') 8 3 x 10-8
W23(A-L'-I'-C3') 8 3 x 10-8
Z47(A-L'-S'-C3') 8 2 x 10-8
V8(3L'-C3') 9 2 x 10-8
R2(A-2S'-C2') 4 2 x 10~8
N2(3F'-C3') 5 2 x 10- 8
031(A-S'-I' -C3') 8 1 x 10-8
CC23(A-2L'-C3') 8 1 x 10
R23(A-2S'-C3') 7 8 x 10 9
L3(2A-F'-X'-C3') 5 6 x 10 9
W3(2A-L'-X'-C3') 5 4 x 109
03(2A-S'-X'-C3') 5 3 x 10 9
Sum of all accident sequences for 7
initiating event category 7 x 10
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capable of adequate core cooling at 8 minutes following the
shutdown, Z2 and CC2 would also not lead to a core meltdown.
This decreases the probability of a core meltdown to 5 X 107
per shutdown.
The CT small CV's are the most sensitive subsystem fol-
lowing the CACS for this initiating event category. The
greater sensitivity of the CT small CV's in comparison to
the CT large CV's should not be taken to imply that the CT
small CV's are more important than the CT large CV's. The
difference in sensitivities is mainly due to the fact that
the CT small CV's have a lower median reliability in comparison
to the CT large CV's. Intrinsically, the failure of a CT
large CV is a more serious event because it eliminates the
main loop much more quickly than the failure of a CT small
CV. However, the greater sensitivity of the CT small CV's
does indicate that improvements in the reliability of this
subsystem can be beneficial.
Table 5-IV indicates the effect of changes in the operating
reliability of the main loop isolation values and the main
circulators during circulator-turbine imbalance conditions.
Notice that large changes in the reliabilities of
the isolation valves and main circulators to perform properly
during imbalance conditions due to either a failed CT large CV
or a CT small CV do not have a significant impact on the pro-
bability of a core meltdown.
Table 5-V shows the change in the probability of a core
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TABLE 5-IV.
The Sensitivity of Main Loop Isolation Valve and Circulator
Operating Reliability for Shutdowns Due to
Category I Initiating Events
Isolation Valve Factor Change in the
Isolation Valve or Circulator Probability of a
or Circulator Reliability Loss of Decay Heat
Function (High, Low) Removal
Main Loop Isolation
Valve closes due to .9995 0.87
imbalance created .999
by a failed
CT Large CV .95 1.2
CT Small CV .9
Main Loop Isolation
Valve opens follow- .9999 0.93
ing an imbalance
condition .99 1.7
Main Circulator
remains operable
following an .95 0.87
imbalance condi- .995
tion created by
a failed
CT Large CV .10 1.2
CT Small CV .75
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TABLE 5-V.
The Effect of Restarting Initially Failed Shutdown Feed
Pumps for Reactor Shutdowns Due to
Category I Initiating Events
Probability of Re-Starting
Initially Failed Shutdown
Feed Pumps Factor Change in the
(Given at Least Probability of a Loss of
15 Minutes) Decay Heat Removal
Restart 1 of 3 1.0
Restart 1 of 2 1.0 0.96
Restart 1 of l 1.0
Restart 1 of 3 .75
Restart 1 of 2 .60 0.97
Restart 1 of 1 .30
Restart 1 of 3 .25
Restart 1 of 2 .20 0.99
Restart 1 of 1 .10
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meltdown given different probabilities of re-starting ini-
tially failed shutdown feedpumps. The table shows that only
a very small decrease is gained even if all initially failed
feedpumps can be started.
In addition to Table 5-I, the sensitivites of the sub-
system unit reliability valves are illustrated in sensitivity
plots. The purpose of these plots is to allow easy extrapola-
tion of the effect of possible changes in the reliability of
various subsystems. These changes may be due to either improve-
ments in the subsystem component reliabilities, or changes in
the subsystem configuration which do not affect its performances
as modelled in the ESD's.
In each figure, the probability of a loss of decay heat
removal (per shutdown) is plotted as a function of the sub-
system unit reliability. Three curves are shown on each plot
which correspond to different values of the beta factor. The
middle curve corresponds to a beta factor for all subsystems
of 0.03. The top and bottom curves respectively correspond to
beta factors of 0.1 and 0.01 for all subsystems. The sensitivity
plots for subsystems 4,5,6,7,8, 10 and 12 are included as
Figures 5.2 through 5.8, respectively.
As an example of the use of these curves, each-CACS loop
air cooler contains two forced-air fans. The correct operation
of both fans was assumed necessary for proper CACS loop per-
formance. However, should the operation of only one fan be
adequate, the unit reliability of the CACS would increase to
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FIGURE 5.2 Sensitivity plot of subsystem I4 for
shutdowns due to category I initiating
events
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FIGURE 5.3 Sensitivity plot of subsystem 5 for shutdowns
due to category I initiating events
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SUBSYSTEM 6, THE SHUTDOWN FEEDWATER SYSTEM
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FIGURE 5.4 Sensitivity plot of subsystem 6 for shutdowns
due to category I initiating events
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SUBSYSTEM 7, THE AUXILIARY BOILERS
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FIGURE 5.5 Sensitivity plot of subsystem 7 for shutdowns
due to category I initiating events
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SUBSYSTEM 8, MAIN LOOP TRANSFER TO
DECAY HEAT REMOVAL OPERATION
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FIGURE 5.6 Sensitivity plot of subsystem 8 for shutdowns
due to category I initiating events
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FIGURE 5.7 Sensitivity plot of subsystem 10 for
shutdowns due to category I initiating
events
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SUBSYSTEM 12, THE RESUPERHEATER BYPASS
CONTROL VALVES
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FIGURE 5.8 Sensitivity plot of subsystem 12 for shutdowns
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.9943. Figure 5.7 is the sensitivity plot of the CACS, and
for the median beta factor, this increase in the CACS unit
reliability would result in a decrease in the probability of a
core meltdown to about 4 X 10 7 per shutdown.
The importance of the component reliability of the main
loop shutdown cooling system was also investigated for this
initiating event category. The sensitivity of this value to
changes in the main loop subsystem reliability valves was deter-
mined. Core meltdowns following a reactor shutdown occur due to
failure of both the main loop cooling system and the CACS. It
was felt that some main loop subsystems might be more impor-
tant toward increasing the main loop reliability than to decreas-
ing the core meltdown probability.
Table 5-VI shows the sensitivity of the main loop shutdown
cooling subsystems toward the unreliability of main loop
shutdown cooling. The median reliability of the main loop shut-
down cooling system was determined to be .9989. The sensiti-
vities are represented as changes in the unreliability (the
compliment of the reliability) because this gives numbers that
are more easily comparable. A decrease in the reliability from
the median value to .9980 is only a .999 factor change.
However, this same change is an increase by a factor of 1.8 in
the unreliability.
The auxiliary boilers and the CT small CV's show the
greatest senstivity, but on the whole, the subsystems have
the same general effect. This would indicate that they all con-
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TABLE 5-VI.
Sensitivity of the Subsystem Unit Reliability Values
to the Reliability of Main Loop Shutdown Cooling for
Reactor Shutdowns Due to Category I Initiating events
Subsystem Unit Factor Change in the
Reliability Unreliability of the
Subsystem Index Sensitivity Main Loop Shutdown
and Name Range (Low, High) Cooling System*
4: CT Large CV's .99 089
5: CT Small CV's .97 5726
6: Shutdown feed- .96 2.4
water System .9996 0.93
7: Auxiliary .875 7.7
Boilers .999 0.77
8: Main Loop
Transfer to 93 3.8Decay Heat 
.9993 0.81Removal
Operation
12: Resuperheater .99 2.0
Bypass Control .9999 0.93
Valves
*1.1 x 10-3 per shutdown based on median subsystem reliability
values. Corresponds to a reliability of .9989.
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tribute more or less equally to the main loop shutdown cooling
reliability.
5.2-3 Sensitivity to Intrasystem Common Mode Failures
Due to the potentially serious effect of common mode
failures on the reactor shutdown cooling operation, the sensi-
tivity of the results to changes in the subsystem beta factors
were investigated in detail. Table 5-VII lists the median
probabilities of a loss of decay heat removal (per shutdown).
at different beta factor values.
The relatively small change in the probability of a melt-
down between P= 0.0 (no common mode failures) and = 0.01
(1% of all unit failures are common mode failures) is due to
the fact that at low values of the beta factor, the predominant
means of core meltdown is due to the failure of two CACS loops
prior to fifteen minutes following the shutdown. This can be
seen from Table 5-VIII, which lists at different values of a,
the percent of the core-melt probability due to accident sequences
which occur in the various ESD outcome categories. At a=0.01,
outcome category 4 still represents almost 85% of the core-
melt probability. At higher values of the beta factor, those
accident sequences involving common mode failures begin to
appear and eventually dominate at a=0.1. This is seen by the
increases in outcome categories 5,8 & 9.
Table 5-IX lists the dominant accident sequences according
to their individual outcome categories. For outcome category 4,
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TABLE 5-VII.
The Probability of a Loss of Decay Heat Removal at
Different Beta Factor Values for Shutdowns Due to
Category I Initiating Events
Probability of a Loss of
Common Mode Failure Decay Heat Removal
(Beta Factor) (Per Shutdown)
0.0 3 x 10-
0.003 3 x 107
0.01 4 x 10-
0.03 7 x 10-
0.1 3 x 10-6
TABLE 5-VIII
A List of the Calculated Percent of Core Meltdown
Occuring at Different Time Intervals Following A
Shutdown Due to Category I Initiating Events.
Time Interval Following Percent of Core Meltdowns
ESD Outcome Shutdown in Which Melt-
Category down is Assumed to Occur B=0.0 -=0.003 ==0.01 B==0.03 -=0.01
0-15 minutes due to only
4 one auxiliary loop available 99.5 99.5 84.8 58.6 23.9
20-30 minutes-loss of
5 decay heat removal 0.07 1.1 5.7 22.1 50.1
15-30 minutes-loss of
6 decay heat removal 0.001 0.009 0.03 0.1 0.2
10-15 minutes-loss of
7 decay heat removal 0.04 0.3 0.8 1.2 0.9
5-10 minutes-loss of
8 decay heat removal 0.4 3.0 8.0 14.8 17.3
within 5 minutes-loss of
9 decay heat removal 0.002 0.1 0.7 3.2 7.7
U,
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TABLE 5-IX
A List of the Dominant Accident Sequences
According to their Outcome Categories for
Shutdowns due to Category I Initiating Events
OUTCOME CATEGORY 4: Only One CACS Loop Available 0 to 15
Minutes after the Shutdown
Accident Probability of a Loss of Decay Heat
Sequence Removal (per shutdown)
=0.0 3=0.003j 3=0.01 3=0.03 3=0.1
W9(A-L'-I'-C2') 8x10-8 -constant .
Z2(A-L'-S'-C2') 7x10~ "
09(A-S'-I'-C2') 3x10-8
CC2(A-2L'-C2') 4x10-8
R2(A-2S'-C2') 2x10-8
V2(3L'-C2') lx10~10 7x10~9 2x10-8 7x10-8 2x10~7
T2(3S'-C2') x10~10 3x10~ 9  3xl0-8  8x10- 8 3x10~7
Sum of all accident 
_7 7 
_7 7
sequences for this 3x10 3x10 3x10 4x10 7x10
category
OUTCOME CATEGORY 5: Loss of Decay Heat Removal 20 to 30
Minutes after the Shutdown
Accident Probability of a Loss of Decay Heat
Sequence Removal (per shutdown)
_=0.0 =0.003 S=0.01 S=0.03 a=0.1
K3(3A-X'-C3') lx1010 2x10~9 lx10~ lxlO lxl0-6
N2(3F'-C3') <lxlO l lx10~10 2x10~9 2x10-8 2x10~7
L3(2A-F'-X'-C3') 5xd0~11 4x0-10 2x10~9 6x10 4x10-8
W3(2A-L'-X'-C3') <1x10~1 1 lx10-10 lx10-9 4x10 3xl0-8
03(2A-S'-X'-C3') <x0~1 1 lx10- 1 0 8x10-10 3x10 9 2x10-8
Sum of all accident 
-10 -9 -8 -7 
-6
sequences for this 2x10 3x10 2x10 lx10 2x10
category I _ I II 
_ II
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TABLE 5-IX (continued)
OUTCOME CATEGORY 8: Loss of Decay Heat Removal 5 to 10
Minutes after Shutdown
Accident Probability of a Loss of Decay Heat
Sequence Removal (per shutdown)
6=0.0 6=0.003 6=0.01 =0.03 f=0.1
- 10 - 10 -9-88
T14(3S'-C3') <lxlO 3x10 3x10 3x10 3x10
W23(A-L'-I'-C3') 3x10 lx10 9x10 3x10 8x10
Z47(A-L'-S'-C3') <lxlO10 3x109 8x109 2x10-8 8x10-8
031(A-S'-I'-C3') <lxlO10 lx10~9 4x10~9 1x10-8 4x10-8
CC23(A-2L'-C3') <lxlO10 2x10~9 5x10~9 1x10-8 5x10-8
Sum of all accident 
-10 -9 -8 -7 -7
sequences for this 9x10 9x10 3x10 lx10 5x10
category
OUTCOME CATEGORY 9: Loss of Decay Heat Removal within 5
Minutes of the Shutdown
Accident Probability of a Loss of Decay Heat
Sequence Removal (per shutdown)
6=0.0 6=0.003 =0.01 6=0.03 6=0.1
V8(3L'-C3') lx10- 1 2 3x10 10 3x10~9  2x10- 8 2x10 7
Sum of all accident -12
sequences for this 4x10 3x10 10 3x10 9  2x10 8  2x10
category
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accident sequences W9, Z2, 09, C2 and R2 are all independent
of common mode failures. At S=0 they are dominant, but as 6
increases, accident sequences V2 and T2 increase until they
become dominant. These two accident sequences involve
common mode failures of the CT large CV's and CT small CV's
respectively.
For outcome category 5, no sequences contribute signifi-
cantly until high beta factors. The accident sequence K3 is
the dominant accident at S=0.03 and 0.1. It involves common
mode failures of the auxiliary boilers and the CACS. The
accident sequence N2 is the other major contributor in this
category, and it involves common mode failures of the shut-
down feedwater supply and the CACS.
The two dominant sequences from outcome categories 8 and
9, T14 and V8, involve common mode failures of the circulator-
turbine control valves and the CACS.
The contribution of the individual subsystem common mode
failures was investigated by varying the individual subsystem beta
factor value while keeping the other subsystem beta factor
values constant. The sensitivities were investigated at the
low, median and high beta factor values. Table 5-X lists the
factor change in the probability of a loss of decay heat re-
moval for the two cases in which
1) all beta factor values are low and the individual
beta factor values are high, and
2) all beta factor values are high and the individual
beta factor values are low.
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TABLE 5-X.
The Individual Subsystem Common Mode Failure
Contributions at High and Low Beta Factor Values for
Shutdowns Due to Category I Initiating Events
Subsystem Index Factor Change in the Probability
and Name of a Loss of Decay Heat Removal
Beta Value for Beta Value for
Individual Individual
Subsystems is 0.1 Subsystems is 0.01
While All Others While All Others
Are 0.01 Are 0.1
4: CT Large CV's 1.3 0.94
5: CT Small CV's 1.8 0.84
6: Shutdown Feed- 1.1 0.93
water Supply
7: Auxiliary 1.2 0.79
Boilers
8: Main Loop
Decay Heat 1.1 0.84
Removal
Operation
10:Core Auxiliary 2.3 0.32
Cooling System
12:Resuperheater
Bypass Control 1.3 0.93
Values
4
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In both cases, the common mode failure contribution of the
CACS as the most significant. These common mode failure
sensitivites are also shown in the bargraph representation
of Figure 5.9. The upper line represents f=0.l for all sub-
systems, and the lower line represents 6=0.01 for all sub-
systems. The bars show the increase or decrease in the pro-
bability of a core meltdown as the individual beta factor is
varied to 0.01 or 0.1.
Table 5-XI lists the change in the probability of a core
meltdown as the individual subsystem beta factor values are
varied to 0.01 and 0.1 and all other beta factor values are
0.03. Figure 5.10 is the bargraph representation. The common
mode failure contribution of the CACS is the most important.
The effect of changes in the beta factor value on the sen-
sitivity of the subsystem unit reliability values is shown in
Table 5-XII. Notice that the sensitivity of subsystems 4, 5 &
12 decreases as the fraction of common mode failures increases.
These subsystems essentilly determine the main loop availability
states. As the reliability of these subsystems decreases,
the initial main loop performance is degraded, and two CACS
loops are required more often. At lower values of the beta factor,
the percentage of failures that occur due to failure of two
CACS loops prior to 15 minutes after the shutdown is higher.
Therefore, changes in the reliability of subsystems 4,5 or 12
has a greater effect on the probability of a core meltdown.
As the beta factor value -increases, the percentage of the outcome
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TABLE 5-XI.
The Individual Subsystem Common Mode Failure
Contributions at Median Beta Factor Values for
Shutdowns Due to Category I Initiating Events
Subsystem Index Factor Change in the Probability
and Name of a Loss of Decay Heat Removal
Beta Value for Beta Value for
Individual Individual
Subsystems is 0.1 Subsystems is 0.01
While All Others While All Others
Are 0.03 Are 0.03
4: CT Large CV's 1.1 0.96
5: CT Small CV's 1.4 0.90
6: Shutdown Feed- 1.1 0.98
water System
7: Auxiliary 1.2 0.94
Boilers
8: Main Loop
Decay Heat 1.7 0.97
Removal
Operation
10:Core Auxiliary 2.0 0.73Cooling System
12:Resuperheater
Bypass Control 1.2 0.96
Valves
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TABLE 5-XII
The Sensitivity of the Subsystem Unit Reliability
Valves at Different Beta Factor Values for Shut-
downs Due to Category I Initiating Events.
Subsystem
Unit Factor Change in the Probability
Reliability of A Loss of Decay Heat Removal
Subsystem Sensitivity
Index and Range All Beta= All Beta = All Beta=
Name (lowhigh) 0.01 0.03 0.1
4:CT Large .99 3.2 2.7 1.9
CV's .9999 0.78 0.82 0.89
5:CT Small .97 10.7 7.9 4.4
CV's .9997 0.54 0.62 0.75
6:Shutdown .96 1.2 1.8 2.2
Feedwater
System .9996 0.99 0.95 0.93
7: Auxiliary .875 2.2 3.8 5.4
Boilers .999 0.97 0.90 0.79
8: Main Loop
Transfer to .93 1.5 2.1 3.1
Decay Heat
Removal .9993 0.98 0.93 0.84
Operation
10:Core
Auxiliary .9 39.6 31.6 20.3
Cooling
System .9999 0.76 0.81 0.88
285
category 4 failures decreases as the beta factor increases,
and it is primarily due to this effect.
As the beta factor value increases, those accident se-
quences which involve a common mode failure in the main loops
and in the CACS become dominant. Those accident sequences
that involve common mode failures in the auxiliary boilers or the
shutdown feedwater supply are the most likely, and this explains
why the sensitivity of subsystems 6, 7 and 8 increases as the
beta factor value increases. The common mode failure probability
is tied to the subsystem unit reliability through the beta
factor. Thus, changes in the reliability of subsystems 6, 7 and
8 are more important at higher beta factor values because of
the greater contribution of their common mode failures to the
probability of a core meltdown.
Lastly, Table 5-XIII shows that sensitivity of the main
loop isolation valve and main circulator operating reliability
during a circulator-turbine imbalance condition increases
slightly as the beta factor value decreases. This is due to
their contribution to ESD outcome category 4. However, their
affect on the probability of a core meltdown is rather small.
5.2-4 The Contribution of Test and Maintenance Unavailabilities
The effect of equipment unavailabilities, due to test
or maintenance purposes, on the probability of a loss of decay
heat removal can be seen in both Table 5-XIV and Figure 5.11.
At the median beta factor value, the probability of a core melt-
down is 3 X 10~ per shutdown with equipment failures only. The
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TABLE 5-XIII
The Sensitivity of Main Loop Isolation Valve
and Main Circulator Operating Reliability During
Circulator-turbine Imbalances for Shutdowns Due
to Category I Initiating Events
Isolation Factor Change in the
Function Valve or Probability of a Loss
Circulator of Decay Heat Removal
Reliability
(low, high) S=0.01 S=0.03 S=0.l
Main Loop
Isolation Valve
Closes due to .9995 0.79 0.87 0.95
Imbalance Created .999
by a failed
CT Large CV .95 1.3 1.2 1.1
CT Small CV .9
Main Loop
Isolation Valve
Opens Following .9999 0.90 0.93 0.98
an Imbalance .99 2.0 1.7 1.2
Condition
Main Circulator
Remains Operable
Following an .95
Imbalance Created .995 0.79 0.87 0.95
by a failed
CT Large CV .10
CT Small CV .75 1.4 1.2 1.1
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TABLE 5-XIV.
A List of Core Meltdown Probabilities for Equipment
Failures Only and all Failure Contributions for
Shutdowns Due to Category I Initiating Events
Intrasystem Probability of a Loss of Decay Heat
Common Mode Removal (Per Shutdown)
Failure
Fraction Equipment Failures
(Beta Factor) and Test and
Equipment Maintenance
Failures Only Unavailabilities
0.0 4 x 10- 8  3 x 10
0.003 5 x 10-8 3 x 10~7
0.01 9 x 10- 8  4 x l0
0.03 3 x 10~ 7  7 x 10~ 7
0.1 2 x 10-6 3 x 10-6
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inclusion of test and maintenance unavailabilities increases the
core-melt probability by a factor of 2.2. The variation in
the probability of a core meltdown can best be seen in
Figure 5.11. At low beta factor values, the test and main-
tenance unavailability contribution is large, but as the beta
factor value increases, this contribution decreases due to the
dominance of common mode failures.
Table 5,-XV lists the percentage of the core-melt probability
due to accident sequences occurring in the different ESD outcome
categories considering equipment failures only. In comparison
to Table 5-VIII, it can be seen that including test and main-
tenance unavailabilities greatly increases the percent of core
meltdowns which occur due to only one CACS loop operating
prior to 15 minutes following shutdown. At the median beta
factor value the percent of the core-melt probability due
to outcome category 4 accident sequences is doubled by including
test and maintenance unavailabilities.
A list of the dominant accident sequences considering no
test and maintenance unavailabilities is shown in Table 5-XVI.
The table lists the change in the accident sequence probability
given in Table 5-III. A comparison with Table 5-III shows that
the outcome category 4 sequences appear much lower in the order
without test and maintenance unavailabilities. Also, their
probability is most greatly decreased from the value in Table
5-III, which includes test and maintenance unavailabilities. It
is interesting to note that in Table 5-XVI the first six acci-
dent sequences involve common mode failures.
TABLE 5-XV
A List of the Calculated Percent of Core Melt-
downs Occuring at Different Time Intervals Fol-
lowing Shutdown. Subsystem Failures Due to
Equipment Failure Only. Category I Initiating
Events.
ESD Outcome Time Interval Following Percent of Core Meltdowns
Category Shutdown in Which Melt-
down is Assumed to Occur fS=0.0 f=0.003 3=0.01 S=O.03 =0.1
0-15 minutes due to only
4 one auxiliary loop available 99.7 86.4 59.5 26.1- 7.4
20-30 minutes-loss of
5 decay heat removal 0.01 2.9 16.1 42.1 62.5
15-20 minutes-loss of
6 decay heat removal 0.0001 0.01 .05 0.01 0.1
10-15 minutes-loss of
7 decay heat removal 0.04 1.5 3.0 2.7 1.2
5-10 minutes-loss of
8 decay heat removal 0.2 8.8 13.8 22.4 18.7
within 5 minutes-loss of
9 decay heat removal 0.0006 0.4 2.5 6.7 10.1
O
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TABLE 5-XVI.
A List of the Dominant Accident Sequences Considering
Equipment Failures Only for Shutdowns Due to
Category I Initiating Events
Factor Change in the
Individual Accident
Accident ESD Outcome Sequence Probability
Sequence Category Given in Table 5-111
K3(3A-X'-C3') 5 0.92
T14(3S'-C3') 8 0.96
V8(3L'-C3') 9 0.95
NZ(3F'-C3') 5 0.95
TZ(3S'-C2') 4 0.26
V2(3L'-C2') 4 0.25
W23(A-L'-I'-C3') 8 0.55
Z47(A-L'-S'-C3') 8 0.55
031(A-S'-I'-C3') 8 0.96
W9(A-L'-I'-C2') 4 0.15
Z2(A-L'-S'-C 2 ') 4 0.15
09(A-S'-I'-C2') 4 0.27
R23(A-2S'-C3') 7 0.99
R2(A-2S'-C2') 4 0.26
CC2(A-2L'-C2') 4 0.10
CC23(A-2L'-C3') 8 0.39
03(2A-S'-X'-C3') 5 0.51
W3(2A-L'-X'-C3') 5 0.29
L3(2A-F'-X'-C3') 5 0.20
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TABLE 5-XVII
The Contribution of Individual Subsystem Test and
Maintenance Unavailabilities for Shutdowns due to
Category I Initiating Events
Subsystem Test and Factor Change in the Probability
Index and Maintenance of a Loss of Decay Heat Removal*
Name Unavailability T & M Unavailability Included on
(per unit) Specific Subsystem only
S=0.01 S=0.03 S=0.1
6:Shutdown 
-3
Feedwater 4x10 1.0 1.0 1.0
Supply
7:Auxiliary 1.2x10-2  1.0 1.0 1.0Boilers
8:Main Loop
Transfer to 
-
3
Decat Heat 4x10 1.0 1.0 1.0
Removal
Operation
10:Core
Auxiliary 1.2x10-2  2.7 1.8 1.3Cooling
System
12: Resuperheater
Bypass 2x10-3 1.4 1.2 1.1Control
Valves
* The core-melt probability considering equipment failures
only is given in Table 5-XIV.
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TABLE 5-XVIII.
Main Loop Shutdown Cooling Reliability With and Without
Test and Maintenance Unavailabilities for Shutdowns
Due to Category I Initiating Events
Intrasystem Reliability of the Main Loop
Common Mode Shutdown Cooling System
Failure
Fraction Equipment Failures
(Beta Factor) and Test and
Equipment Maintenance
Failures Only Unavailabilities
0.0 .9998 .9996
0.003 .9997 .9996
0.01 .9996 .9994
0.03 .9991 .9989
0.1 .9975 .9973
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The individual subsystem contributions due to test and
maintenance unavailability are shown in Table 5-XVII. The
table clearly shows that only the unavailability of the CACS
and the resuperheater bypass control valves has any effect on
the probability of a core meltdown. The resuperheater bypass
unavailability, even though it is small compared to that of the
CACS, is significant because failures of the resuperheater
bypass circuit were assumed to quickly eliminate that main loop
involved.
Table 5-XVIII shows that equipment test and maintenance
unavailabilities do not have any significant effect on the
main loop shutdown cooling reliability.
5.3 Initiating Events Affecting the Performance of a
Single Main Cooling Loop
5.3-1 Model of Events
Figure 5.12 is a simplified diagram of the reactor shut-
down cooling operations following a shutdown initiated by an
event which eliminates a single main cooling loop. A forced
shutdown results from these events only if an operational pro-
tection system failure also occurs. The shutdown cooling
operations begin with two main loops available. Three auxiliary
boilers are available, but both main loops must remain fully
available in order to allow sufficient time for the boilers to
RESUPERHEATER
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VALVES
SUBSYSTEM
12
C.T.
LARGE
CVs
SUBSYSTEM
4
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6
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For Main Loop B STARTS
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FIGURE 5.12 A Simple Diagram of a Reactor Shutdown Initiated
By an Event Eliminating a Single Main \D
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reach rated conditions. If at any time main loop failure
occurs, all three CACS loops are available to take over the
core cooling.
5.3-2 Sensitivity of the Subsystem Unit Reliability Values
The median value for the probability of a loss of decay
heat removal for reactor shutdowns due to category II.A initiating
-5
events is 2 X 10 per shutdown. Table 5-XIX lists the
sensitivities of the subsystem unit reliability values. For
these reactor shutdowns, the subsystem sensitivities follow
the same trend as the subsystem sensitivities for reactor shut-
down due to category I initiating events. The reliability of the
CACS is, by far, the most important factor determining the pro-
bability of a core meltdown. However, the reliability of the
auxiliary boilers is not a significant factor.
Table 5-XX lists the dominant accident sequences for this
initiating event category. The first four accident sequences are
the most dominant contributors. These are CC2, Z2, CC23 and
Z47. For these sequences only a single main loop is available
due to a failure of either the resuperheater bypass control
valve, the CT large CV, or the CT small CV on the other main
loops. A single main loop cannot operate long enough to allow
the auxiliary boilers to reach their rated conditions, and the
CACS is required to operate. The small sensitivity of the
auxiliary boiler reliability value is due to the fact that the
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TABLE 5-XIX.
Core Meltdown Sensitivity of the Subsystem Unit Reliability
Values for Shutdowns Due to Category II.A Initiating Events
Subsystem Unit Factor Change in the
Reliability Probability of a
Subsystem Index Sensitivity Loss of Decay
and Name Range (Low, High) Heat Removal*
4: CT Large CV's .99 2.0
.9999 0.85
5: CT Small CV's .97 4.2
.9997 0.64
6: Shutdown Feed- .96 1.1
water System .9996 1.0
7: Auxiliary .875 1.4
Boilers .999 0.99
8: Main Loop
Transfer to .93 1.4
Decay Heat .9993 0.99
Removal
Operation
10:Core Auxiliary .9 34.8
Cooling System .999 0.10
12:Resuperheater .99 2.0
Bypass Control .9999 0.84
Values
*Based on the median subsystem reliability values, the
probability of a loss of decay heat removal is 2 x 10-5
per shutdown.
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TABLE 5-XX.
A List of the Dominant Accident Sequences For
Reactor Shutdowns Due to Category II.A Initiating Events
Probability of a Loss
Accident ESD Outcome of Decay Heat Removal
Sequence Category Per Shutdown
CC2(A-L'-C2') 4 7 x 106
Z2(A-S'-C2') 4 5 x 10 6
CC23(A-L'-C3') 8 2 x 1o
6
Z47(A-S'-C3') 8 1 x 106
W3(2A-X'-C3') 5 3 x 10
X3(A-F'-X'-C3') 5 1 x 10
BB2(2S'-C2') 4 9 x 10
V2(2L'-C2') 4 8 x 1o8
D2(L'-F'-C2') 4 5 x 108
BB28(2S'-C3') 8 3 x 108
V8(2L'-C3') 9 
3 x 10-8
Y2(2F'-C3') 6 
3 x 108
CC6 (L 1-1I1-C2 1 4 3 x108
AA2(F'-S'-C2') 4 
3 x 108
DD41(F'-L'-C3') 8 2 x108
U2(L'-S'-C2') 4 
2 x 10
Z14 (S ' -I ' -C2') 4 1 x 
1o8
AA64(F'-S'-C3') 8 
1 x 10-8
Sum of all accident sequences for -
this initiating category 2 x 10
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auxiliary boilers do not operate in these four accient sequences.
The large sensitivity of the CACS reliability value is due to
the fact that it is required to operate prior to 15 minutes
following the shutdown in all but three of the sequences listed
in Table 5-XX. It is interesting that the two most likely
accident sequences for this initiating event category (CC2 and
Z2) could be eliminated by increasing the design capability of
the CACS so that one auxiliary loop was adequate at eight
minutes after the shutdown. This would decrease the probability
-6
of a core meltdown to about 5 X 10 per shutdown.
The median probability of a core meltdown for this initia-
ting event category was not significantly affected by changes
in the main loop isolation value operating reliability or main
circulator operating reliability during circulator-turbine
imbalance conditions. The effect of restarting initially failed
shutdown feedpumps was also insignificant. This is due to the
small contribution, for this initiating event category, of those
accident sequences involving shutdown feedpump failures and main
loop failures due to circulator-turbine imbalance conditions.
Figure 5.13 is the sensitivity plot of the CACS reliability
value for shutdowns due to initiating events which eliminate
one main loop. An increase in the CACS unit reliability to
.9943 due to the design change mentioned in section 5.2-2
would decrease the probability of a core meltdown for this ini-
tiating event category to 1 X 10-5 per shutdown. Only a sensi-
tivity plot of the CACS is provided due to the greater sensitivity
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of this subsystem over the others.
5.3-3 Sensitivity to Common Mode Failures and Test and Main-
tenance Unavailabilities
The variation in the probability of a loss of decay
heat removal due to both common mode failures and test and
maintenance unavailabilities is shown in Table 5-XXI. Notice
that the probability of a core meltdown is increased more by
the inclusion of the test and maintenance unavailabilities than
by increases in the beta factor value.
It can be seen in Table 5-XXII, that the majority of core
meltdowns occur with only a single CACS loop available prior
to fifteen minutes following the shutdown. At the median beta
factor value, 74% of the core-melt probability is due to accident
sequences of this type. In Table 5-XXIII, the individual
accident sequences for outcome categories 4 and 8 are listed.
Many of the accident sequences from outcome category 4 are
unaffected by common mode failures, but all are affected by
test and maintenance unavailability of the CACS. The accident
sequences of outcome category 8 all increase as the beta
factor value increases due to common mode failure of the
CACS.
After considering the dominant accident sequences, it is
not too suprising that the investigation of the individual sub-
system common mode failure contributions showed that only common
mode failure of the CACS were significant. Also, the investigation
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TABLE 5-XXI.
A List of Core-Melt Probabilities for Equipment
Failures Only and for all Failure Contributions for
Shutdowns Due to Category II.A Initiating Events
Intrasystem Probability of a Loss of Decay
Common Mode Heat Removal (Per Shutdown)
Failure
Fraction Equipment Failures
(Beta Factor) and Test and
Equipment Maintenance
Failures Only Unavailability
0.0 2 x 10- 6  1 x 10- 5
0.003 3 x 106 1 x 105
0.01 4 x 10- 6  1 x 10- 5
0.03 6 x 10-6 2 x 10-5
0.1 1 x 10 5 3 x 10
5
TABLE 5-XXII
A List of the Calculated Percent of Core Meltdowns
Occuring for the Various ESD Outcome Categories for
Shutdowns due to Category II.A Initiating Events
OC)
ESD Outcome Time Interval Following Percent of Core Meltdowns
Category Shutdown in which Melt-
down is Assumed to Occur S=0.0 =0.003 S=0.01 =0.03 S=0.1
4 0-15 minutes only one
CACS loop available 99.6 96.3 89.5 74.0 44.8
5 20-30 minutes-loss ofdecay heat removal 0.03 0.3 0.8 2.2 7.2
6 & 7 10-20 minutes-loss ofdecay heat removal 0.0006 0.007 0.03 0.2 0.8
8 5-10 minutes-loss ofdecay heat removal 0.4 3.4 9.6 23.3 46.1
9 within 5 minutes-loss
of decay heat removal 0.003 0.03 0.01 0.03 1.1
304TABLE 5-XXIII
A List of the Dominant Accident Sequences
According to Outcome Categories for Shutdowns
due to Category II.A Initiating Events
OUTCOME CATEGORY 4: Only One CACS Loop Available 0 to 15
Minutes after the Shutdown
Accident Probability of a Loss of Decay Heat
Sequence Removal (per shutdown)
6=0.0 3=0.003 1=0.01 =0.03 =O.l
CC2(A-L'-C2') 7x10 6  constant
Z2(A-S'-C2') 5x10-6
BB2(2S'-C2') 9x10~9 2x10 3x10-8 9x10-8 3x10
V2(2L'-C2') 4x10~ 5x10-8 6x10-8 lx10~7 3x10
DD2(F'-L'-C2') 5x10-8 constant
AA2(F'-S'-C2') 3x10 3x10-8 3x10-8 3xl0 3x10-8
CC6(L'-I'-C2') 2x10 8 'constant
U2(L'-S'-C2') 2x10-8
Z14(S'-I'-C2') lx10 8
Sum of all accident l 5  0 5  5  5  5
sequences for this lx10 lx10 1x10 lx1- lx10
category
OUTCOME CATEGORY 8: Loss of Decay Heat Removal 5 to 10
Minutes after the Shutdown
Accident Probability of a Loss of Decay Heat
Sequence Removal (per shutdown)
_=0.0 3=0.003 6=0.01 =0.03 3=0.1
CC23(A-L'-C3') 3x10~8 3x10 7  8x10 7  2x10-6 8x10-6
Z47(A-S'-C3') 2x10-8 2x10 7  6x10 7  lx10- 6 5x10-6
BB28(2S'-C3') <lx10~1 0 6x10 10 4x10 9  3x10~8  5x10-8
DD4l(F'-L'-C3') lx10~1 0 2x10 5x10~9 2x10-8 5x10-8
AA64(F'-S'-C3') <lx10~ 1 0 lXO9 4x10~9 lx10~8  4x10~8
Sum of all accident 
-8 6 6 5sequences for this 5x10 4x10 lx10 4x10 lx10
category
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TABLE 5-XXIV
The Contribution of Individual Subsystem Test and
Maintenance Unavailabilities For Shutdowns Due to
Category II.A Initiating Events.
Factor Change in the Probability
of a Loss of Decay Heat Removal*
T & M Unavailability included on
Subsystem T & M Specific Subsystem Only.
Index and Unavailability
Name Per Unit Beta=0.0l Beta=0.03 Beta=0.l
10:Core 1.2X10- 2  3.0 2.2 1.5
Auxiliary
Cooling
System
12:Resuperheater 2X10 3  1.3 1.3 1.3
Bypass Control
Valves
* The core-melt probability considering equipment failures only
is given in Table 5-XXI.
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TABLE 5-XXV
The Sensitivity of the Subsystem Unit Reliability
Values at Different Beta Factor Values for Shutdowns
Due to Category II.A Initiating Events
Subsystem
Unit Factor Change in the Probability
Reliability of a Loss of Decay Heat Removal
Subsystem Sensitivity
Index and Range
Name (low, high) Beta=0.0l Beta=0.03 Beta=0.1
4:CT Large .99 2.1 2.0 2.0
CV's .9999 0.85 0.85 0.86
5:CT Small .97 4.2 4.2 4.0
CV's .9997 0.63 0.64 0.65
6:Shutdown .96 1.0 1.1 1.2
Feedwater
System .9996 1.0 1.0 0.99
7:Auxiliary .875 1.1 1.4 1.9
Boilers .999 1.0 0.99 0.97
8: Main Loop
Transfer to .93 1.1 1.4 1.4
Decay Heat .9993 1.0 0.99 0.97
Removal
Operation
10: Core
Auxiliary .9 39.6 34.8 25.7
Cooling .999 0.10 0.10 0.11
System
12: Resuperheater .99 2.1 2.0 2.0
Bypass Control
Valves .9999 0.84 0.84 0.85
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of the test and maintenance unavailability contributions
showed that the major effect was due to CACS loop unavailability
but that resuperheater bypass system unavailability also con-
tributed. The test and maintenance unavailability contribution
of these two subsystems is shown in Table 5-XXIV.
Table 5-XXV lists the sensitivities of the subsystem unit
reliability values at the low, median and high beta factor
values. Notice that the sensitivity of subsystems 4,5 & 12 do
not change significantly as the fraction of common mode
failures increases. This is due to their contribution to the
accident sequences CC2(A-L'-C2') and Z2(A-S'-C2') which are
not affected by common mode failures. The sensitivity of sub-
systems 6,7 & 8 is quite small over the entire range of beta
factor values. The sensitivity of the CACS decreases as the
beta factor value increases due to the decrease in the per-
centage of core meltdowns which occur in outcome category 4.
5.4 Losses of Offsite Power
5.4-1 Model of Events
Figure 5.14 is a simplified model of the reactor shutdown
cooling operations in which the plant offsite power supply is
initially unavailable. The reactor shutdown begins with three
main loops available. However, the operation of the shutdown
feedpumps is dependent upon the starting of their corresponding
emergency diesel generators, and the auxiliary boilers which are
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powered by the non-essential bus, are initially unavailable.
Also, because main loop operation was assumed limited to 30
minutes due to steam generator inventory depletion, the auxi-
lairy boilers cannot reach their rated operating conditions
unless offsite power is restored within 5 to 10 minutes. There-
fore, if offsite power is not restored early, the CACS must
eventually take over core cooling, and the CACS operation is
also dependent on the diesel generator performance.
Powering the auxiliary boiler electrical requirements
from the essential buses is a possible design option which was
explored in some detail. In the ESD, the auxiliary boilers
were modelled so that they could be treated as being powered
from either the essential buses or the non-essential bus. If
the auxiliary boilers are powered from the essential buses,
their availability is dependent on the operation of the emergency
diesel generators, and long term main loop operation may occur
even if offsite power is not restored. A model of the shutdown
cooling operations for this design option is shown in Figure
5.15.
In the ESD modelling, the restoration of offsite power
was assumed to have no effect on the main loops performance.
This greatly facilitated the modelling of the two options of
the auxiliary boiler operation. However, the effect of re-
storing offsite power on the main loop cooling system perfor-
mance was considered in the analysis of the dominant accident
sequences, and the final results do account for this effect.
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Specifically, for accident sequences named K, L and M,
if offsite power is restored within 10 minutes following the
shutdown, the auxiliary boilers will have sufficient time to
reach their rated operating condition. The probability of
offsite power being restored in this interval is about 0.6.
This is also true for accident sequences named W and 0 if
offsite power is restored within 5 minutes (probability 0.35).
The probability of the dominant accident sequences with these
index names was adjusted to account for the probability of not
restoring offsite power in time to allow auxiliary boiler
operation. Also, the accident sequence probability where
offsite power is restored, was decreased by the failure pro-
bability of the auxiliary boilers.
5.4-2 Sensitivity of the Subsystem Unit Reliability Values
5.4-2-1 Auxiliary Boilers Powered From the Non-Essential Bus.
The sensitivities of the subsystem unit reliability
values for shutdowns accompanied by the loss of offsite power
are listed in Table 5-XXVI. The sensitivity values are the
factor changes in the median value of the probability of a
loss of decay heat removal due to changes in the subsystem
unit reliability value. The table shows that only the emergency
diesel generator reliability and the CACS reliability have any
effect on the probability of a core meltdown.
The dominant accident sequences for this initiating event
category are listed in Table 5-XXVII, and the median probability
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TABLE 5-XXVI.
Core Meltdown Sensitivity to Subsystem Unit Reliability
Values for Reactor Shutdowns Resulting From
the Loss of Offsite Power
Subsystem Unit Factor Change in the
Reliability Median Probability
Subsystem Index Sensitivity of a Loss of Decay
and Name Range (Low, High) Heat Removal*
4: CT Large CVs
5: CT Small CV's
6: Shutdown Feed-
water System
7: Auxiliary
Boilers
8: Main Loop
Transfer to
Decay Heat
Removal
Operation
9: Emergency
Electrical
Supply
10:Core Auxiliary
Cooling System
12: Resuperheater
bypass control
valves
.99
.9999
.97
.9997
.96
.9996 1.
.875
.999
.93
.9993
.9
.997
.9
.999
.99
.9999
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
3.1
0.47
8.3
0.61
1.0O
1.0
*5 x 10~4 per shutdown based on median subsystem reliability
values.
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TABLE 5-XXVII.
A List of the Dominant Accident Sequences for
Shutdowns Due to the Loss of Offsite Power
Probability of a Loss
Accident ESD Outcome of Decay Heat Removal
Sequence Category Per Shutdown
N22(3A-3B'-R15') 6 3 x 104
K3(3A-R10'-C3') 5 1 x 10-
L8 (3A-B'-R30-C3') 5 2 x l0-
M17 (3A-2BI-R30-C3') 5 1 x 
10-5
Ll7(3A-B'-R30'-C3') 5 7 
x 106
M19(3A-2B'-R30'-SS'-C3') 5 
6 x 106
Y55(2A-L'-3B'-RlQ') 7 5 x 10-6
-6
L3(2A-F'-RlO'-C3' 3 5 3 x 10
W3(2A-L'-RlO'-C3') 5 2 x 10
03(2A-S'-Rl'-C3') 5 
2 x 106
M15(3A-2B'-R30-C3') 5 7 
x 107
V4(3L'-B'-c2') 4 
3 x 107
V5(3L'-2B'-C2') 4 3 
x 107
X36(A-L'-I'-B'-R5'-C2') 4 3 x 10-
T6(3L'-B'-RlO'C2') 4 
3 x l0-
T9(3L'-2B'-RlO'C2) 4 
2 x 107
Y39(A-L'-I'-2B'-R5'-C2') 4 
2 x 107
N21(3A-3B'-R15-C3') 6 
2 x 107
M8(2A-F2-B'-R30-C3') 5 
2 x 107
X19(2A-L'-B'-R30-C3') 5 2 
x 107
Sum of all accident sequences for 4
this initiating event category 5 x 10
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of a loss of decay heat removal is 5 X 10~4 per shutdown. For
the most dominant accident sequence, sequence N22(3A-3B'-R15'),
main loop operation was assumed limited to 15 minutes due to
inadequate throttling of the CT small CV's. These valves are
dependent on the instrument air supply which requires essential
electric power. Offsite power restoration was assumed to have
a minimal effect on main loop performance for this accident se-
quence because the initial steam generator depletion limits main
loop operation even though instrument air is also restored. But,
if each of the valves were equipped with air accumulators con-
taining enough air for the full thirty minutes of main loop
operation, the restoration of offsite power within 10 minutes
following shutdown would allow auxiliary boiler operation for
this sequence. Also, the restoration of offsite power within
30 minutes (probability 0.75) rather than 15 minutes (0.65)
would reduce the accident sequence probability. Given these
changes, the adjusted probability of accident sequence N22
-4
would be 2 X 10 , and this would reduce the median probability
of a loss of decay heat removal to 4 X 10~4 per shutdown.
The sensitivity plots of the emergency diesel generators
and the CACS are included in Figures 5.16 and 5.17 respectively.
From the CACS sensitivity plot, it can be seen that increasing
the reliability of an auxiliary loop to .9943 by having re-
dundant air cooler fans would decrease the probability of a
-4
core meltdown to just over 4 X 10 per shutdown.
With the auxiliary boilers powered by the non-essential bus,
6x10-3
0
-1
0
0
H4
0
lx103
lx10-
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FIGURE 5.16 Sensitivity plot of subsystem 9 for shutdowns
due to the loss of offsite power
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only the diesel generator reliability and the CACS reliability
have any effect on the median probability of a loss of decay
heat removal. This is due to the dominance of accident sequences
N22(3A-3B'-R15') and K3(3A-RlO'-C3') which only involve diesel
and CACS failures. It is not surprising then that the main loop
isolation valve and circulator operating reliability during cir-
culator imbalance conditions has no effect on the median prob-
ability of a core meltdown. Neither does the restarting of
initially failed shutdown feedpumps. However, the restarting
of initially failed diesel generators does affect the core-melt
probability for this initiating event category.
The changes in the probability of a loss of decay heat
removal is listed in Table 5-XXVIII for different probabilities
of restarting initially failed diesel generators. An investi-
gation of diesel generator failure data showed that 63% of
the reported failures were due to failure of the diesel system
to start. Of these starting system failures, 52% were judged
by this author to be of a nature which would easily be repair-
able within 10 to 15 minutes. Thus, the probability that an
initially failed diesel could be restarted might be as high as
0.3. However, this assumes that the fault can be properly
identified within this time period, and that the effort is
actually made by an operator to attempt to restart a failed
diesel following the reactor shutdown. The Table shows
that a 10% likelihood of restarting any initially failed
diesel has a negligible effect on the probability of a
core meltdown. A 30% likelihood has a slight effect
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TABLE 5-XXVIII
The Effect of Restarting Initially Failed Diesel
Generators for Reactor Shutdowns
Due to the Loss of Offsite Power
Probability of Restarting
Initially Failed Diesel
Generators Given at Least
10 Minutes
(3 of 3 failed, Factor Change in the
2 of 3 failed, Probability of a Loss of
1 of 3 failed) Decay Heat Removal
1.0
1.0 .44
1.0
.75
.60 .82
.30
.25
.20 .94
.10
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and even the limiting case of starting all initially failed
diesels allowed by the model, only changes the median probability
by a factor of 0.44.
5.4-2-2 Auxiliary Boilers Powered From the Essential Buses.
The median probability of a loss of decay heat removal
for reactor shutdowns following a loss of offsite power, if
the auxiliary boilers are powered from the essential buses, is
3 X 10~ per shutdown. The dominant accident sequences are
listed in Table 5-XXIX. Notice that in this case, accident
sequence N22 is almost two orders of magnitude greater than
the next accident sequence. The only subsystem reliability
value with any effect on the probability of a core meltdown is
the emergency diesel generator reliability. The probability
of a loss of decay heat removal is also sensitive to the main
loop operating performance with no essential power available.
The probability of accident sequence N22 and the median pro-
bability of a core meltdown would decrease to 2 X 10~4 if
main loop operation for the full thirty minutes were possible
with no essential power available.
Table 5-XXX lists the percentage of the core-melt probability
due to accident sequences which occur in the various ESD outcome
categories for both cases in which the auxiliary boilers are
powered by the non-essential bus or by the essential buses. In
both cases, almost 98% of the meltdowns occur between 15 and 30
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TABLE 5-XXIX.
A List of the Dominant Accident Sequences for
Shutdowns Due to the Loss of Off site Power With
the Auxiliary Boilers Powered From the Essential Buses
Probability of a Loss
Accident ESD Outcome of Decay Heat Removal
Sequence Category Per Shutdown
N22(3A-3B'-R15')
M19(3A-2B'-R30'-SS'-C3')
Y55 (2A-L'-3B'-R10')
M17(3A-2B'-Y'-R30-C3')
V4(3L'-B'-C2')
V5(3L'-2B'-C2')
T6(3S'-B'-RlO'-C2')
X36(A'-L'-I'-B'-R5'-C2')
T9(3S'-2B'-RlO'-C2')
Y39(A-L'-I'-2B'-R5'-C2')
N21(3A-3B'-R15'-C3')
N14(2A-F'-2B'-R30'-C3')
K3(3A-X'-C3')
AA49(F'-L'-S'-2B'-R5'-C2')
022(A-S'-I'-2B'-R5'-C2')
025(A-S'-I'-2B'-R5'-C2')
X32 (2A-L'-2B'-R30'-SS' -C3'
L8(3A-B'-X'-R30'-C3')
M15(3A-2B'-X'-R30'-C3')
6
5
7
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
6
5
5
4
4
4
)5
5
5
3 x l0~4
6 x 10-6
5 x 10-6
5 x 107
3 x 107
3 x 107
3 x 107
3 x 10~7
2 x 10~7
2 x 10~
2 x 10~
1 x l0~7
1 x l0~7
1 x l0-7
1 x lo~
1 x l0~
6 x 10-8
2 x 10-8
2 x 10-8
Sum of all accident sequences for 
_4
this initiating event category with 3 x 10
the auxiliary boilers powered from
the essential buses
TABLE 5-XXX.
A List of the Calculated Percent of Core Meltdowns
Occurring in Different Time Intervals Following Shutdowns
Due to the Loss of Offsite Power
Percent of Core Meltdowns
ESD Time Interval Following Aux. Boilers on
Outcome Shutdown in Which Melt- Aux. Boilers on Non-
Category down is Assumed to Occur Essential Buses Essential Bus
4 -0-15 minutes-only one 0.9 0.5
CACS loop available
5 20-30 minutes-loss of
decay heat removal 0.3 44.6
6 15-20 minutes-loss of
decay heat removal 97.1 53.1
7 10-15 minutes-loss of
decay heat removal 1.6 0.9
8 5-10 minutes-loss of
decay heat removal 0.1 0.1
9 within 5 minutes-loss of
decay heat removal 0.03 0.02
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minutes. With the auxiliary boilers powered by the non-essential
bus, less than half the core-melt probability is due to accident
sequences which occur in the 20 to 30 minute interval involving
combinations of emergency diesel and CACS loop failures. The
remainder is due to accident sequences involving the common
mode failure of the diesels. With the auxiliary boilers powered
from the essential buses, the core-melt probability is dominated
entirely by accident sequences involving the common mode
failure of the diesels.
If the auxiliary boilers are powered by the essential buses,
the diesel generator reliability is the dominating factor con-
tributing to the probability of a core meltdown. Figure 5.18 is
the sensitivity plot for the diesel generators for this design
option. The probability of a core meltdown is also sensitive
to restarting initially failed diesel generators. Table 5-XXXI
shows the factor change in the median probability of a core
meltdown for different probabilities of successfully restarting
initially failed diesels. The impact of this possibility is
slightly larger than in the case where the auxiliary boilers
are powered from- the non-essential bus. This is due to the
fact that some diesel restarts will also allow auxiliary boiler
operation. A 10% probability of successfully restarting an
initially failed diesel has a negligible effect while at 30%
probability has a slight effect. However, the limiting case of
restarting all initially failed diesels allowed by the model has
a very significant impact. This limiting case again emphasizes
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TABLE 5-XXXI.
The Effect of Restarting Initially Failed Diesel
Generators for Shutdowns Due to the Loss of Offsite Power
With the Auxiliary Boilers Powered from the Essential Buses
Probability of Restarting
Initially Failed Diesel Factor Change in the
Generators Given at Least Probability of a Loss of
10 Minutes Decay Heat Removal
1.0
1.0 0.06
1.0
.75
.60 0.71
.30
.25
.20 0.90
.10
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the importance of the diesel generators for this design option
following a loss of offsite power.
5.4-2-3 Restoration of Offsite Power
The effect of off site power restoration was investigated
by assuming two limiting cases. First, that offsite power is
not restored within the thirty minute main loop operating
period; and second, that offsite power is restored within 5
minutes of the reactor shutdown. The probability of a loss of
-3decay heat removal for these two cases was 1 X 10 per event
and 2 X 10-6 per event respectively.
Table 5-XXXII lists the dominant accident sequences for the
case of no offsite power restoration. The dominant contributions
to the probability of a core meltdown are the common mode failure
of the diesel generators followed by the common mode failure of
the CACS.
Table 5-XXXIII lists the dominant accident sequences for the
case in which offsite power is restored in 5 minutes. The
availability of the auxiliary boilers reduces the accident
sequence probability for many of the sequences, and the list of
dominant sequences begins with the sequences in which offsite
power restoration makes no difference to the main loop perfor-
mance. The first two accident sequences involve common mode
failure of the CT large CV's. These eliminate the main loops
in about two minutes. In the next three accident sequences,
main loop operation is limited to less than 25 minutes. Thus,
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Table 5-XXXII
A List of the Dominant Accident Sequences
For Shutdowns Due to the Loss of Offsite Power if
no Restoration Occurs in the 30 Minute Main Loop
Operating Period
Probability of a Loss
Accident ESD Outcome of Decay Heat Removal
Sequence Category Per Shutdown
N22(3A-3B')
K3(3A-C3')
M17(3A-2B'-C3')
Ll0(3A-B'-C3')
Y55(2A-L'-3B')
M19(3A-2B'-SS'-C3')
L3(2A-F'-C3')
W3(2A-L'-C3')
03(2A-S'-C3')
X30(2A-L'-2B'-C3')
M10 (2A-F'-B'-C3')
N14 (2A-F'-2B'-C3')
P21(2A-S'-2B'-C3')
X21(2A-L'-B'-C3'1)
T6(3S'-B'-C2')
X36(A-L'-I'-B'-C2')
T9(3S'-2B'-C2')
Y39(A-L'-I'-2B'-C2')
V4 (3L'-B'-C2')
V5(3L'-2B'-C2')
9 x l0 4
2 x 10~
7 x 10-5
5 x 10-5
1 x 10-5
6 x 10-6
4 x 10-6
3 x 10-6
2 x 10-6
7 x 107
7 x 10-
5 x 107
5 x 107
5 x l0-
4 x 107
4 x 107
3 x 107
3 x 10-
3 x l0 7
3 x 10 7
Sum of all accident sequences for 
-3
this initiating event category 1 x 10
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TABLE 5-XXXIII.
A List of the Dominant Accident Sequences For
Shutdowns due to the Loss of Offsite Power if
Restoration Occurs Within 5 Minutes Following the Shutdown
Probability of a Loss
Accident ESD Outcome of Decay Heat Removal
Sequence Category Per Shutdown
V4(3L'-B'-C2') 4 3 x 107
V5(3L'-2B'-C2') 4 3 x 107
X19(2A-L'-B'-R-C3') 5 2 x 107
P28(2A-S'-B'-R-C3') 5 2 x 107
N21(3A-3B'-R-C3') 6 2 x 10
W14(2A-L'-B'-R-C3') 5 1 x lo
K3(3A-R-X'-C3') 5 1 x l0-
014 (2A-S'-B'-R-C3') 5 8 x 10-8
V7(3L'-3B') 9 8 x 10-8
T2(3S'-C2') 4 7 x 108
W9(A-L'-I'-C2') 4 7 x 10-8
Z2(A-L'-S'-C2') 4 6 x 10-8
V2(3L'-C2') 4 6 x 10-8
CC2(A-2L'-C2') 4 4 x 10-8
X3(A-L'-F'-C3') 5 4 x 10- 8
P3(A-S'-F'-C3') 5 3 x 108
09(A-S'-I'-C2') 4 3 x 108
M3(A-2F'-C3') 5 2 x 108
N2(3F'-C3') 5 2 x 108
T14(3S'-C3') 8 2 x 108
W23(A-L'-I'-C3') 8 2 x 10-8
Z47(A-L'-S'-C3') 8 2 x 10-8
V8(3L'-C3') 9 2 x 10-8
R2(A-2S'-C2') 4 2 x 10 8
Sum of all accident sequences for 6
this initiating event category 2 x 10
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the auxiliary boilers do not have sufficient time to become
available.
5.4-3 Sensitivity to Common Mode Failures and Test and
Maintenance Unavailabilities
The variation in the probability of a loss of decay heat
removal due to both the fraction of common mode failures and
test and maintenance unavailabilities is listed in Table
5-XXXIV and plotted in Figure 5.19. From these, it can be seen
that for beta factor values greater than 0.01, test and main-
tenance unavailabilities make a negligible contribution to
the probability of a core meltdown for this initiating event
category. Notice also, that for beta factor values greater
than 0.01, the probability of a core meltdown increases pro-
portionally with the beta factor. This is due to the dominance
of accident sequences N22(3A-3B'-R15') and K3(3A-RlO'-C3')
which involve common mode failures of the diesel generators
and the CACS.
Table 5-XXXV lists the percent of the core-melt prob-
ability due to accident sequences occurring in each ESD outcome
category for the different beta factor valves. The relatively
small contribution of outcome category 4 (only one CACS loop
available prior to 15 minutes following the shutdown) explains
the unimportance of test and maintenance unavailabilities.
Also, meltdowns occurring between 15 and 30 minutes following
the shutdown account for over 95% of the total probability
over the entire range of beta factor values.
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TABLE 5-XXXIV.
A List of the Core Meltdown Probabilities Considering
Equipment Failures Only, and all Failure Contributions
for Shutdowns Due to the Loss of Offsite Power
Intrasystem Probability of a Loss of Decay
Common Mode Heat Removel (Per Shutdown)
Failure
Fraction Equipment Failures
(Beta Factor) and Test and
Equipment Maintenance
Failures Only Unavailabilities
0.0 2 x 10- 5  4 x 10- 5
0.003 7 x 10- 5  1 x 10~ 4
0.01 2 x 10~4 2 x 10~4
0.03 5 x 10~ 5 x 10~
0.1 2 x 10-3 2 x 10-3
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Equipment failures and
test and maintenance
lx10 unavailabilities
Equipment failures only
U
0
E-1
0 lx10 ..
0
i
0
2x10- 5
0.001 0.003 0.01 0.03 0.1
BETA FACTOR
FIGURE 5.19 Probability of a core meltdown due to
the loss of offsite power
TABLE 5-XXXV
A List of the Calculated Percent of Core Meltdowns
Occuring in Different Time Intervals Following Shut-
downs Due to the Loss of Offsite Power. For Different
Beta Factor Values
Time Interval Following Percent of Core Meltdowns
ESD Outcome Shutdown in Which Melt-
Category down is Assumed to Occur =0.0 =0.003 ==0.01 =0.03 ==-0.1
0 to 15 minutes only one
4 CACS loop available 3.7 1.8 0.9 0.5 0.3
20 to 30 minutes-loss of
5 decay heat removal 62.5 52.3 47.7 44.6 44.4
15 to 20 minutes-loss of
6 decay heat removal 33.2 45.2 50.6 53.1 54.2
10 to 15 minutes-loss of
7 decay heat removal 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9
5 to 10 minutes-loss of
8 decay heat removal 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
within 5 minutes-loss of
9 decay heat removal 0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.02 0.06
UJ
I-i
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TABLE 5-XXXVI.
A List of the Individual Subsystem Common Mode Failure
Contributions at High and Low Beta Factor Values for
Shutdowns Due to the Loss of Offsite Power
Individual Factor Change in the
Subsystem Median Probability
Subsystem Index Beta Factor of a Loss of Decay
and Name Value Heat Removal
9: Emergency 0.01 0.65
Electrical 0.1 2.2
Supply
10:Core Auxiliary 0.01 0.73
Cooling System 0.1 2.0
TABLE 5-XXXVII.
A List of the Sensitivity of the Subsystem Unit Reliabi-
lity Values at Different Beta Factor Values for Shut-
downs Due to the Loss of Offsite Power.
Subsystem Factor Change in the
Unit Reliability Probability of a Loss
Subsystem Index Sensitivity of Decay Heat Removal
and Name Range $=0.01 $=0.03 8=0.1
9: Emergency .9 4.4 3.1 2.6
Electrical .997 0.43 0.47 0.49
Supply
10:Core Auxiliary .9 12.2 8.3 6.7
Cooling System .999 0.62 0.61 0.61
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The investigation of individual subsystem common mode
failure contribution showed that only common mode failures of
the diesel generators and the CACS were significant. The factor
change on the median probability of a loss of decay heat removal
due to changes in the individual subsystem beta factor valves
is listed in Table 5-XXXVI.
Table 5-XXXVII lists the variation in the sensitivity of
the diesel generator and CACS unit reliability values due to
changes in the beta factor valve. As beta increases, the sen-
sitivity of both subsystems decreases. This is due to the
dependence of the CACS on diesel generator operation, and to
their relatively equal contributions to the probability of a
core meltdown. As the fraction of common mode failures increases,
the effect of changing the reliability of either system alone
decreases due to the dominating effect of the common mode
failure of the other subsystem.
5.5 PCRV Depressurization Accidents
5.5-1 Model of Events
In the analysis of the potential accident sequences due
to PCRV depressurization accidents, two specific types of
accident were considered. For large PCRV leaks involving one
of the steam generator cavity closures, the main loop associated
with the closure was assumed to be eliminated. The reactor
shutdown cooling operations are then performed with only two
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main loops initially available, and a simplified model of
these events would be similar to that of Figure 5.12. For
all other PCRV leaks, all three main loops were considered to
be available, and a model of the shutdown cooling operations
would be similar to that of Figure 5.1.
The major difference in the modelling of the reactor shut-
down cooling operations following a depressurization accident
is due to the effect of the decreased helium density on the
design capabilities of the main loops and the CACS. After the
depressurization is complete, the helium density is determined
by the containment equalization pressure. Three ranges of
containment equalization pressure were chosen, and the main
loop and CACS capabilities were modelled according to the
guidelines discussed in Chapter 3.
Also, losses of offsite power concurrent with the PCRV
depressurization accident were considered. The loss of offsite
power may occur due to the transient to the electrical network
produced by the turbine trip which accompanies the shutdown.
This occurrence was discussed in Chapter 4, and for the analyses
of shutdowns following depressurization accidents, a prob-
ability of 1 x 10-3 per event was conservatively assumed.
5.5-2 Sensitivity to the Subsystem Unit Reliability Valves
Offsite Power Available
The median probability of a loss of decay heat removal
for shutdowns following a depressurization accident with off-
site power available was determined to be 9 x 10~7 per event
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if three main loops are initially available. If only two main
loops are initially available, the median probability is
2 X 10-5 per event. The dominant accident sequences for each
of these types of accident are listed in Tables 5-XXXVIII and
5-XXXIX respectively.
With three main loops initially available, the first four
accident sequences consist of a common mode failure of a main
loop subsystem followed by the failure of the CACS. Notice also,
the two sequences DYl0 and DQ10. For these accident sequences,
main loop operation is limited due to the low containment
equalization pressure, and the probability of CACS failure is
increased due to the more stringent operating requirements.
With only two main loops available, the two most dominant
sequences involve main loop failures eliminating one of the
loops. Because a single main loop is not capable of core cooling
following a depressurization, these failures lead to an early
dependence on the CACS.
Table 5-XL lists the percentage of the core-melt probability
due to accident sequences in the various time intervals following
the reactor shutdown. With three main loops available, over 25%
of the meltdowns would occur in the 20 to 30 minute time interval.
The remainder occur mostly within 5 minutes of the shutdown.
However, if only two main loops are initially available, almost
98% of the meltdowns occur within the first five minutes following
shutdown.
It is interesting that the probability of a loss of decay
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heat removal following a depressurization accident, is not
greatly different from that of shutdowns in which the reactor
is pressurized. Core temperatures will generally be higher
following shutdown due to a depressurization accident, and
some core damage is more likely to occur. However this
analysis shows that the present shutdown cooling system design
is quite effective in preventing a core meltdown in both a
pressurized and a depressurized reactor.
Table 5-XLI lists the factor change in the median prob-
ability of a core meltdown due to changes in the subsystem
unit reliability values. In both cases (three main loops ini-
tially available, and two main loops initially available), the
probability of a core meltdown is most affected by changes in
the CACS reliability. It is interesting that the sensitivities
of the subsystem reliability values follow the same trends
as for pressurized reactor shutdowns with three or two main
loops initially available. Notice also, that the reliability
of the main loop isolation valves to close following main
loop failure is included in the table. Isolation valve fail-
ures affect the CACS performance by allowing core bypass flow.
However, they do-not contribute significantly to the prob-
ability of a core meltdown.
There are two other items which need to be discussed in
this section. The first is the probability that a CACS loop
failure may lead to bypass flow through that loop. This was
assumed to have a probability of 1 x 10~ per CACS loop per
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TABLE 5-XXXVIII.
A List of the Dominant Accident Sequences for
Reactor Shutdowns Due to a Depressurization Accident
With Three Main Loops Initially Available
Probability of a Loss
Accident ESD Outcome of Decay Heat Removal
Sequence Category Per Shutdown
DK3(3A-CPl-X'-C3') D4 1 x 10-
DT2 (3S ' -CPl-C3 ') D7 1 x 10
DV2(3L'-CPl-C3') D7 1 x lo
DN2(3F'-CPl-C3') D4 1 x l0-
DZ2(A-L'-S'-CPl-C3') D7 1 x 10 .
DYl0(2A-L'-CP3-C3') D7 9 x 10-8
DQl0(2A-S'-CP3-C3') D7 6 x 10-8
DC2(A-2L'-CPl-C3') D7 6 x 10-8
DKl0(3A-CP1-SS'-C3') D6 6 x 10-8
DR2(A-2S'-CP1-C3') D7 3 x 10- 8
DK8(3A-CP3-SS'-C3') D6 1 x 10-8
DL3(2A-F'-CPl-X'-C3') D4 6 x 10 9
DT4(3S'-CP2-C3') D7 5 x 10 9
DV4(3L'-CP2-C3') D7 4 x 10 9
DW3(2A-L'-CPl-X'-C3') D4 4 x 10 9
D03(2A-S'-CPl-X'-C3') D4 3 x 10 9
DB2(L'-2S'-CPl-C3') D7 2 x 10 9
DY2(L'-2F'-CPl-C3') D7 2 x 10 9
Sum of all accident sequences for
this initiating event 9 x 10
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TABLE 5-XXXIX.
A List of the Dominant Accident Sequences for
Reactor Shutdowns Due to Depressurization Accidents
With Only Two Main Loops Initially Available
Probability of a Loss
Accident ESD Outcome of Decay Heat Removal
Sequence Category Per Shutdown
DC2(A-L'-CPl-C3') D7 1 x 10-5
DZ2(A-S'-CP1-C3') D7 7 x 10-6
DY10(2A-CP3-C3') D7 6 x 10-6
DW3(2A-CPl-X'-C3') D4 3 x 10~7
DB2(2S'-CPl-C3') D7 1 x 10~7
DV2(2L'-CPl-C3') D7 1 x l0~7
DX3(A-F'-CP1-X'-C3') D4 1 x l0~7
DY2(2F'-CPl-C3') D5 1 x 10~7
DC6(A-L'-CP3-C3') D7 6 x 10-8
DZ6(2L'-CP3-C3') D7 4 x 10-8
DU2(L'-S'-CPl-C3') D7 4 x 10-8
DC4(A-L'-CP2-C3') D7 1 x 10-8
DX5(A-F '-CP2-C3') D5 1 x 10-8
DW10(2A-CP2-SS'-C3') D6 1 x 10 8
DW8(2A-CPl-SS'-C3') D6 1 x 10 8
Sum of all accident sequences for
this initiating event 2 x 10-
TABLE 5-XL
A List of the Calculated Percentage of Core Meltdowns
Occuring in Various Time Intervals Following Shutdowns
Due to PCRV Depressurization Accidents.*
Percent of Core Meltdowns
ESD Time Interval Following Two Main Three Main
Outcome Shutdown in Which Melt- Loops Initi- Loops Initi-
Category down is Assumed to Occur ally available ally Available
D4 20 to 30 minutes-loss of 1.6 25.6
decay heat removal
D5 10 to 20 minutes-loss of 0.5 0.3
decay heat removal
D6 5 to 10 minutes-loss of 0.1 8.0
decay heat removal
D7 within 5 minutes-loss of
decay heat removal 97.8 66.1
* Offsite power available following the shutdown
(WA
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TABLE 5-XLI.
A List of the Sensitivity of the Subsystem Unit Reli-
ability Valves for Reactor Shutdowns Following PCRV
Depressurization Accidents
Subsystem Unit Factor Change in the Probability
Reliability of a Loss of Decay Heat Removal*
Subsystem Sensitivity
Index and Range Two Main Loops Three Main Loops
Name (Low, High) Initially Available Initially Available
4:CT Large .99 1.8 2.4
CVS .9999 0.89 0.85
5:CT Small .97 3.4 6.9
CVS .9997 0.73 0.66
6:Shutdown .96 1.2 2.9
Feedwater
System .9996 1.0 0.89
7:Auxiliary .875 1.2 3.1
Boilers .999 0.99 0.93
8:Main Loop .93 1.1 1.9
Transfer to
Decay Heat Re- .9993 0.99 0.95
roval operation
10: Core Auxiliary .9 26.1 23.0
Cooling System .999 0.27 0.28
12. Resuperheater .99 1.8 2.3
Bypass Control
Valves .9999 0.88 0.84
D18:Main Loop .99 1.3 1.6
Isolation
Valves .9999 0.97 0.95
* Based on median subsystem unit reliability values
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shutdown. Mechanistically, it was felt that this occurrence
would require the starting of an auxiliary circulator, in order
to open the auxiliary loop isolation value, and then the sub-
sequent circulator failure and isolation valve failure. However,
this was not a significant contributor to the core-melt pro-
bability, and increasing the probability of this event to 1 X 10-2
per loop changed the median probability of a core meltdown in
either case by at most a factor of 1.3.
The second item to be discussed is the operating reliability
of the main circulators near their overspeed trip setpoint. The
circulator overspeed control/protection device has not yet been
designed. Also, just how close the circulator speed will come
to the overspeed trip set point for certain accident sequences is
unknown. Therefore, a term was included in the analysis which
simulated main loop failure for accident sequences where the
main circulators were operating near the overspeed trip setpoint.
Itwas the author's estimate that the probability that the main
loops would survive this operating condition was 0.99. The
sensitivity analysis showed this to be a small contributor to
the core-melt probability. A decrease in the probability of
main loop survival to 0.9 only changed the probability of a
core meltdown by a factor of 1.6. Likewise, increasing the main
loop survival probability to 0.999 changed the median probability
of a core meltdown by a factor of 0.93. Thus, this particular
assumption concerning circulator reliability does not have a
significant effect on the core-melt probability for this initiating
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event category.
Offsite Power Unavailable
The contribution to the probability of a core meltdown due
to a simultaneous PCRV depressurization accident and loss of
offsite power was also investigated. Offsite power may be lost
concurrent with a depressurization accident due to the transient
in the electrical network caused by the turbine trip which
accompanies the reactor shutdown. A list of the dominant acci-
dent sequences for this event is shown in Table 5-XLII.
With three main loops initially available, the median pro-
bability of a core meltdown due to this particular event is
9 X 10 per shutdown. The two most dominant accident sequences
are DN39 and DK3 which involve common mode failures in the
emergency diesel generators and CACS respectively. Including
these accident sequences along with those listed in Table 5-XXXVII
yields a median probability of 2 X 10-6 per shutdown for the
loss of decay heat removal following a depressurization accident
with three main loops initially available.
It is interesting that core-melt accident sequences due to
the concurrent loss of offsite power are so significant for this
depressurization accident. It indicates the dependence of the
shutdown cooling systems on essential electric power.
If only two main loops are initially available, the
contribution of core meltdowns due to the concurrent loss of
offsite power is not very significant. The two most dominant
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TABLE 5-XLII.
A List of the Dominant Accident Sequences for PCRV
Depressurization Accidents and the Concurrent
Loss of Offsite Power
Three Main Loops Initially Available
Probability of a Loss
Accident ESD Outcome of Decay Heat Removal
Sequence Category Per Shutdown
DN39(3A-3B'-RlO') D6 6 x 10-
DK3(3A-CPl-RlO'-C3') D4 2 x 107
DM28(3A-CPl-2B'-R30'-C3') D4 2 x 10-8
DLl3(3A-CPl-B'-R30-C3') D4 2 x 10-8
DLl5(3A-CPl-B'-R30'-C3') D4 2 x 10-8
DY40(2A-L'-3B'-R5') D6 9 x 10 9
Sum of all accident sequences for 7
this event 9 x 10
Two Main Loops Initially Available
Probability of a Loss
Accident ESD Outcome of Decay Heat Removal
Sequence Category Per Shutdown
DY40(2A-3B'-R5') D6 6 x 107
DW3(2A-CPl-R5'-C3') D4 2 x 107
DCl2(A-L'-2B') D7 4 x 10-8
DC8(A-L'-CPl-C3') D7 4 x 10 8
DZl2(A-S'-2B') D7 3 x 10-8
Sum of all accident sequences for 
-6
this event l x 10
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accident sequences for this event both involve common mode
failures. However, the dominant accident sequences from Table
5-XXXIX involve single failures, and they are therefore more
significant.
Sensitivity Plots
For reactor shutdowns following PCRV depressurization acci-
dents, the reliability of the CACS to operate is the most sen-
sitive of the shutdown cooling subsystem inputs. A sensitivity
plot for the CACS is provided for each depressurization accident
case (i.e., three main loops initially available and two main
loops initially available). These are Figures 5.20 and 5.21
respectively. Included in both these plots are the contributions
from core-melt accident sequences with offsite power initially
available and with offsite power initially unavailable.
5.5-3 Sensitivity to Common Mode Failures and Test and
Maintenance Unavailabilities
For reactor shutdowns following PCRV depressurization
accidents the variation in the probability of a loss of decay
heat removal due to intrasystem common mode failures and test
and maintenance unavailabilities is shown in Figure 5.22.
Lists of these values for accidents with three main loops ini-
tially available and with two main loops initially available
are given in Table 5-XLIII and 5-XLIV, respectively. These
values include the contributions from core-melt accidents
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FIGURE 5.20 Sensitivity plot of subsystem 10 for shutdowns
following PCRV depressurization accidents with
three main loops initially available
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TABLE 5-XLIII.
A List of Core-Melt Probabilities Considering
Equipment Failure Only and all Failure Contributions
for Shutdowns Following a Depressurization Accident
With Three Main Loops Initially Available
Intrasystem Probability of a Loss of Decay
Common Mode Heat Removal (Per Shutdown)
Failure
Fraction Equipment Failures
(Beta Factor) and Test and
Equipment Maintenance
Failures Only Unavailabilities
0.0 1 x 10 7  4 x 10~ 7
0.003 2 x 10 7  6 x 10 7
0.01 5 x 10~ 8 x 10~
0.03 1 x 106 2 x 106
0.1 6 x 10-6 7 x 10-6
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TABLE 5-XLIV.
A List of Core-Melt Probabilities Considering
Equipment Failures Only and all Failure Contributions
for Shutdowns Following Depressurization Accidents
With Only Two Main Loops Initially Available
Intra-system Probability of a Loss of Decay
Common Mode Heat Removal (Per Shutdown)
Failure
Fraction Equipment Failures
(Beta Factor) and Test and
Equipment Maintenance
Failures Only Unavailabilities
0.0 5 x 10-6 2 x 10-5
0.003 6 x 10- 6  2 x 10-5
0.01 7 x 10- 6  2 x'10- 5
0.03 1 x 10-5 2 x 10-5
0.1 2 x 10-5 4 x 10-5
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FIGURE 5.22 Probability of a core meltdown for shutdowns
due to PCRV depressurization accidents
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with offsite power initially available and with offsite power
initially unavailable. For the case of three main loops ini-
tially available, common mode failures are more significant than
the test and maintenance unavailabilities especially at higher
beta factor values. However, with only two main loops initially
available, common mode failures are less important, and the test
and maintenance contribution is, therefore, more significant.
Table 5-XLV lists the percentage of the core-melt probability
due to accident sequences occurring in the various time intervals
following shutdown for three main loops initially available and
for different beta factor values. As the beta factor valve
increases, the percentage of core meltdowns occurring in the
20 to 30 minute interval increases while the percentage of
meltdowns in the first 5 minutes decreases. Table 5-XLVI lists
the dominant accident sequences at different beta factor values
and according to their ESD outcome categories. The first three
accident sequences in the 20 to 30 minute interval involve a
common mode failure which eliminatesthe main loops and a common
mode failure of the CACS. Thus, the contribution of this
category increases as a increases. In outcome category D7,
all the accident sequences except DT2 and DV2 do not involve
common mode failures, and the contribution of this category
decreases as 0 increases due to the increasing contribution of
outcome category D4.
In outcome category D6, the important accident sequence
is DN39, which involves the common mode failure of the diesel
TABLE 5-XLV
A List of the Calculated Percent of Core Meltdowns
in Various Time Intervals Following Shutdowns Due
to Depressurization Accidents With Three Main Loops
Initially Available.
Time Interval Following Percent of Core Meltdowns
ESD Outcome Shutdown in Which Melt-
Category down is Assumed to Occur f=0.0 S=0.003 R=0.01 S=0O.03 R==O.l
20 and 30 minutes-loss
D4 of decay heat removal 8.8 13.0 19.0 30.2 42.0
10 to 20 minutes-loss
D5 of decay heat removal 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
5 to 10 minutes-loss
D6 of decay heat removal 22.8 28.0 35.0 32.0 30.6
within 5 minutes-loss
D7 of decay heat removal 68.2 58.0 45.8 37.2 26.2
WA
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TABLE 5-XLVI
A List of the Probability of the Dominant
Accident Sequences at Different Beta Factor Values
For Shutdowns Following Depressurization Accidents
with Three Main Loops Initially Available
OUTCOME CATEGORY D4: Loss of Decay Heat Removal 20 to 30
Minutes after the Shutdown
Accident Probability of a Loss of Decay Heat
Sequence Removal (per shutdown)
=0.0 =0.003 f=0.01 =0.03 =0.1
DK3(3A-CPl-X'-C3') lx10 2x109 1xl10- 8  lx10~ 7  lx10 6
DN2(3F'-CPl-C3') <lxlO1 0 6xl0~9  2x10-8  lx10~ 7  6xl0 7
*DK3(3A-CPl-R10'-C3') 5x10 3x10-8 8x10-8 2x10 7 7x10~7
*DM28(3A-.CPl-2B'-R30' -C3' 2x10 8 - constant
*DL15(3A-.CPl-B-R30'-C3') lx10 lx10-8 lx10- 8  2x10-8 3x10
Sum of all accident -8 8 7 7 6
sequences for this 4x10 7x10 2x10 5x10 3x10
category
OUTCOME CATEGORY D6: Loss of Decay Heat Removal 5 to 10
Minutes after the Shutdown
Accident Probability of a Loss of Decay Heat
Sequence Removal (per shutdown)
S=0.0 3=0.003 1=0.01 a=0,03 =O.l
DKl0(3A-CP3-SS'-C3') 6x10-8 . constant
DKB (3A-CPl-SS '-C3') 8x10~9 "
*DN39(3A-3B'-Rl' ) 3x10 8 8x10-8 2x10 6xl0 7 2x10 6
Sum of all accident 7 7
sequences for this lx10~ 2x10~ 3x10 7x10 2x10
category
* Loss of offsite power concurrent with depressurization
accident
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TABLE 5-XLVI (continued)
OUTCOME CATEGORY D7: Loss of Decay Heat Removal within 5
Minutes of the Shutdown
Accident Probability of a Loss of Decay Heat
Sequence Removal (per shutdown)
a=0.0 =O.003 =0.01 =0.03 =0.l
DT2(3S'-CPl-C3') lx10~10 lxl0~ 3x10-8 lx10~ 7 6x10 7
DV2(3L'-CPl-C3') lx10 10 8xl0~9 3x10-8  lx10 7  5x10 7
DZ2(A-L'-S'-CPl-C3') 7x10-8 8x10-8 8x10-8 lx10~ 7 2x10~7
DYl0(2A-L'-CP3-C3') 9x10 8 constant
DQ10(2A-S'-CP3-C3') 6x10 8  "
DC2(A-2L'-CPl-C3') 4x10-8 4xl- 8 5xlO- 8  6xlO- 8 9x10- 8
DR2(A-2S'-CPl-C3') 3xl-8 3x10-8 3x10~8 3x10-8 6x10-8
Sum of all accident 
-7 7 7 7 6sequences for this 3x10 3x10 4x10 6x10 2x10 6
category
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generators for concurrent losses of offsite power. This
sequence increases as a increases. However, accident sequences
DKl0 and DB8 involve main loop support system falures and
are not affected by the beta factor valve. Thus, the contri-
bution of this outcome category only increases slightly as
S increases.
For depressurization accidents with only two main loops
initially available, the percentage of core meltdowns in each
ESD outcome category is basically constant over the beta
factor range. This is due to the dominance of accident
sequences DC2(A-L'-CPI-C3') and DZ2(A-S'-CPI-C3') which are
not very sensitive to the beta factor valve.
The individual subsystem common mode failure contributions,
for the case of three main loops initially available, are
listed in Table 5-XLVII. The table shows that the two major
subsystem common mode failure contributions are due to the
CACS and the emergency diesel generators (due to concurrent
losses of offsite power). With only two main loops initially
available, the only significant common mode failure contri-
bution is due to the CACS. At the median beta factor value
of 0.03 for all other systems, varying a for the CACS to 0.01
and 0.1 produced a change in the median probability of a core
meltdown by factors of 0.88 and 1.4 respectively.
The contribution to the probability of a core meltdown
due to the individual subsystem test and maintenance unavail-
ability is listed in Table 5-XLVIII. In both cases where
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TABLE 5-XLVII.
A List of the Individual Subsystem Common Mode Failure
Contributions for Shutdowns Following Depressurization
Accidents with Three Main Loops Initially Available
Subsystem Index Factor Change in the Probability
and Name of a Loss of Decay Heat Removal
Beta Factor for Beta Factor for
Individual Individual
Subsystem is 0.1 Subsystem is 0.01
While All Others While All Others
Are 0.03 Are 0.03
4: CT Large CVs 0.98 1.1
5: CT Small CVs 0.95 1.2
6: Shutdown feed- 0.95 1.2
water System
7: Auxiliary 0.98 1.1
Boilers
8: Main Loop
Transfer to
Decay Heat 0.99 1.0
Removal
Operation
10:Core Auxiliary 0.80 1.7Cooling System
12:Resuperheater
Bypass Control 0.98 1.1
Valves
D18: Main Loop
Isolation 0.99 1.0
Valves
9: Emergency
Electrical 0.79 1.8
Supply
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three main loops are initially available and where two main
loops are initially available, only the contributions of CACS
and resuperheater bypass control valve unavailability were
significant.
5.5-4 The Effect of the Containment Equalization Pressure Range.
Following a depressurization accident, the event sequence
paths were branched according to the containment equalization
pressure range. The factor changes in the median probability
of a core meltdown due to the upper and lower bounds of the
probability values that these pressure ranges will occur are
listed in Table 5-XLIX.
However, in order to better understand the contribution to
the core-melt probability made by accident sequences in each
containment equalization pressure (CEP) range, calculations
were performed in which the probability of any one individual
pressure range occuring was 1.0. The core meltdown probabilities
for each of the CEP ranges, and as a function of the beta factor
value, are listed in Table 5-L and 5-LI respectively for shut-
downs with three main loops initially available and two main
loops initially available. Notice that in both cases, the pro-
bability of a core meltdown, given the CEP is less than 1.25
atm., is quite high compared to the other two pressure ranges.
The contribution of accident sequences in this low CEP range
is the significant factor in the changes in the median core-
melt probability values listed in Table 5-XLIX.
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TABLE 5-XLVIII
A List of the Individual Test and Maintenance
Unavailability Contributions for Shutdowns Following
Depressurization Accidents with Three Main Loops
Initially Available
Subsystem Subsystem Factor Change in the Probability
Index Test and of a Core Meltdown due to Indi-
and Name Maintenance vidual Subsystem T&M While all
Unavailability Other Subsystem Unavailabilities
(per unit) are zero
Three Main Loops Two Main Loops
Initially Available Initially Available
10:Core
Auxiliary 
-2
Cooling 1.2xl0 1.9 2.2
System
12:Resuperheater
Bypass 
-2
Control 2x10 1.1 1.2
Valves
TABLE 5-XLIX
The Seneitivity of the Probability of Specific CEP
Ranges for Shutdowns Following Depressurization
Accidents
Containment Probability Factor Change in the Probability
Equalization of CEP being of a Loss of Decay Heat Removal
Pressure in Given
Range Range Three Main Loops Two Main Loops
Initially Available Initially Available
CEP>l.50atm. .99
CEP<l.25atm. 1x10-
3  2.8 3.1
CEP>l.50atm. .9999
CEP<l.25atm. 1x10-
5 0.82 0.79
TABLE 5-L
The Variation in the Probability of a Core Meltdown
Given the Probability of Occurrence of Each Specific
CEP Range is 1.0 for Depressurization Accidents with
Three Main Loops Initially Available
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TABLE 5-LI
The Variation in the Probability of a Core Meltdown
Given the Probability of Occurrence of Each Specific
CEP Range is 1.0 for Depressurization Accidents with
Two Main Loops Initially Available
Intrasystem Probability of a Loss of Decay Heat
Common Mode Removal (Per Shutdown) For Each
Failure Fraction, Specific CEP Range
Beta Factor
CEP 1.50-
CEP>l.50atm. 1.25atm. CEP<l.25atm.
0 .0 lx10- 5 4x10-5 6x10 -2
0.003 1x10- 5  4x10-5 6x10-2
0.00 O11x10-51- 5  6x10 -
0.01 1X10 5  5x10- 6x10-
0.03 2x10-5  6x10-5 6x10 2
0.1 3x10 5 lx10~4 6x10 2
Intrasystem Probability of a Loss of Decay Heat
Common Mode Removal (per shutdown) for each
Failure Fraction, Specific CEP Range
Beta Factor CEP 1.50-
CEP>l.50atm. 1.25atm. CEP<l.25atm.
0.0 2x10 7  4x10 -6 2x10 3
0.003 3x10 7  5x10 6 2x10 3
0.01 6x10 7  8x10 6 2x10-3
0.03 2x10-6  2x10 5 2x10 3
0.1 6x10-6 5x10-5 2x10- 3
359
5.6 Initiating Events Commonly Degrading Main Loop Shutdown
Cooling Performance
5.6-1 Introduction
In this section, potential main loop common mode failures
were investigated. The areas of common dependence of the main
cooling loops were discussed in Section 4.3-2. In general, these
main loop failures were treated as two types of events: either
as initiating events which eliminated the main loop shutdown
cooling system, or as common mode failures occuring after the
shutdowns which were independent of the initiating event.
For initiating events which result in main loop cooling
system failure, the CACS is the primary means of core cooling.
If main loop failure occurs prior to 15 minutes following
shutdown, the probability that two or more CACS loops fail to
start is 8.2 X 10~4 per demand. This is determined using a
beta factor of 0.03 and a test and maintenance unavailability
of 1.2 X 10- 2. If the main loop failure does not occur until
after this time, the probability that all three CACS loops
will fail is 2.4 X 10~ per demand. In section 5.6-2, an
example of this type of event - the loss of all feedwater to
the main loops - is discussed.
Main loop failures following the initiating event, but
not due to the initiating event, were considered for all ini-
tiating event categories. These failures were primarily con-
sidered to occur as the result of main loop support system
failures. However, the treatment of these failures was general
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enough to include all potential main loop common mode failures.
The results of these investigations are discussed in section 5.6-3.
5.6-2 Failure of the Feedwater Supply
Following a reactor shutdown, the main loops are supplied
with feedwater by the shutdown feed pumps. The normal source
of feedwater is the main condenser hotwell. However, should
this source be unavailable, two back-up supplies exist. They
are the condensate storage tanks and the emergency feedwater
connection from the fire main.
In the event that all sources of feedwater are lost, main
loop shutdown cooling operation is limited to 30 minutes by
the steam generator inventory depletion. The probability of
a loss of decay heat removal is just under 3 x 10~4 per shut-
down event, and the dominant accident sequences are listed in
Table 5-LII. The dominating event is the common mode failure
of the CACS following main loop steam generator depletion.
This is sequence N2, and it accounts for almost 98% of the
total core-melt probability for this initiating event.
A sensitivity plot for the CACS is shown in Figure 5.23.
Notice that the probability of a core meltdown is more sensi-
tive to the CACS unit reliability than it is to the beta
factor value. Also, an increase in the auxiliary loop relia-
ability to .9943 due to redundant air cooler fans would de-
crease the probability of a loss of decay heat removal to below
2 X 10~4 per event.
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TABLE 5-LII.
A List of the Dominant Accident Sequences for
Shutdowns Following the Loss of all Feedwater Supplies
Probability of a Loss
Accident ESD Outcome of Decay Heat Removal
Sequence Category Per Shutdown
N2(3F'-C3') 5 2 x 10~4
Y2(2F'-L'-C3') 6 4 x 10-6
Q2(2F'-S'-C3') 6 3 x 10-6
T2(3S'-C2') 4 8 x 10-8
W9(F'-L'-I'-C2') 4 8 x 10-8
AA2(F'-L'-S'-C2') 4 7 x 10-8
V2(3L'-C2') 4 6 x 10-8
Sum of all accident sequences for 4
this initiating event 3 x 10
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SUBSYSTEM 10, THE CORE AUXILIARY
COOLING SYSTEM
0 beta 0.1
0 beta = 0.03
beta = 0.01
lx10- 3
0
o44 lx10
0
0
z -5
lxlO i igi I I I
.9 .9917 .999
SUBSYSTEM UNIT RELIABILITY
FIGURE 5.23 Sensitivity plot of subsystem 10 for
shutdowns following the loss of all
feedwater supplies
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5.6-3 Support System Failures
Following any reactor shutdown, main loop failure may
occur due to the failure of a common support system. The two
primary support systems are the instrument air and the service
water, and both systems are dependent upon essential electric
power being available. The upper and lower failure probability
values for these systems, given the number of essential buses
energized were listed in Table 4-XII. The lower bound values
were used in the calculations of the median core-melt probabilities
for the different initiating event categories. Table 5-LIII lists
the factor change in the median core-melt probability values
due to applying the upper bound failure probabilities for
the support systems.
The table shows that support system failures following pres-
surized reactor shutdowns are only very small contributors to
the probability of a loss of decay heat removal. A check of
the dominant accident sequences for pressurized reactor shut-
downs (Table 5-III, 5-XX and 5-XXVII) shows that the only accident
sequence involving support system failure is sequence M19
(3A-2B'-R30'-SS'-C3'). In this particular sequence, the service
water system fails because it has only doubly redundant cooling
water towers. For a reactor shutdown following a loss of off-
site power, the failure of the two essential buses which power
the two cooling water towers leads to service water system
failure and eventually main loop failure unless offsite power
TABLE 5-LIII
A List of the Change in the Median Core-Melt Probability
Due to the Upper Bound Support System Failure Probabilities
Time Interval Support Factor Change in the Probability of a Loss of
Following System Decay Heat Removal (for each initiating event
Shutdown in which Failure category) due to Upper Bound Support system
Main Loop Failure Failure Probabilities
is Assumed to Shutdowns Shutdowns Shutdowns Shutdowns Following a De-Occur due to due to due to the pressurization Accident
Category Category loss of
I. II.A Offsite 3 Main Loops 2 Main Loops
Initiating Initiating Power Initially Initially
Events Events Available Available
Instrument
Air System 1.0 1.0 1.1 --- ---
5 to 15 Failure
Minutes Service
Water 
___ ___ 
_-- 1.0 2.2
System
Failure
Service
15 to 30 Water 1.1 1.0 1.1 --- ---
Minutes System
Failure
UJ
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is restored. However, this accident sequence is only a small
contributor for this initiating event category, and this indi-
cates that the present service water cooling tower arrange-
ment does not significantly affect the probability of a core
meltdown.
For reactor shutdowns following a depressurization accident,
support system failures are somewhat more significant due to
the fact that service water system failures were considered to
lead to main loop failures in the 5 to 15 minute time interval
following shutdown. Table 5-XXXVIII showed that for depressuri-
zation accidents with three main loops initially available
the two accident sequences DKlO(3A-CPI-SS'-C3') and DK8(3A-CP3-
SS'-C3') are significant contributors to the probability of a
core meltdown.
In this portion of the sensitivity analysis, some additional
information regarding potential main loop common mode failures
was gained. Specifically, following shutdowns due to category I
initiating events, a main loop common mode failure with proba-
bility 1 X 10~4 which eliminated the main loops prior to 15
minutes following the shutdown, would only change the median
probability of a core meltdown for this initiating event cate-
gory by a factor of 1.2. Such an arbitrary common mode failure
is quite unlikely due to the many main loop intrasystem common mode
failures already taken into account. However, this small change
in the median probability of a core meltdown indicates that any
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unaccounted common mode failures would have to be more likely
than 1 X 10~ in order to significantly affect the results.
In this same regard, the median probability of a core
meltdown for shutdowns due to category II.A initiating events
is insensitive to main loop common mode failures even as
likely as 1 X 10-3 per shutdown.
For reactor shutdowns following a loss of offsite power,
support system failures were only slight contributors to the
probability of a core meltdown. However, main loop common
mode failures even as likely as 1 X 10-3 per shutdown would
not significantly affect this initiating event category.
For reactor shutdowns following PCRV depressurization
accidents, the upper bound of the support system failure pro-
bability is equivalent to a main loop common mode failure pro-
bability of .1 X 10-3 per shutdown. For depressurization acci-
dents with three main loops available this increases the pro-
bability of a core meltdown by over a factor of 2. However,
in the case in which only two main loops are initially available
there is no change in the core-melt probability.
5.7 Other Analyses
5.7-1 The Effect of Changes in the Steam Generator Inventory
The design of the GCFR demonstration plant is not yet
fixed, and possible future design changes may have some effect
on the results presented in this chapter. One such possible
design change would involve the steam generators. A redesign
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of the steam generators which reduced the inventory of steam
water would affect the main loop operating times used in the
ESD modelling.
The effect of such a steam generator design change was
analyzed by assuming a 20% reduction in all the main loop opera-
ting times. The only accident sequences which were significantly
affected by this change were those for which the main loop
operating time was close to either 15 or 20 minutes. Specifi-
cally, for pressurized accident sequences labeled P and X, the
main loops were no longer able to operate long enough to allow
auxiliary boiler operation. Also, for accident sequences labeled
Q and Y, main loop operation was less than 15 minutes, and thus
two CACS loops were required rather than only one. Similar
changes were also made in the appropriate event sequences following
depressurization accidents. The changes in the median probability
of a core meltdown, for each initiating event category, due to
a 20% reduction in the main loop operating times are listed
in Table 5-LIV.
In all initiating event categories, the accident sequences
most affected by such a design change were those labeled P or X.
In these sequences the main loops no longer operate long enough
to allow the auxiliary boilers to reach their rated operating
conditions. However, the overall effect of this change is
small due to the relatively minor contribution of these specific
accident sequences.
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TABLE 5-LIV.
The Effect of a 20% Reduction in Main Loop Operating
Time on the Median Core-Melt Probabilities of the
Various Initiating Event Categories
Factor Change in the Median
Probability of a Loss of
Decay Heat Removal Due to a
20% Reduction in the Main
Initiating Event Category Loop Operating Times
I. Reactor Shutdowns not
affecting the performance
of either shutdown cool-
ing system
II.A Reactor Shutdowns
affecting the per- 1.2
formance of a single
main loop
III.C Reactor Shutdowns
due to the loss of 1.0
off site power
III.B Reactor Shutdowns
following PCRV depres-
surization accidents.
3 main loops initially 1.1
available
2 main loops initially 1.2
available
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5.7-2 Increasing the Shutdown Feedpump Capacity
With the present design capacity of the shutdown feed-
pumps, a single available main cooling loop supplied with
shutdown feedwater is operable for less than 15 minutes.
The failure rate of the CACS, in this interval is 8.2 x 10~4
per demand. If the shutdown feedpump capacity were increased
such that a single main loop were capable of operating at
least 15 minutes, then the failure rate of the CACS for these
accident sequences would decrease to 2.4 x 10~4 per demand.
The core-melt probability for initiating event categories
I and II.A would be most affected by this design change, and
the specific dominant accident sequences which would be
affected can be seen in Tables 5-III and 5-XX. The more
dominant accident sequences which are affected are CC2, Z2,
W9, 09, CC23 and Z47. For inadvertent reactor shutdowns,
the median core-melt probability would decrease to 5 x 10-7
per shutdown, and for reactor shutdowns due to the loss of
a single main loop, the core-melt probability decreases
to slightly over 1 x 10-5 per shutdown.
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5.7-3 Other Possible CT Small CV Failure Modes
The failure mode of the CT small CV assumed in this
study was the failure of the valve to throttle. This was con-
sidered to be the most likely failure mode because it does
not involve any action on the part of the valve or its
controller. Another possible failure mode, the valve fails
closed, would required either that the valve had closed prior
to the reactor shutdown, or that the shutdown controller
function to close the valve.
The probability of a CT small CV failing closed and the
failure remaining undetected prior to a reactor shutdown was
considered to be about 1 X 10 4. It was assumed that an elec-
trical interlock device would require the CT small CV to be
opened prior to the opening of the CT large CV. This would
assure that the small valve was opened during the startup of
the reactor. It was also assumed that the small valves would
be equipped with monitoring devices which would detect valve
closures during reactor operation. These CT small CV failures
were investigated by assuming an unavailability for the values
-4
due to undetected valve closures. At 1 X 10 , this failure
mode had no effect on the probability of a core meltdown for
any initiating event category. Even if the probability of
such a valve failure were 1 X 10- 3, the only initiating event
categories for which the probability of a core meltdown would
be affected are those for which only two main loops are ini-
tially available. For these initiating event categories, the
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median probability of a core meltdown is changed by a factor
of less than 1.2.
The probability that following a reactor shutdown the CT
small CV would completely close, rather than throttle, was
considered to be small compared to the probability that no
action would occur. The ESD was therefore modelled according
to the more likely failure mode. However, the results presented
in this chapter would not change significantly if the "valve
fails closed" failure mode had been modelled instead. For all the
dominant accident sequences except those involving the common
mode failure of the small valves. The difference in the main
loop operating times between the two small valve failure modes
would not affect either the auxiliary boiler availability or
the CACS operating requirements. The common mode failure of
all three small valves by failing closed would eliminate the
main loops in about 30 seconds. this is roughly the coast-
down time of the main circulators. With a CACS start-up time
of two minutes, this particular event would result in a core
meltdown. However, GA(2) is presently considering much shorter
CACS starting times which would allow CACS operation even if
such an unlikely event were to occur.
The probability of a common mode failure of all three
valves by failing closed was considered to be at least one
order of magnitude less than the common mode failure of the
valves by failing to throttle. This would place it in the
range of 10-5 to 10-6 per shutdown. If the CACS were not
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capable of core cooling for this particular event, it would
be a major contributor to the probability of a core meltdown.
However, it appears likely that the CACS will be capable of
starting quickly enough to prevent a core meltdown, and even
if all three CACS loops were required to start successfully,
this particular CT small CV common mode failure would not con-
tribute significantly to the overall core-melt probability.
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Chapter 6
Probability of a Core Meltdown
6.1 Introduction
6.1-1 Constituents of the Core-Melt Probability
The overall probability (per year) of a core meltdown
is the sum of the core-melt probability values for all the
initiating event categories. For each initiating event
category, the probability of a core meltdown has a contri-
bution from core meltdowns which occur following the reactor
shutdown and a contribution from core meltdowns which occur
due to failure of the reactor to shutdown. Thus,
P =IP.CM 1
where, PCM is the overall probability (per year) of a core
meltdown and the Pi's are the contributions from the various
initiating event categories. Each P. in turn is determined
by the equation:
P = IE S + PF)
PIE is the frequency or probability of occurrence of the
initiating event. These were discussed in Chapter 4. P is
the conditional probability of a loss of decay heat removal
following reactor shutdown given the initiating event. The
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median core-melt probability for each of the initiating
event categories and the sensitivity of these values to
the different shutdown cooling system failure contributions
was discussed in Chapter 5. P F is the conditional probability
that a core meltdown occurs due to failure of the reactor
to shutdown for a given initiating event. Because accident
sequences following failure to shutdown were not investi-
gated, these accidents were all conservatively assumed to
result in a core meltdown. This is a conservative assumption
because the main loop heat removal capability is not immedi-
ately lost following all of the events which initiate
reactor shutdown. It is therefore likely that a core melt-
down can be prevented in certain of these accident sequences.
In Section 6.2, the total probability of a loss of decay
heat removal following a reactor shutdown is discussed.
Possible design changes are pointed out in Section 6.3 and
discussed according to their effect on the overall probability
of a core meltdown. In Section 6.4, the contribution of core
meltdowns due to failure of the reactor to shutdown is dis-
cussed, and accident sequences following a failure of the
reactor to shutdown are discussed briefly.
6.1-2 Absolute Versus Relative Probabilities
Due to the conceptual nature of the GCFR design, the
core-melt probabilities presented in this study are a first-
cut assessment. Lack of detail in specific areas of the
design did not allow the depth of analysis necessary to
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determine absolute probability values with a high degree of
confidence. Conservative assumptions were made in the major
areas of uncertainty, and the sensitivity of these assump-
tions was investigated to determine their impact on the
results. But probably the most significant factor is that
the design of the GCFR is still evolving and future design
changes may affect the results of this study.
The thrust of this study has been to determine useful
design information to aid in the further development of the
GCFR. Thus, the relative values of the core-melt accident
sequences do provide quantitative inputs to the overall
design evaluation.
As work on the GCFR concept continues, and more detailed
information becomes available, refinements in the accident
sequence modelling and in the evaluation of the subsystem
reliability values and common mode failure probabilities will
allow better estimates of the absolute value of the core-melt
probability.
6.2 The Probability of a Loss of Decay Heat Removal Following
Reactor Shutdown
The initiating event frequencies and the calculated
median probabilities of a loss of decay heat removal (per
shutdown) for each initiating event category are listed in
Table 6-I. The product of these two values yields the prob-
ability (per year) of a loss of decay heat removal for each
initiating event category.
Table 6-i
A List of the Overall Core-Melt Probability
Contributions from each Initiating Event Category
Initiating Event Category Frequency of Median Probability Probability of a Loss of
Reactor Shutdowns of a Loss of Decay Decay Heat Removal
(per year) Heat Removal (per year)
(per shutdown)
Estimated
Range (1)Value
I. Inadvertant Forced 3 7x10 2x10-6 lx10-6 -9x1-6
Reactor Shutdowns
II.A Shutdowns following -2 2x105 2x10 1x1~-3x10~
Failure of a Single 10
Main Loop
II.B Main Loop Common 10-4 8x10 4 (2) 8x10_8  6x10-8-9x10~8
Mode Failures
III.A External Events(3) 10~-10-6 10-2 (4) --- lxlO -lxlO-6
III.B PCRV Depressuriza-
tion Accidents 3 -6 -9 -10 -9
3 Main Loops Available 10 (5) 2x10 2x10 8x10 -7x10
-6 -5 -11 -11 -11
2 Main Loops Available 10 2x10 2x10 2x10 -4x10
III.C Shutdowns following 10-2 5x10~- 5x106 2x10-62x10-5
the Loss of offsite power,
-6-6 -5
Sum for all Initiating Event Categories 7x10 6  3x10 -3x10
(1) Corresponds to the upper and lower beta factor values
(2) Refers to the case of main loop failure in the first 15 minutes following shutdown
(3) Refers to the occurrence of an earthquake greater in magnitude than an SSE
(4) This value was discussed in Chapter 4
(5) Probability of a leak in one of the smaller PCRV penetration closures
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This study has been a point estimate analysis with the
major emphasis on the core-melt probability per shutdown as
opposed to the core-melt probability per year. The core-melt
probability, per reactor shutdown, is a median point estimate.
It is based on the median subsystem unit reliability values,
the test and maintenance unavailabilities, and the median
beta factor value of 0.03. Of these three contributors to
the subsystem failure probability, only the beta factor value
was evaluated with an uncertainty range. While the other
values do possess uncertainty ranges, the effect of uncer-
tainty in the beta factor value was considered to outweigh
the effect of uncertainty both in the failure data used to
generate the subsystem unit reliability values, and in the
test and maintenance unavailability values. Thus, a range
of the median point estimate of the core-melt probability
was determined based on the median subsystem unit reliability
values, the test and maintenance unavailabilities and the
upper and lower bounds of the beta factor value of 0.1 and
0.01 respectively.
However, the core-melt probability per year includes
the initiating event frequency values which are not all
median estimates. In all cases, except the frequency of
inadvertent reactor shutdowns, the probability of a reactor
shutdown due to the initiating event was determined as an
order of magnitude estimate. This accuracy was considered
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to be sufficient for an evaluation of the relative core-melt
probabilities of the various initiating event categories.
As more data on the various initiating events becomes avail-
able, a more refined estimate of these values can be made.
This will aid in the attempt to determine a better value for
the absolute probability of a core meltdown in a GCFR. Yet,
it is unlikely that this would significantly change the
relative importance of the various initiating event categories.
Also, the probability of a core meltdown (per reactor year)
is not a median value. It is the best estimate of that value
for the purposes of this study, and while the range shown
in the table is due to the beta factor uncertainty, it should
be noted that for some of the initiating event categories,
the uncertainty in the initiating event frequency may outweigh
the beta factor uncertainty.
The sum of the estimated core-melt probabilities for each
of the initiating event categories is slightly over 7 x 106
per year, and the sums of the upper and lower median esti-
mates due the upper and lower beta factor values gives a
range of 3 x 10- 6 to 3 x 10-5 per year. The two major con-
tributors to the core-melt probability are losses of decay
heat removal following shutdowns due to category I initiating
events (inadvertent reactor trips) and following shutdowns
due to the loss of offsite power (category III.C). Losses
of decay heat removal following shutdowns due to category II.A
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initiating events (failures of one main loop) are only small
contributors even at the conservative estimate of the
operational protection system (OPS) failure rate of
1 x 10-2 per demand. For reactor shutdowns due to main loop
support system failures (category II.B), an initiating event
probability of 1 x 10 per year was estimated by the author.
Losses of decay heat removal following shutdowns due to these
initiating events are negligible contributors to the total
probability of a core meltdown. However, even if the prob-
ability of occurrence of these initiating events were 1 x 10-3
per year, the total probability of a core meltdown would not
be significantly affected.
The contribution to the probability of a core meltdown
due to the occurrence of an earthquake of greater magnitude
than a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) is shown under initiating
event category III.A. No median core-melt probability was
selected for this event, but at most it is only a very small
contributor to the median core-melt probability. However,
the range of the probability of a core meltdown due to the
occurrence of an SSE was included in the sum of the upper
and lower values of the point estimate range, where it made
only a small contribution.
The probability of a loss of decay heat removal follow-
ing a depressurization accident has a negligible impact on
the overall probability of a core meltdown. This is due in
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part to the assumption that severe losses of containment
integrity concurrent with the depressurization accident were
very unlikely. This assumption was considered reasonable
because the containment failure modes should be basically
independent of the depressurization. However, even if the
coupling between these two events were on the order of 10-1
to 10-2 per event, the probability of a core meltdown due
to PCRV depressurization accidents would be at most 2 x 10
per year with three main loops initially available, and
6 x 10~9 per year if only two main loops were initially
available. The total probability of a core meltdown would
not be changed significantly even if this were the case.
The contribution of common mode failures and test and
maintenance unavailabilities to the core-melt probability
can be seen from Table 6-II. Considering only random equip-
ment failures, the core-melt probability is 3 x 10 7 per
year. Including intra-system common mode failures increases
the probability of a core meltdown to 6 x 10-6 per year,
while the addition of test and maintenance unavailabilities
only increases this value to 7 x 10 per year. The signifi-
cance of common mode failures is due to the dominance of
accident sequences in initiating event categories I and
III.C. Only in initiating event category II.B is the test
and maintenance contribution much greater than that of
common mode failures. This is because, for the event listed
in the table, two CACS loops are required to operate.
Table 6-II
The Contributions of Intrasystem Common Mode Failures
and Test and Maintenance Unavailabilities to the Core-Melt Probability
Initiating Event Category Probability of a Loss of Factor Increase Factor Increase
Decay Heat Removal Due to Common Due to T&M Una-
(per year) Mode Failures (a) vailabilities (a)
No T&M No T&M T&M Column (2) Column (3)Included Column (1) Column (2)
(1) (2) (3)
S = 0 S = 0.03 a = 0.03
Inadvertent Forced Shutdowns I. 1x10 7  9x10~ 2x1-6 8.3 2.2
Shutdowns Following Failure of -8 -8 7
a Single Main Loop II.A 2x10 6x10 2x10 3.1 3.3
Main Loop Common Mode 
-8 -8 -8
Failure (b) II.B 2x10 3x10 8x10 1.4 3.0
PCRV Depressurization
Accidents III.B
3 Main Loops Available lxlO lxlO 2x10 9  10.0 1.4
Main Loops Available 5x10 lx-10 2x-10 2.0 2.4
Shutdowns Following the Loss 
-7 -6 
-6
of Offsite Power III.C 2x10 5x10 5x10 28.8 1.0
SUM OF ALL INITIATING 7 -6 6
EVENT CATEGORIES 3x10 6x10 7x10 17.6 1.2
(a) For these calculations, the exact values were used, while the numbers listed in columns 1, 2 and 3
are rounded to the nearest whole number.
(b) Main loop failure assumed in the first 15 minutes following shutdown. G>co
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It is important to note that the two most dominant
accident sequences account for over half of the total
core-melt probability. These are sequences N22 (3A-3B'-RlO')
and K3(3A-RlO'-C3') which involve common mode failures of
the diesel generators and the CACS respectively. The dom-
inant accident sequences following inadvertent forced reactor
shutdowns account for most of the remainder of the core-melt
probability. These sequences are listed in Table 5-111 and
the most important of these also involve common mode failures.
6.3 The Effect of Potential Design Changes
A number of possible design changes were discussed
throughout Chapter 5. These are summarized below and their
overall effect on the probability of a core meltdown is dis-
cussed.
Table 6-111 shows the calculated probability of a core
meltdown due to inadvertent forced reactor shutdowns (cate-
gory I initiating events) for three specific design changes.
Two of these changes affect the CACS while the other concerns
the shutdown feedpump capacity. For reactor shutdowns due to
category I initiating events, a large percentage of the
core-melt probability is due to accident sequences occurring
prior to 15 minutes following the shutdown with only one
CACS loop operating. If the CACS heat removal capability
were increased such that one loop were capable of core cooling
at 8 minutes after the shutdown, the probability of a loss of
decay heat removal would be decreased.
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TABLE 6-III
The Affect of Specific Design Changes
on the Core-Melt Probability Following Shutdown
Due to Category I Initiating Events
Probability of a Loss of Decay
Heat Removal (per Shutdown) Due
to Category I Initiating Events
Potential Design Change Median Range
Base Case 7x10~7  7 -3x10-6
Increase CACS Heat Re- 
-7 -7 -6moval Capability 5x10 2xl0 -3x10
Increase CACS Reliabi- 
-7 -7 
-6lity to .9943 4x10 2x10 -2x10
Increase Shutdown 
-7 -6Feedpump Capacity 5x10 2x10 -3x10
Both Design Changes Above 3x10~7 3x10 7 -3x10-6
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In the determination of the CACS unit reliability, it
was assumed that both of the air cooler fans were required
to operate. The CACS unit reliability was then calculated
at .9917. However, if only one fan were required to operate,
the CACS of this increased CACS reliability was determined
using the sensitivity plot of Figure 5.7. The combined
effect of these two design changes was extrapolated from
this sensitivity plot.
Increasing the shutdown feedpump capacity will decrease
the core-melt probability for this -category if a single
main loop is capable of operating for at least 15 minutes.
The effect of this design change is shown in Table 6-III.
However, this design change is an alternative to increasing
the CACS heat removal capability. In effect, either a
single CACS loop can be capable of core cooling sooner to
account for the operating time of a single main loop, or the
operating time of a single main loop can be extended until
one CACS loop is adequate. The decrease in the core-melt
probability is effectively the same for these two changes,
and in the remaining discussion the shutdown feedpump design
change can be substituted for the CACS design change.
Other possible design changes which do not affect the
subsystem performance as modelled in the ESD, but may affect
its reliability of operation can be investigated through
the sensitivity plots. After improvements in the CACS
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reliability, possible design changes which might increase
the reliability of the CT small CV's to throttle would be
most beneficial.
The three design changes mentioned above, also have
a significant impact on the probability of a loss of decay
heat removal for shutdowns due to category II.A and category
II.B initiating events. However, because of the small con-
tribution to the overall probability of a core meltdown due
to these events, no significant change in the overall value
results. This is also the case for reactor.shutdowns due
to PCRV depressurization accidents.
For reactor shutdowns following the loss of offsite
power, the effect of potential design changes is shown in
Table 6-IV. The first potential design change concerns
powering the auxiliary boilers from the essential buses
rather than the non-essential bus. This change decreases
the core-melt probability for this category from 5 x 10~4
to 3 x 10-4 per shutdown. The auxiliary boiler electrical
loads are not large and could be easily incorporated into
the essential electrical loads without significantly affec-
ting the required diesel generator capacity.
The other significant design change involves increasing
the operating time of the main loops when no essential power
is available. In this study, main loop operation without
essential power was limited to 15 minutes due to incomplete
TABLE 6-IV
The Effect of Specific Design Changes On
the Core-Melt Probability Following Shut-
downs Due to the Loss of Offsite Power
Adjusted Probability of a Loss of Decay
Heat Removal (per shutdown) Due to Loss
of Offsite Power Events
Auxiliary Boilers on Auxiliary Boilers on
Potential Non-Essential Buses Essential Buses
Design
Change Median; Range Median; Range
Base Case 5x10 4 2x10 4-2x10~ 3x10- ; lxl~O-lx10-3
Extend Main Loop
Operation to 30
Minutes Without 4
Essential Power 4x10 ; 2x10 4 -2x10 3  2x10 ; 9x10 5 -9x10 4
Increase CACS Reli- 4 4 4
ability to .9943 4x10 ; 2x10 -lx10 3  3x10 ; lxl0 -lx10 3
Both Design Changes44_ 3454Above 3x10 4 ; lx10 4 -2x10 3 2x10 ; 9x10 5 -9x10 4
W~k
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throttling of the CT small CV's. These valves require a con-
tinuous supply of instrument air for correct operation. If
each valve were equipped with a separate air accumulator to
supply its air requirements, main loop operation without
essential power could be extended until steam generator de-
pletion (assumed to be 30 minutes). This design change de-
creases the probability of a loss of decay heat removal
following shutdowns due to the loss of offsite power. Also,
increasing the reliability of the CACS will decrease the
probability of a loss of decay heat removal if the auxiliary
boilers are powered by the non-essential bus. But if the
auxiliary boilers are powered by the essential buses, the
probability of a core meltdown is dominated entirely by the
failure of the emergency diesel generators.
The separate and combined effect of these potential
design changes is summarized in Table 6-V. The table lists
the probability of a loss of decay heat removal (per year)
as it is affected by the specific design change or changes.
The single most significant design change is powering the
auxiliary boilers from the essential buses. This decreases
the median probability of a core meltdown to 5 x 10-6 per
year with a range due to the beta factor range of 2 x 10-6
to 2 x 10-5 per year. If all of the design changes discussed
above were made, the median probability of a loss of decay
heat removal would decrease to 3 x 10-6 per year with a
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TABLE 6-V
The Overall Effect of Potential Design
Changes on the Core-Melt Probability
Adjusted Probability of a Loss of
Decay Heat Removal (per year)
Estimated
Potential Design Change Value Range
Base Case 7x10-6  3xl0-6 - 3x10-5
1: Power Auxiliary Boilers
From the Essential 
-
6  
-6 -5
Buses 5x10 2x10 - 2x10
2: Increase CACS Heat
Removal Capability 6x10-6  3x10-6 - 3xl0-5
3: Extend Main Loop
Operation to 30
Minutes Without -6- 5
Essential Power 6x10 6  3x10 -6 - 3x
4: Increase CACS Reli- 6 -6 -5
ability to .9943 5x10 3x10 - 2x10
Design Changes 2, 3 and 6 
-6 54 Above 4x10 2x10 - 2x10
Design Changes 1, 2, 3 -6  -6  -5
and 4 Above 3x10 lx10 lx10
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range of 1 x 10 6 to 1 x 10 per year. However, if the
above changes were made except for powering the auxiliary
boilers from the essential buses, the median probability
of a core meltdown would be 4 x 10-6 per year with a range
of 2 x 10-6 to 2 x 10-5 per year.
The design changes discussed above only represent those
changes which were investigated in the study and which were
found to have some impact on the core-melt probability.
They do not represent a complete analysis of all potential
design changes. Furthermore, whether any design changes are
warranted will depend on a complete consideration of all the
various design trade-offs.
6.4 Probability of a Core Meltdown Due to Failure of the
Reactor to Shutdown
An analysis of the accident sequences following failure
of reactor shutdown systems was not performed in this study.
The reliability of the reactor shutdown systems was considered
to be sufficiently high such that core meltdowns due to their
failure would not contribute significantly to the overall
probability of a core meltdown.
There are two independent reactor shutdown systems in
the GCFR. These are the control rod system and the shutdown
rod system. The analysis of LWR reactor protection systems
in the RSS indicates that a failure rate of 1 x 10-5 per
demand is attainable for a single shutdown system .
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Allowing for potential common failure modes due to the fact
that both GCFR shutdown systems are rod-type systems, it
is considered that a failure rate in the range of 10~7 to
10-8 per demand is reasonable for the two GCFR shutdown
systems.
An upper bound on the failure rate for the GCFR shutdown
systems can be obtained by conservatively assuming that
failure of the reactor to shut down leads to a core meltdown.
Assuming three forced reactor shutdowns are required per
year and that core meltdowns due to failure should not con-
tribute more than 10% of the overall probability of a core
meltdown, the upper bound on the failure rate of the reactor
shutdown systems would be 2 x 10~7 per demand. At a failure
rate of 2 x 10 8 per demand, failure of the reactor to shut
down would not contribute more than 1% to the probability
of a core meltdown. Therefore, based on this analysis,
failure of the reactor to shut down should not be a signifi-
cant contributor to the core-melt probability.
However, failure of the reactor to shut down does not
automatically result in a core meltdown. For example, the
loss of condenser vacuum is a reactor trip parameter, but
failure of the reactor to shut down does not immediately re-
sult in a core meltdown because main loop cooling is not lost.
Operation of the main loops can be continued for a consider-
able period of time allowing for possible remedial actions.
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Some important points regarding the plant response to this
particular class of accidents are discussed below.
The input parameter sensors of the plant protection sys-
tem are common to both reactor shutdown systems. If the
reactor shutdown signal is not initiated, a reactor transient
will result. Failure of the shutdown signal to be initiated
is unlikely due to multiple input sensors for each reactor
protection system parameter, and due to the fact that there
is a primary trip parameter and at least one back-up trip
parameter for each anticipated reactor shutdown situation.
Also, for most of these situations operator action would re-
sult in a manual initiation of the reactor shutdown. Whether
a core meltdown occurs, in the event that the shutdown
signal is not initiated, will depend on the severity of the
power to heat removal imbalance caused by the initiating
event.
If following the initiation of a reactor shutdown signal
the reactor is not shut down, a number of plant actions will
occur. The turbine throttle is tripped and the resuperheater
bypass control valves are opened, the auxiliary boilers and
shutdown feedpumps are started, and the emergency diesel
generator and the CACS are started in the event they may be
needed. However, the CT large CV's do not close because the
reactor shutdown verification signal is also required for this
action. The main loop are still operating at full power pro-
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viding core cooling. However, the steam generators will
soon be exhausted unless a source of feedwater is established.
The main feedpump turbines are normally driven by ex-
traction steam from the main turbine, and the turbine trip
interrupts the feedwater supply. In order to continue full
power main loop operation, the main feedpump turbines need
to be driven by the steam exhaust in the resuperheater bypass
line. The shutdown feedpumps are inadequate due to their
low capacity. Provision is made for this mode of operation
for the feedpumps both at startup and during orderly reactor
shutdowns. Main loop operation could continue for some time
in this operating mode.
The details of these plant responses are not final, but
clearly the potential exists for preventing core meltdown in
situations where the reactor shutdown systems have failed.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Remarks
7.1 Summary
This study is an attempt to utilize the accident analysis
(1)
techniques of the Reactor Safety Study (RSS) toward a
first-cut assessment of the gas-cooled fast-breeder reactor
(GCFR) as typified by the conceptual design of the 300 MW(e)
demonstration plant. The major thrust of the study was dir-
ected toward the investigation of the probability of potential
accident sequences leading to core meltdowns. This involved
the determination of the dominant accident sequences and the
sensitivity of the results to the reliability values of the
shutdown cooling subsystems. However, the potential conse-
quences of core-melt accidents were not investigated.
In the analysis, those potential core meltdowns due to
losses of decay heat removal following reactor shutdowns were
investigated in detail. Probabilistic models were construc-
ted of the plant responses following the initiation of the
reactor shutdown signal. Two such models, called event se-
quence diagrams (ESD) were constructed. One modelled the
plant responses following shutdowns in which the reactor re-
mains pressurized. The other modelled the plant responses
following shutdowns due to a prestressed concrete reactor
vessel (PCRV) depressurization accident. These are shown in
Figures 3.3, 3.4 a, b, c, d, e, f, and 3.5 a, b. c.
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The reactor shutdown initiating events were grouped into
categories according to their effect on the reactor shutdown
cooling system performance. These categories are listed in
Table 4-I. Category I. contains all those events which require
a reactor shutdown but do not affect the performance of either
the main cooling loops or the core auxiliary cooling system
(CACS). Category II. contains those events which degrade the
performance of the main loop cooling system only. This cate-
gory contained two important subcategories. Subcategory II.A
consisted of those events affecting the performance of a
single main cooling loop, and subcategory II.B contained those
events which commonly degraded the performance of all the
main loops. Catgeory III included the events which commonly
degraded the performance of both the main loop cooling system
and the CACS. The major subcategories of this group were ex-
ternal events (III.A), internal events (III.B), and support
system failures (III.C). The major initiating events in these
three subcategories were respectively earthquakes, PCRV de-
pressurization accidents, and reactor shutdowns due to the
loss of offsite power.
The reliability of the GCFR shutdown cooling subsystems
was evaluated utilizing generic failure data from the RSS.
Three contributions to the subsystem failure rate were consi-
dered. These were random equipment failures, intra-system
common mode failures and equipment unavailabilities due to
test and maintenance purposes. The subsystem unit reliability
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values and the subsystem test and maintenance unavailabilities
are listed in Tables 4-VIII and 4-IX respectively. In order
to determine the intrasystem common mode failure probability,
a parameter, the beta factor, was utilized. The beta factor
was defined as the fraction of unit failures which are common
mode failures, and the intra-system common mode failure prob-
ability (z) is then determined in terms of the subsystem unit
reliability (p) and the beta factor (S) using the following
relationship:
z = (1-p)
Two types of data were investigated in order to determine an
appropriate value for the beta factor. These were component
failure data, shown in Table 4-VII, and the common mode failure
contributions calculated in the RSS for light water reactor
systems, shown in Figure 4.7. Both of these types of data
indicated a beta factor range of 0.01 to 0.1, but the informa-
tion was not specific enough to allow a determination of a
beta factor for each individual subsystem. Thus, this range
was used for each subsystem, the median of this range of 0.03
(assuming a log-normal distribution) was used for each sub-
system. These subsystem beta factor values are also given
in Table 4-VIII.
For each of the initiating event categories a median
point estimate of the probability of a loss of decay heat
removal (per reactor shutdown) was calculated, and the sensi-
tivity of this value to each of the three subsystem failure
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contributors was investigated. The results of the sensitivity
analysis determined those subsystem failures which contributed
most to the calculated core-melt probability for each of the
initiating event categories. The dominant accident sequences
were determined, and the percentage of the core-melt prob-
ability, due to accident sequences occurring at different time
intervals after shutdown, was investigated as an input to the
evaluation of the core meltdown process and to the final acci-
dent consequence calculations. The results of the sensitivity
analyses are included as Chapter 5.
For each initiating event category, the product of the
frequency of the initiating event and the probability of a
loss of decay heat removal (per shutdown) yields the prob-
ability of a core meltdown (per year). These values are listed
in Table 6-I. An estimate of the overall probability of a
core meltdown (per year) was determined from the sum of these
values. This was evaluated to be 7 x 10-6 per year. It should
be emphasized that while this study is a first-cut assessment
of the absolute value of the GCFR core-melt probability, it is
the relative values of these numbers that has provided quanti-
tative inputs into the overall design evaluation.
The major uncertainty in the median point estimate of
the core-melt probability (per shutdown) was considered to
be contained in the range of the intra-system common mode
failure probabilities as established by the range of the beta
factor value. For each initiating event category, the beta
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factor range of 0.01 to 0.1 results in a range of the median
estimate of the core-melt probability. This uncertainty
range was also used to determine a range of the estimated
core-melt probability (per year). These ranges are shown in
Table 6-I, and they yield a range of the overall core-melt
probability of 3 x 10- to 3 x 106 per year.
Some results from the sensitivity analyses were applied
to demonstrate the effect on this value of possible design
changes. These are listed in Table 6-V, and given these
design changes, it would be possible to reduce the median es-
timate of the core-melt probability to 3 x 10 per year with
6 -5
a range of 1 x 10 to 1 x 10 per year. However, the over-
all evaluation of the sensitivity studies indicated that the
present design of the GCFR shutdown cooling systems is well
balanced. This is discussed further in the next section.
7.2 Comments on the GCFR Shutdown Cooling Design
The results of this study show that the GCFR shutdown
cooling system design, consisting of the main loop shutdown
cooling system and the CACS, can be capable of maintaining
adequate decay heat removal with a high degree of reliability
over the entire range of reactor shutdown initiating events.
The design feature of providing the initial shutdown heat re-
moval by continued operation of the main loop cooling system
is a significant factor contributing to the shutdown cooling
reliability. The stored energy of the steam generators is
available to drive the helium circulators with the capability
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of continuing in this operating mode for at least 30 minutes.
Main loop shutdown cooling operation is then continued by
driving the helium circulators with auxiliary boiler steam.
If at any time main loop failure occurs, the CACS is avail-
able to take over core cooling.
The main loop shutdown cooling system design is con-
sidered to be quite balanced. Following inadvertent forced
reactor shutdowns, the main loop shutdown cooling reliability
was slightly under .999, and Table 5-VI showed that the sensi-
tivities of the various main loop shutdown cooling systems
were within the same magnitude range. This indicates that
the different subsystem failures all contribute more or less
equally to main loop unreliability.
The largest contributor to main loop shutdown cooling
unreliability is failure of the auxiliary boilers followed
closely by the contribution of circulator-turbine small control
valve (CT small CV) failures. However, comparison with Table
5-I shows that auxiliary boiler failures are not as significant
to the core-melt probability for inadvertent reactor shutdowns.
This is due to the fact that auxiliary boiler failures affect
main loop operation in the 20 to 30 minute time interval, and
in this interval, only a single CACS loop is required. Of the
main loop shutdown cooling subsystems, the failure of the CT
small CV's contributes most to the probability of a core melt-
down. The correct operation of these valves is required to
assure main loop availability, and their failure leads to
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earlier dependence on the CACS. This is also true of the cir-
culator-turbine large control valves (CT large CV's) and the
resuperheater bypass control valves, but the reliability of
these valves was determined to be higher than that of the
small valve. Thus, these analyses indicate that more improve-
ment can be gained by increasing the reliability of the CT
small CV to throttle properly following a reactor shutdown.
The CACS is designed to provide core cooling in the event
that main loop shutdown cooling system failure occurs. The
contribution of CACS failures to the core-melt probability
for most of the reactor shutdown initiating event categories
is quite large. However, this is primarily due to two factors.
First is that the CACS is more complex than any of the in-
dividual main loop shutdown cooling subsystems, and it there-
fore has a lower unit reliability. Second is that a large
percentage of main loop failures occur in the first fifteen
minutes after shutdown, and in this time interval, two of the
three CACS loops are required for adequate core cooling.
In the final analysis, however, the major contributors
to the overall core-melt probability are common mode failures.
In fact, the two single largest contributors are the common
mode failure of the diesel generators following a reactor shut-
down due to a loss of offsite power, and the common mode fail-
ure of the CACS for this same event. Powering the auxiliary
boilers from the essential electrical buses will reduce the
contribution of the accident sequence involving common mode
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failure of the CACS. However, the diesel generator depen-
dence still remains.
This review would seem to indicate that a substantial
improvement could be gained by design efforts directed at
evaluating and reducing potential common mode failures. But
this is a simplification of the problem. Considerable de-
sign effort has already been directed toward such a goal.
In the normal design process, potential common failure modes
are eliminated from the design whenever they are detected.
The problem essentially lies in the inability to predict the
probability of any undetected common mode failures. The beta
factor approach to predicting intrasystem common mode failure
probabilities is useful in that it provides a consistent
methodology and it allows the analyst to utilize presently
available failure data. However, while it allows potential
common mode failures to be included in the analysis, it does
not provide any useful design insight. The uncertainty range
of the beta factor value of 0.01 to 0.1 determined the range
of the median point estimate of the probability of a core
meltdown. In fact, the calculated core-melt probability for
the GCFR of 7 x 10-6 per year with a range of 3 x 10-6 to
3 x 10-5 per year compares will with the predicted core-melt
probability for LWR's, which is a median value of 6 x 105
per reactor year with a 95%-5% confidence range of 2 x 10-5
S 10 (1)to 4 x 10 per reactor year
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In addition to these general comments on the overall
shutdown cooling system design, the analysis of the accident
sequences has yielded other more specific information. These
are summarized below:
(1) Main loop isolation valve failure, resulting in core
bypass flow through a failed main loop, is not an
important contributor to the probability of a core
meltdown. Even following a PCRV depressurization
accident, when core flow requirements are strictest,
the contribution to the core-melt probability due
to isolation valve failures is not predicted to be
significant.
(2) Main loop failures due to circulator-turbine im-
balance conditions were also not very significant
contributors to the probability of a core meltdown.
(3) The effect of restarting initially failed shutdown
feedpumps during the main loop operating period was
insignificant.
(4) The potential effect of restarting initially failed
diesel generators following a shutdown due to the
loss of offsite power was determined to be quite
significant. However, the realistic benefit to be
gained by such efforts is likely to be small due to
a relatively low probability of successfully starting
an initially failed diesel in the time available.
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(5) The core-melt probability is not sensitive to main
loop support system faults following reactor shut-
downs. In fact the level of arbitrary main loop
common mode failures which would significantly affect
the core-melt probability is quite high.
A number of potential design improvements have been ana-
lyzed in this study, and these are summarized below. Whether
any design changes are warranted will depend upon the calcu-
lations of the accident sequence consequences, which are needed
to complete the risk evaluation, and the analysis of economic
(an other) trade-offs.
Auxiliary Boilers. Providing the auxiliary boiler electrical
requirements from the essential buses results in a significant
decrease in the probability of a core meltdown. These elec-
trical loads are not large and will not cause any significant
penalty by increasing the required diesel generator capacity.
Core Auxiliary Cooling System. Increasing the CACS heat re-
moval capability can also result in a decrease in the core-melt
probability by allowing successful operation of a single CACS
loop sooner after the shutdown. However, this potential design
change may not be economically justified until an overall study
of the cost benefit of various design changes is evaluated.
Shutdown Feedpumps. Increasing the shutdown feedpump capacity
to allow a single main loop to operate for at least 15 minutes
produces effectively the same change in the core-melt prob-
403
ability as the CACS design change, mentioned above, by
allowing a single main loop to operate until a single CACS
loop is adequate.
Circulator-Turbine Small Control Valves. The continuous
operation of these valves, following a reactor shutdown due
to the loss of offsite power, is needed to assure proper
operation of the main loops and the full conservative use of
the stored energy of the steam generator inventories. De-
coupling these valves from the instrument air supply, for
example, by providing each with a separate air accumulator
tank, would allow main loop operation for at least 30 minutes
without essential power. This can result in a significant
reduction in the probability of a core meltdown.
Throughout the analysis of the accident sequences, a
number of design features were found to be quite important.
These are summarized below.
(1) It was assumed that each of the CT small CV's was
equipped with both an interlock and a monitoring device to
assure that the valve is opened during reactor start-up, and
to detect valve closings during normal power operation. These
actions minimize the probability of a CT small CV being in a
closed position prior to a reactor shutdown signal.
(2) It is recommended that the CACS have the capability
of starting within 30 seconds. The likelihood that the CACS
will be needed this quickly is low, but the potential may exist
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for main loop failure within the presently assumed minimum of
2 minutes. For example, a common mode failure of the CT small
CV's by failing closed cannot be dismissed. This particular
event is very unlikely because it requires a specific failed
action on the part of each independent small valve or shutdown
controller. However, the probability of occurrence of this
event may be likely enough to make it a significant contributor
to the core-melt probability if the CACS cannot start quickly
enough. GA has begun design investigations regarding the
capability of the CACS to provide core cooling in the unlikely
event of a sudden, instantaneous loss of the main loop cooling
system (2) It is recommended that these investigations be
continued.
Even if all three CACS loops were required to operate for
such an event, these would be sufficient to reduce the signifi-
cance of early main loop cooling system failure events. Also,
the 30 second CACS start-up need not be dependent on the diesel
generator start-up time. For a simultaneous loss of offsite
power and turbine trip, the early common mode failure of the
main loop shutdown cooling system should be quite insignificant
compared to the dominant accident sequence for this initiating
event, which involves the common mode failure of the emergency
diesel generators.
(3) One of the major areas of concern in this study in-
volved potential dependencies between the main loops and the
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CACS which might lead to a failure of both shutdown cooling
systems. In general, the two cooling systems were found to
be quite independent. Some potential dependencies involving
the service water system and the instrument air system were
discussed in Chapter 4, and it is assumed that these potential
common mode failures will be eliminated from the design. The
major link between the main loop shutdown cooling system and
the CACS is their common dependence on essential electrical
power. The dominant contribution of the core-melt accident
sequences following the loss of offsite power is an indication
of the significance of this dependence. Yet in the opinion of
this author, the design of the essential electrical system is
quite adequate. The essence of this dependence is the relatively
short time (compared to light water reactors, and especially
the high-temperature gas-cooled reactor) for which the GCFR
can maintain core cooling with no essential electrical power
available.
(4) Due to the large contribution to the core-melt prob-
ability of accident sequences due to reactor shutdowns initiated
by the loss of offsite power, the capability of the turbine-
generator to withstand a full-load rejection and continue
powering the plant auxiliaries becomes increasingly important.
Electrical-mechanical control systems for this purpose are
utilized in fossil-fired power plants in this country and in
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Great Britain. However, their present experience indicates
a rather low reliability. Due to the importance of electric power to
the ultimate shutdown cooling system performance, efforts to improve the
reliability of a full-load rejection system - while not specifically part
of a nuclear power plant design - could prove to be very beneficial.
7.3 Comments on the Study Methodology
The major advantage of the event sequence diagram (ESD)
methodology is the detail which it allows in the construction
of the accident sequences. Detail was included which properly
accounted for the operating dependencies of the shutdown
cooling subsystems. Also, the possible effect on the over-
all shutdown cooling performance of a number of operating
uncertainties were able to be considered. The ESD identifies
each individual accident sequence. This provides information
regarding the specific failures which have occurred in the
sequence, and the time at which the meltdown is assumed to
occur. This is useful information concerning both the calcu-
lation of the mechanics of the initial core meltdown process
and the calculation of the accident sequence consequences.
The disadvantage of the ESD modeling is the amount of
time and effort which is required to model, in detail, the large
number of potential accident sequences. The vast majority of
the potential accident sequences are very unlikely and do not
contribute significantly to the overall core-melt probability.
However, it is not always easy to distinguish which accident
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sequences are dominant before constructing and analyzing the
model. Also, when determining sensitivities, some of the
less likley sequences may be important contributors. There-
fore, the detailed modelling of all the accident sequence
possibilities allows some assurance of completeness.
While the initial investment of work is large, the final
ESD model is a very flexible working tool, and modifications
can be easily made as they become necessary. Thus, as the
GCFR design evolves, the ESD's may be suitably modified as
necessary. Also, the modelling is not very sensitive
to changes in the specifications or operating requirements
of the shutdown cooling subsystems. As long as the overall
design bases of the subsystems remains the same, the
effect of possible changes in the subsystem unit reliability
values can be determined from the sensitivity plots. For
example, it is likely that the CACS operating requirements,
following a PCRV depressurization accident, will have to be
modified to fully account for the effects of air ingress on
their heat removal performance. But, as long as the basic
CACS design basis of two loops equal to the decay heat load
at 2 minutes after shutdown and one loop equal to the decay
heat load at 15 minutes, the modelling is unaffected. Even
if the overall subsystem design basis were changed, modifi-
cations in the ESD's could be easily made.
As the conceptual design of the GCFR progresses, and
as more detailed information becomes available, additional
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modelling efforts in a number of specific areas may be possible.
1) The ESDs can be extended to model the accident sequences
following failure of the reactor to shut down.
2) The modelling of the resuperheater bypass control valve
failures is considered to be very conservative. No bene-
fit was allowed fram continued main loop operation fol-
lowing failure of this valve to open. However, it may be
likely that a main loop can continue operating for some
period of time following this failure. For pressurized
reactor shutdowns, the helium circulator-turbine steam
exhaust pressure is maintained just above the reactor
coolant pressure by the lifting of the resuperheater
safety and relief valves. The extent of main loop opera-
tion in this condition is yet to be reasonably determined,
and further modelling will have to await these analyses.
3) The present ESD's consider the plant responses in the
first thirty minutes following the reactor shutdown. Ex-
tending the modelling to longer time periods after the
shutdown would allow the operating reliability of the
decay heat removal equipment to be explicitly included in
the analysis.
Regarding the actual accident sequence probability calcu-
lations, the beta factor approach was used to calculate the
intra-system common mode failure probabilities. While this
approach is most applicable on a component level, with caution
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and judgement, it can be applied to the subsystem level. The
advantage of this approach is that it allows a justifiable
estimation of the common mode failure probability based on
failure data and other sources of failure rate information.
However, many questions need to be answered before the beta
factor approach can be better extended to the subsystem
level. Some of these concerns are listed below:
1) How can a beta factor be better determined for a specific
subsystem which may consist of a number of redundant
valves and pumps?
2) Are there related effects between the beta factor and the
subsystem reliability value? For example, a subsystem
with a high reliability may also have a larger beta
factor. Because the random failure rate has been decreased,
the level of unforseen common mode failures may be pro-
portionally higher. Conversly, a subsystem with a low
reliability may have a low beta factor because the random
failures may outweigh the potential common mode failures.
3) What is the relationship of the beta factor to the number
of redundant items in the subsystem? As the number of
redundant units increases, the penalty of applying the
beta factor approach indiscriminately is very great and
probably unrealistic.
As more failure data regarding multiple component failures
becomes available, some of these questions may be answered.
However, the effect of uncertainty in the beta factor approach
41o
may be better handled by using more sophisticated calcula-
tional techniques. In general, a Monte Carlo calculational
approach similar to that used in the reactor safety study
could be applied to the entire ESD accident probability cal-
culation. This approach is outlined below as a recommendation
of possible future work.
1) The failure data uncertainty can be applied to the cal-
culation of the subsystem unit reliability values to deter-
mine an appropriate confidence range and probability distri-
bution function for each of these values.
2) Probability distribution functions can also be determined
for each of the subsystem test and maintenance unavailability
values.
3) The beta factor range established for each subsystem would
then be treated as the confidence limits for the beta factor
valve, and an appropriate probability distribution function
can be applied to this range.
4) The convolution of all these probability distribution
functions through all of the accident sequences of the ESD's
can be performed for each of the initiating event categories
by a Monte Carlo technique. This will yield a median core-
melt probability with the appropriate upper and lower confi-
dence limits.
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Appendix A
GCFR Subsystem Descriptions
and Failure Probability Quantifications
A.1 Introduction
In this appendix, those subsystems which function in the
shutdown of the reactor and in the subsequent shutdown and
decay heat removal operations are described in detail. Also
presented here are the fault tree diagrams developed for the
subsystem failure modes modelled in the event sequence dia-
gram (ESD). Due to the conceptual nature of the GCFR design,
the subsystem design bases or configurations may change as
the design evolves. Therefore, the subsystem descriptions,
which are mostly taken from the Bechtel balance-of-plant
study mentioned in Chapter 2, should not be interpreted as
final.
The ESD explicitly models the operational dependencies
between the main loop shutdown cooling subsystems. Otherwise,
the subsystem failures are assumed to be independent. In
order to search for possible dependencies between the indi-
vidual subsystems which were not explicitly modelled in the
ESD, the fault tree diagrams were developed. These fault
tree diagrams are basically qualitative in nature. They were
drawn for the purpose of determining interrelationships which
might lead to intersystem common mode failures. However,
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these fault tree diagrams also served as guides for
evaluating the subsystem unit reliabilities.
The following terms, which are used throughout this
appendix, are defined below:
Reliability: This is the probability that a given system
or component will perform a desired function in a certain
time interval and under specific operating conditions.
Failure Probability: This is the probability that a system
or component will suffer a defined failure in a specified
period of time. In this study, this is the complement of
the reliability.
Demand Probability: For those systems or components that
are required to start, change state, or function following an
initiating event, this is the probability that the system
or component will fail to operate on demand.
Operating Failure Rate: For those systems or components
required to operate for a specified period of time, this is
the probability per unit time (normally per hour) of a
failure occurring. The failure probability for the interval
specified is then the operating failure rate multiplied by
the time interval.
Unavailability: This is the probability that a system or
component will not be capable of operating at a particular
time, i.e., it is in a failed state. Availability is the
complement of unavailability.
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The subsystems to be described are:
. The reactor shutdown systems
. The circulator-turbine large control valve
. The shutdown feedwater system
. The auxiliary steam supply systems
. The emergency electrical supply
. The core auxiliary cooling system
. The resuperheater bypass system
. The service water system
. The service & instrument air system
. The reactor plant cooling water system
. The main circulator service systems.
The majority of these systems belong to the balance of
plant (BOP), and their descriptions are taken from the
Bechtel BOP design study.
This appendix also includes a description of the other
ESD inputs and the range of their valves selected for the
sensitivity analysis. These include:
. The loss and restoration of offsite power
. Main loop support systems, and
. Main loop isolation valve operations.
Failure Data
Median point estimates of the subsystem unit failure
probabilities were calculated using generic failure data
from WASH-1400 (Ref. 1). The median subsystem unit relia-
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bilities listed in Chapter 4 are the complements of the
valves calculated in this Appendix. A subsystem unit
reliability is the reliability of a single independent
path of a given subsystem. The basic failure data utilized
is included in Table 4-V.
Test and Maintenance Unavailabilities
Equipment outages for either test or maintenance pur-
poses can have a significant impact on the overall failure
probability of a subsystem. This unavailability contribution
to the subsystem failure probability can be written as
f x t DQ= 720 where
f is the frequency of test or maintenance equipment outages
in average acts per month,
tD is the average duration of these acts in hours, and,
720 is the number of hours per month.
Because there are no definite test or maintenance
schedules for the GCFR demonstration plant equipment, typical
equipment unavailabilities from Reference 1 were used to
obtain an overall unavailability for each subsystem. These
are listed in Table 4-VI. Unavailability contributions were
calculated only for those subsystems not operating during nor-
mal power operation. The major contribution to these un-
availabilities is maintenance acts which were assumed to be
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performed on a non-periodic - as needed - basis. Only one
of the subsystem independent paths was assumed to be down
for test and maintenance purposes at any one time. Also,
it was assumed that test or maintenance would not be per-
formed on items of two separate main loop subsystems simul-
taneously if these items corresponded to different shutdown
cooling loops. For example, maintenance would not be per-
formed simultaneously on the shutdown feedpump for main loop
A and the auxiliary boiler for main loop B without shutting
down the reactor.
Common Mode Failures
The GCFR subsystems have been designed such that single,
random equipment failures cannot eliminate more than one of
the independent paths. However, common mode failures of these
independent paths may result from undetected design errors,
manufacturing or installation related errors, maintenance
or operator errors, and failures due to common environmental
effects. The common mode failures of the independent paths
of one subsystem are termed intra-system common mode failures,
and a variable term z was incorporated into the random
failure probabilities to represent these occurrences
Section 4.3-3 includes a more complete description of this
intra-system common mode failure term.
An evaluation of this common mode failure probability
can be obtained by relating z to the subsystem unit failure
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rate. Fleming (Reference 2) defined a term called the "beta
factor" for evaluating common mode failures of redundant
components.
= the fraction of total component failures which are
common mode failures.
This beta factor can be extended to cover independent paths
of a particular subsystem. S then becomes the fraction of
subsystem unit failures which result in a common mode failure,
and thus
Z = Sq
Two types of data were investigated in order to get an
estimate of the likely range of beta. The first was component
failure data from Refs. 1, 3 and 4. Table 4-VII summarizes
the fraction of component failures in which more than one
item failed. For the individual component types, this data
is not statistically large enough for more than an order of
magnitude estimate. The second type of information was the
actual system failure rate calculations for LWR systems in
WASH-1400 (Ref. 5). The failure rate contributions from
random failures and from common mode failures were listed.
For those subsystems in which there was a common mode failure
contribution, a beta factor for that system was calculated.
These are listed in Table A-I. However, these numbers are
only approximate values, because most of these systems did
TABLE A-I
LWR System Common Mode Failure
Fractions (Beta Values)
PWR Systems Beta Factor
Auxiliary Feedwater System
. Small LOCA .003
. Loss of offsite power .09
Containment Spray Injection System .092
Consequence Limiting Control System
Hl Mode .008
Hl Hl Mode .012
Low Pressure Injection System .0009 (1)
High Pressure Injection System .0009 (1)
Safety Injection Control System .016
Containment Spray Recirculation System .012
Low Pressure Recirculation System .13 (2)
High Pressure Recirculation System .13 (2)
Containment Heat Removal System .0013
BWR Systems
Automatic Depressurization System .005
High Pressure Service Water System .048
Emergency Service Water System .0001
Diesel Generator Systems
PWR .33 (3)
BWR 0.03 (3)
(1) Single failures dominate total system failure rate.
(2) Double failures dominate random failure rate.
(3) Following a large LOCA and loss of offsite power only.
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not consist of completely independent paths. For example,
the Auxiliary Feedwater System has three redundant, diverse
pumps feeding two headers which pass through the contain-
ment where each header then supplies the three main feed
lines.
The majority of the component failure data indicated
either design inadequacy or human error as the cause of the
common mode failures. The common mode failure contributions
calculated in WASH-1400 were mostly the result of human
errors (i.e. all valves of a redundant system were left in
a failed position following routine testing or maintenance).
The range of beta factors is rather large due to the wide
variety of system involved. However, the vast majority of
the systems and component types have a beta factor between
0.003 and 0.1. The only beta factor which is significantly
greater than 0.1 concerns diesel-generator failure following
a simultaneous loss of offsite power and loss of coolant
accident for a PWR. The potential common mode failure re-
sults from the inrush of current due to the essential
electrical loads which must be assumed upon starting. The
common mode failure probability is greater for the PWR than
the BWR due to the larger electrical load for the PWR in this
event.
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In the GCFR demonstration plant design, the diesel
generators are not required to assume large loads immedi-
ately upon starting due to the capability of initially con-
tinuing main loop operation independent of the electrical
supply. Therefore, this potential common mode failure
should not be a significant concern.
It is the author's feeling that a beta factor of 0.01
is reasonable for a system of redundant units in which
considerable design effort has been spent toward minimizing
potential common mode failures. However, a range of 0.01
to 0.1 was chosen as the range of beta for all the GCFR
subsystems. This range of the beta factor is consistent
with the available data and it allows for potential common
mode failures due to unforeseen environmental effects. A
median beta factor value of 0.03 was chosen for all GCFR shut-
down cooling subsystems. While it is reasonable to assume
that these subsystems would have different beta factors,
the available data was not detailed enough to justify any
distinction between the subsystem beta factor values.
Table 4-VIII listed the subsystem beta factor values, and Table
A-II summarizes the subsystem unit failure probabilities
and test and maintenance unavailabilities of the shutdown
cooling subsystems.
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TABLE A-II
A List of Subsystem Unit Failure Probabilities
and Test and Maintenance Unavailabilities
Subsystem Test and
Subsystem Index Unit Failure Maintenance
and Name Probability Unavailabilities
4: CT large* CVs 1.3x10-3/d
5: CT small* CVs 3.3x10-3/d
6: Shutdown Feed- 
-3 
-3
water System 2.6x10 /d 4.0x10
7: Auxiliary 3 
-2
Boilers 8.1x10 /d 1.2x10
8: Main Loop Decay
Heat Removal- 
-3 
-3
Operation 6.2x10 /d 4.0x10
9: Emergency
Electrical 
-
2  
-3
Supply 3x10 /d 6.0x10
10: Core Auxiliary 
-3 
-2
Cooling System 8.3x10 /d 1.2x10
12: Resuperheater
Bypass Control 
-3 
-3Valves 1.4x10 /d 2.0x10
* Normally operational, therefore no test and maintenance
unavailability was assumed.
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A.2 Fault Tree Analysis
A fault tree is a logic diagram used to display the
possible modes of occurrence of a particular undesired event.
This event is the top fault event in the tree, and those
fault events which lead to this undesired event are described
below the top event and are logically linked to it.
Fault tree analysis is the formalized, deductive process
for identifying and linking the possible failure paths which
lead to the undesired event (Ref. 6).
In simple terms, a fault tree is built by starting with
the undesired event and then by determining which failure
events will immediately cause the top event. This process
of determining the failure events leading to a fault event
already described in the tree can theoretically be continued
until the basic attributable causes of the undesired event
are determined. However, the degree of complexity to which
the tree is developed is generally decided by the amount of
information available concerning the system being analyzed,
the purpose for which the fault tree is to be used, and the
amount of time and effort the analyst is willing to put
into developing the tree.
The types of symbols used in building a fault tree are
described below.
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Symbols
The Rectangle is used to identify an event,
which is usually a failure event, that results
from the combination of fault events through
a logic gate. Thus an event described by a
rectangle is always expanded further into
failure events which result in its occurrence.
The Diamond describes a fault event which is
considered basic to the particular fault tree
in which it appears. The cause of the event
has not been developed further. This may be
due to a low probability of occurrence of the
event, or lack of information, time or money.
The Circle describes a basic fault event that
requires no further development. The frequency
and mode of failure of these events are derived
from emperical data.
The Triangle is used as a transfer symbol. AA line from the apex of the triangle denotes a
transfer into the tree at this point. A line
from the side of the triangle identifies that
portion of the tree below the triangle with the
transfer symbol indicated inside the triangle.
Also, whenever a fault tree is spread over
several pages, a number is often indicated
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near a transfer in which indicates where the
part of the tree indicated is located.
Logic Gates
The AND gate describes the logical operation
which requires that all of the input events
exist before the output event is produced. In
boolean terms, it is the intersection of the
events, and it is defined (for output event C
and input events A and B) as
AfIB = C or A - B = C.
If the two events, A and B, are independent,
then the probability of the output event is the
product of the probability of the input events.
The OR gate describes the logical operation in
which the output state will exist if any one
or more of the input events exists. In boolean
terms this is the union of the events, and it
is defined as
AVB = C or A + B =C.
The probability expression for the output event
is
P(C) = P(A) + P(B) - P(A - B)
However, if the probability of events A and B
are both much less than one, then the probability
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of the output event is, to a very good approxi-
mation the sum of the input events.
A.3 The Reactor Shutdown System
The reactor shutdown system in the GCFR consists of
three sections. These are 1) the input parameter sensors and
circuitry, 2) the reactor trip logic circuitry up to the rod
trip mechanisms, and 3) the control rod and shutdown rod trip
mechanisms.
The input parameter sensors are arranged in a two out
of three voting logic, and there are at least two separate
trip parameters for every anticipated plant event requiring
a reactor shutdown. The present list of plant protection
system trip parameters is included as Table 2-V (Reference
8).
The input parameter sensors are common to both the con-
trol rod system and the shutdown rod system. However, each
rod system has its own trip logic circuitry leading to the
rod trip mechanisms.
Shutdown of the nuclear reaction can be accomplished
by either the control rod system or the shutdown rod system,
and both systems are activated with every reactor shutdown
signal. The control rod system is a set of 21 rods and
drives. Each control rod is contained in a control fuel
element, and each rod has a reactivity worth of 854. The
neutron absorber material contained in the rods is boron
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carbide (B4C), and the constant rod worth (independent of
the rod location in the core) is accomplished by varying
the enrichment of isotope B-10 in the absorber material.
The control rods are connected to their drive mechan-
isms by electromagnetic couplings which are de-energized
by the reactor shutdown signal. Control rod shutdown inser-
tion is then accomplished by a gravity drop after an initial
spring assist which helps to insure the de-coupling of the
electromagnet. The rod kinetic energy is absorbed at the
end of the insertion by a fly-wheel type absorber. There
is also an impact energy absorber built into the control
fuel element which can absorb the rod kinetic energy in the
event of a fly-wheel failure. The stepping motor, which
provides the normal rod control motion, also follows the
rod.
The shutdown rod system is a set of six rods which are
similar in design to the control rods. They are also
located within control fuel elements, but they are always
totally withdrawn from the core during normal reactor opera-
tion. Each shutdown rod has a reactivity worth of 1.60$,
and the rods themselves are constructed without wearing
rings to increase the diametral clearance upon insertion.
The shutdown rod drive mechanisms are quite diverse
from the control rod drives. The shutdown rod drive mech-
anisms are high-speed direct current motors, and the shut-
426
down rod are mechanically coupled to their drivers. The
power supply for these drive mechanism. comes from inde-
pendent storage batteries for each drive mechanism.
The powered insertion of the shutdown rods, coupled
with their larger diametral clearance, provides positive a
assurance that the rods will be inserted even in the event
of core distortions more severe than anticipated.
The fault tree diagram for the failure of the reactor
to shutdown is included as Figure A.l. GA (Reference 9)
estimates a failure rate of less than 10-9 per demand for
the reactor shutdown system. This is based on the following:
1) A failure rate of 1 x 10~9 per demand for the
input parameter sensors is assumed because of the
availability of at least two separate trip para-
meters. It is based on a daily check-out of
sensor values, a weekly check-out of the circuitry,
and analyses done on similar HTGR protective cir-
cuitry.
2) A failure rate of 1 x 10-6 per demand for the logic
circuitry leading to the trip mechanisms is also
assumed from HTGR analyses.
3) A failure rate of 1 x 10- 2 per demand per rod is
assumed for both the control rod and shutdown rod
trip mechanisms.
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Shutdown of the reactor at the most demanding con-
dition, the beginning of cycle, requires the insertion of
at least 5 of the 10 control rods that are entirely out
of the core. Under these same conditions, insertion of 3
of the 6 shutdown rods are required for reactor shutdown.
This leads to a probability of less than 3 x 10-10 per
demand to fail to insert the necessary 5 control rods and
to a probability of less than 2 x 10~7 per demand to fail
to insert at least 3 shutdown rods.
Figure A.2 is a schematic of the plant protection system
reactor shutdown logic. The control rod path requires both
b, and ci and the probability of failing is 1 x 10-6. The
shutdown rod path requires both b2 and c2 , and the probability
of either failing is 1.2 x 10~7. Failure to shutdown requires
that either the input parameter sensors fail (1 x 10-9) or
that both rod systems fail (1.2 x 10-12 assuming no common
mode failures). Thus, the input parameter sensors dominate
the failure probability.
RSS analysis indicates that a failure rate of 1 x 10-5
per demand is attainable with a single shutdown system. The
two diverse shutdown systems of the GCFR should be able to
achieve a much lower failure rate, however because both
systems are essentially rod-type systems, common mode failures
will likely be the limiting factor in.the shutdown reli-
ability.
INPUT
PARAMETER
SENSOR
SECTION
(COMMON TO
BOTH
SHUTDOWN
SYSTEMS)
CONTROL ROD SCRAM
LOGIC CIRCUITRY SECTION
b., (1x10- 6
-9
CONTROL ROD
SCRAM MECHANISM
ci (3xlO 10 )
MANUAL
TRIP
(1xI0- 6) c2 (2x10~ )
SHUTDOWN ROD
SCRAM MECHANISM
FIGURE A.2 Block diagram of the plant protection system reactor shutdown logic
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A.L4 The Circulator-Turbine Large Control Valves
These valves, one for each main loop, are designed to
provide normal control of the circulator-turbine speed.
The pertinent valve design data are listed below:
Size and Rating
Type
Material
Actuator
Nominal Flow Rating
Nominal Inlet Pressure
Nominal Inlet Temperature
AP at Rated Flow
Valve Closing Time
10" - 2500 lb ANSI
"DRAG"
2 - 1/4% CR; 1% Mo
Air Piston
100% loop flow (775,000 lb/hr)
2900 psia
875OF
120 psi
3 seconds
During a reactor shutdown, these valves are designed to
close rapidly (in three seconds) in order to prevent over-
cooling of the core and to conserve the steam/water inventory
in the steam generator. The "close" signal, which is generated
by the plant protection system (PPS), requires both the shut-
down initiation signal and a verification signal that the
reaction has indeed stopped. The verification signal is by
means of a neutron flux level sensor, and its purpose is to
assure that the reactor is actually shutdown before the
cooling capability of the main loops is reduced.
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Failure of this valve to close during the initial
phase of the shutdown process would cause the steam gen-
erator inventory for the loop to be depleted very quickly
(about two minutes). This results in the loss of the shut-
down cooling capability of this main loop, and so this
particular failure mode of the valve was analysed.
The fault tree diagram for failure of this valve to
close, given a reactor shutdown, is included as Figure
A.3. Note that the valve requires instrument air to
function, however, the amount of air normally in accumulator
tanks should be more than sufficient to close all of these
valves.
Both the circulator-turbine control valves along with
the entire main loop steam piping system inside the con-
tainment building are designed to seismic category I
specifications.
A failure rate of 1.3 x 10-3 per demand was calculated
for each individual valve. This was based on the following:
Failure of valve to close ................... 3 x 10~4/d
Failure of the valve control system ......... .1 x 10- 3/d
1.3 x 10- 3 /d
No test and maintenance unavailability was assumed for these
valves since they are normally operational. Two potential
common mode failure contributors were identified. These
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are the failure of the "close" signal and the interruption
of instrument air to the valve. The latter would be elim-
inated by supplying each valve with an individual air
accumulator.
A.5 The Circulator-Turbine Small Control Valves
These valves, one per each main loop, function during
the shutdown heat removal operations (roughly that period
following the reactor shutdown until the auxiliary steam
supply is available) to control the circulator-turbine speed.
These valves are located in a parallel flow circuit with the
circulator-turbine large control valves, and they are fully
open during the normal reactor operations. In the event of
a reactor shutdown, the CT large CV for each loop is designed
to quickly close. However, the CT small CV remains open in
order to maintain the steam flow to the circulator-turbine.
The pertinent valve design data are listed below:
Size and Rating 3" - 2500 lb ANSI
Type "DRAG"
Material 2-1/4% CR; 1% Mo
Actuator Air Piston
Nominal Flow Rating 12% Loop Flow
(106,000 lb/hr)
Nominal Inlet Pressure 2900 psia
Nominal Inlet Temperature 875 0 F
AP at Rated Flow 120 psi
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During the shutdown heat. removal process, the valve
throttles close in order to control the circulator-turbine
speed (thus the helium flow) and maintain core temperatures
within acceptable limits.
The control of this valve is governed by two competing
concerns. These are 1) conserving the steam generator
inventory; thus prolonging the effective operation of the
main loops; and 2) limiting the core temperature excursion.
The first concern requires a quick throttling of the valve,
but it results in higher core temperatures. The second
requires a slower throttling rate to limit core temperatures,
but it effectively limits the possible operating duration
of the main loops. The presently proposed control of this
valve is a compromise. The valve is initially quickly
throttled to about 6% of the fuel loop flow followed by
a slow ramp down to two percent of the loop flow at about
fifteen minutes after the shutdown. The valve remains at
two percent flow until auxiliary steam is available at which
time the valve is closed.
Failure of the valve to throttle close (it is assumed
that the valve remains full open) would result in the deple-
tion of the steam generator inventory for the main loop
involved. This failure eliminates the loop, however, the
period of operation of the loop is longer than the case
where the CT large CV fails to close. The fault tree
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diagram for this failure mode - CT small CV fails to throttle,
given a reactor shutdown - is included as Figure A.4. Note
that the operation of the valve depends both on uninterrup-
table AC power and on a supply of instrument air. The accum-
ulated air in the instrument air system was assumed to be
sufficient to perform only the initial valve throttling,
and the loss of instrument air results in the failure of the
valve to fully perform its stated goal.
There is another failure mode for these valves which
must be discussed. It is the failure of the valve by being
closed prior to the shutdown signal, or failure of the valve
by closing upon receipt of the shutdown signal. Either of
these cases results in a rapid interruption of steam to the
circulator-turbine which quickly eliminates the main loop.
The design presently provides for procedures to minimize the
possibility of the small valve being closed prior to a shut-
down. This requires that the CT small CV always be opened
before the CT large CV. An electrical interlock could also
easily be provided which would inhibit the reverse action.
However, the most promising method to minimize this occurrence
would be an operational monitoring device which confirmed
steam flow through the valve during power operation (during
full power operation, only about 2% of the steam flow passes
through the smaller valve due to its higher flow resistance).
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Concerning full closing of the valve following the
shutdown signal, the shutdown controller is not designed in
sufficient detail to determine any mechanisms for this failure
mode. However, the probability that the valve would fail
by this mode was considered to be much less than the failure
to throttle mode. The impact of this assumption was dis-
cussed in Chapter 5.
A failure rate of 3.3 x 10-3 per demand was calculated
for failure of this valve to throttle. This was based on
the following:
Mechanical failure of the valve .......... 3 x 10~ /d
Failure of the shutdown controller ... .... 3 x 10- 3/d
3.3 x 10 -3/d
No test and maintenance unavailability contribution was
assumed for these values. Maintenance would require the loop
to be shutdown, and testing should not inhibit the proper
functioning of the valve.
A.6 The Shutdown Feedwater System
This subsystem is an independent feedwater supply for
the main loop cooling system, and it is used during reactor
start-up and also for shutdown and decay heat removal
operations. The system, which is shown schematically in
Figure A.5, consists of three separate feedwater circuits -
one for each of the main loops. Each circuit is designed
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to supply three percent of the full-load feedwater flow and
each circuit consists of a feedwater heater and a positive
displacement feedpump powered by an electric motor. The
motor for each pump is energized from a separate essential
electrical bus, and the feedwater heaters are pegged from
the auxiliary steam system to prevent thermal shock to the
steam generators following a reactor shutdown. This feed-
water system also supplies the spray-water requirements
for the desuperheaters.
Each shutdown feedpump takes a suction from a common
line connected to the condenser hotwell. Feedwater flow
control is accomplished by means of a bypass line back to
the condenser hot well, and the feedwater, after passing
through the heater, must pass through a containment isolation
valve before entering the steam generator.
The common suction header from the condenser hotwell
also supplies the auxiliary boiler feedpumps, and the con-
densate storage tank (400,000 gallon capacity) is available
through the condenser and can provide the full required con-
densate flow through the make-up lines. An additional source
of emergency feedwater is provided from the fire main.
The entire system, up to but not including the contain-
ment isolation valve is not designed as a seismic category
I system.
440
The fault tree diagram for failure of the system to
supply feedwater to the steam generators, given a reactor
shutdown is included as Figure A.6.
Shutdown feedwater can be lost due to failures in the
individual supply loops or due to failures in the conden-
sate supply. The operation of the condensate make-up valves
requires both instrument air and uninterruptable AC. How-
ever, these dependencies are unimportant due to the dominating
failure of the CT small CV if either instrument air or un-
interruptable AC is unavailable.
A failure rate of 2.6 x 10-3 per demand was calculated
for each of the individual shutdown feedwater supply loops
based on the following:
Shutdown feedwater pump fails
to start l x 10 3 /d
Pump control system failure
(circuit breaker failure
dominates) 1 x 10 3 /d
Check valve failure 1...............1 x 10 /d
Bypass flow control valve
failure 3x10 /d
Isolation valve fails to
remain open 1 x 10 /d
2.6 x 10- 3 /d
Test and Maintenance
Unavailability 4 x 10-3
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The test and maintenance unavailability used is based on
the sum of unavailabilities for the major pieces of equip-
ment in each shutdown feedwater supply loop. These are the
shutdown feedwater pump and the shutdown feedwater heater.
An unavailability of 2 x 103 was assumed for each due to
test or maintenance purposes. This corresponds to a total
unavailability of three hours per month for each shutdown
feedwater loop. No unavailability contribution was assumed
for the isolation valve because, it was assumed that the
loop would have to be shutdown in order to perform mainten-
ance on this valve.
A.7 The Auxiliary Steam Supply System
This system provides steam to drive the main helium
circulator turbines and bearing water pump turbines during
plant start-up and during decay heat removal operations
following a reactor shutdown. It consists of three complete
steam boiler units, and each unit provides steam for a single
main loop circulator. During normal reactor operation, the
boilers are maintained in a hot standby condition such that
they can be brought to rated conditions in about twenty
minutes.
Each auxiliary boiler is rated to supply 60,000 lb/hr of
steam at 150 psig and 750 0 F, and each unit is equipped with
an auxiliary boiler feedwater pump and an auxiliary boiler
fuel oil pump. The boilers use No. 2 diesel oil as fuel,
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and two separate fuel oil storage tanks provide enough fuel
for five days of operation. A schematic diagram of this
system is provided in Figure A.7.
The three auxiliary boilers are located in a single
building adjacent to the control building. Each boiler is
a package unit with integral superheaters, air atomizing
equipment, piping and controls. The auxiliary boiler feed-
water pumps are vertical multistage centrifugal type, and
the feedwater supply is taken from the shutdown feed pump
suction header leading from the condenser hotwell. The
fuel oil pumps are screw type and take suction from the fuel
oil tanks.
During normal operation, the boilers are maintained
in a "hot standby condition by steam heater coils which are
provided in the lower drum to pressurize the boiler and place
it in a quick restart condition. Steam for these coils is
provided from the main steam supply through a desuperheater.
The initiation of a reactor shutdown signal also initiates
the process of bringing the auxiliary boilers to their rated
condition. Failure of the boiler to reach its rated steam-
ing conditions within twenty minutes of the shutdown signal
was considered to constitute a failure of the system, and
the fault tree diagram for this failure mode is included as
Figure A.8.
From Shutdown
Feedwater Loops
Loop A
Loop B
Loop C
AUXILIARY
BOILER
FUEL OIL
TANKS
FIGURE A.7 Schematic Flow Diagram
Steam Supply
of an Auxiliary Boiler
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A failure rate of 8.1 x 10-3 per demand was calculated
for each auxiliary boiler based upon the following contribu-
tions.
Fuel oil pump fails to start 1 x 10~3 /d
Fuel oil pump circuit breaker failure 1 x 10- 3/d
Feedwater pump fails to start 1 x 10- 3/d
Feedwater pump circuit breaker failure 1 x 10-3/d
Fuel oil control valve failure 3 x 10~ /d
Feedwater control valve failure 3 x 10~ /d
Fuel oil check valve failure 1 x 10~ /d
Feedwater check valve failure 1 x 10 /d
2 Feedwater gate valve failures 2 x 10~ /d
Fuel oil gate valve failure 1 x 10~ /d
8.1 x 10-3/d
Test and maintenance unavailability 1.2 x 10-2
The test and maintenance unavailability is based on the sum
of the unavailabilities of the major system components, with
an unavailability of 2 x 10-3 assumed for the fuel oil pump,
the fuel oil control valve, and the feedwater control valve.
An unavailability of 6 x 10-3 was assumed for the boiler
itself. The total unavailability is equivalent to almost nine
hours of downtime a month for each auxiliary boiler unit.
No maintenance unavailability was assumed for the boiler feed-
water supply pumps, due to the valve cross-connections which
447
allow the two available pumps to supply all three boilers.
A.8 Main Loop Transfer To Long Term Decay Heat Removal
Operation
Following a reactor shutdown, after the auxiliary boilers
have reached their rated steaming conditions, auxiliary steam
must be supplied to the main loops to drive the main helium
circulator turbines and bearing water pumps. At the same
time, the main steam generator discharge must be diverted
around the circulator turbine and to the main condenser. A
skematic flow diagram for this process, which indicates the
required valve operations, is shown in Figure A.9. The
sequence of these valve operations is as follows.
1) The steam generator alternate discharge valve is opened.
2) The auxiliary steam supply valve to the circulator-
turbine is opened, and the auxiliary steam supply
valve to the bearing-water pump turbine opened.
3) Lastly, the auxiliary steam supply is isolated from
the steam generator alternate discharge path by closing
the circulator-turbine small control valve, and the
main steam supply valve to the bearing-water pump tur-
bine.
The fault tree diagram for failure to supply auxiliary
steam to the main loops to allow main loop long term decay
heat removal is included as Figure A.10. Instrument air is
required for some valve functions in this subsystem. However,
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for main loop operation to continue to this point, instru-
ment air must already be available. Failure of the instru-
ment air supply will eliminate the main loops before transfer
to the auxiliary boilers can occur.
A failure rate of 6.2 x 10-3 per demand was calculated
for each individual main loop based on the following.
Alternate discharge path control
valve fails to open 3 x 10 /d
Circulator turbine control valve
failure 3 x 10~ /d
Bearing water pump control valve 4
failure 3 x 10 /d
2 check valve failures (one associated 4
with each control valve) 2 x 10 /d
CT small CV fails to close 1 x 10~ /d
Shutdown controller failure 3 x 10- 3 /d
2 isolation valves fail to open 2 x 10-3/d
6.2 x 10- 3/d
Test and maintenance unavailability 4 x l0-3
The motor operated isolation valves were assumed to be closed
during normal operation. If these were normally open, their
failure rate would be 1 x 10~ 4/d each to fail to remain
open. The subsystem unit failure probability would then be
4.4 x 10- 3 /d. Test and maintenance unavailability contribu-
tions were assumed for the isolation valve closest to the
auxiliary boilers and for the alternate discharge path con-
trol valve. This corresponds to a total downtime of three
hours a month.
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A.9 The Essential Electrical Supply
The Class IE electrical power system consists of three
independent 4160 volt AC subsystems and three 125 volt
uninterruptable power systems. Each of the 4160 volt AC
essential buses supplies a single main loop and a single
auxiliary loop. Also, the essential support system loads
are split between the essential buses. During normal opera-
tion, each essential bus is supplied from the unit auxiliary
transformer. An alternate, off-site power source is also
available for these buses, and upon loss of the normal power
source, automatic, high-speed dead bus transfer will result.
Each essential bus is also equipped with its own separate
emergency diesel generator. These are designed to start
automatically upon complete loss of off-site power, and
they are sized to handle the entire essential bus load dur-
ing the shutdown and decay-heat removal operations. A
single line diagram of the essential and non-essential power
supply system is shown in Figure A.ll.
The diesel generators are each a complete unit for full
operation. Each unit is located in a separate room which
contains a control station, a 3000 gallon day tank and its
own cooling system. The BOP design initially utilized
service water for the diesel jacket cooling requirements,
however, this dependence is to be eliminated in the final
design.
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Each generator is rated at 2130 kw at 0.8 pf and is
driven by a 3400 hp diesel motor. In the event of a loss
of offsite power, each unit will start automatically, reach
rated speed and voltage, and be ready to assume load in 10
seconds. This entire system is designed to seismic category
I specifications except for the 15,000 gallon underground
fuel, storage tank which is supplied for each generator.
A diesel generator system failure rate of 3 x 10-2 per
demand was assumed for each unit. This value comes directly
from WASH-1400. An unavailability for test and maintenance
purposes of 6 x 10-3 is also taken from that source.
A line diagram of the uninterruptable power system is
shown in Figure A.12. Each system consists of a 125 volt
DC bus and a 125 volt AC uninterruptable bus, a battery
charger, an inverter, a static switch and a bypass trans-
former for maintenance purposes. Each DC bus supplies power
to the switchgear control annunciators and indicator lights
for one of the main loops and one third of the emergency
lights.
During normal operation, the DC loads and the inverter
loads for the uninterruptable AC bus are carried through the
battery charger, and the battery is floating. In the event
of a loss of AC power, the battery automatically picks up
the DC loads and the uninterruptable AC loads (through the
inverter). The bypass transformer is provided to carry the
Ir
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load in the event any DC system components are out of service
for maintenance or because of failure.
The battery is sized to carry all the loads on both the
DC and uninterruptable AC bus for four hours, and the battery
charger is sized to carry the full load and simultaneously
recharge the battery in less than 8 hours.
The fault tree diagram for failure of an uninterruptable
power supply is shown in Figure A.13. A failure rate of
1 x 10-5 /hr was calculated, given the loss of essential AC
to the loop, based on the following:
Static switch failure 3 x 10-6/hr
Static inverter failure 3 x 10-6/hr
DC bus failure 1 x 10 /hr
DC battery supply failure 3 x 10 /hr
1 x 10-5/hr
This analysis is essentially concerned with the first thirty
minutes following the shutdown. Failures of the uninterrup-
table power supply do not contribute to subsystem unit
failure probabilities because these are already on the order
of 1 x 10- 3 /demand.
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A.10 The Core Auxiliary Cooling System (CACS)
Each CACS loop consists of an auxiliary circulator, an
auxiliary loop isolation valve, and a pressurized water heat
exchanger which is connected to its own separate heat removal
loop. Each loop is designed to remove two percent of the
reactor full power heat load at the normal helium working
pressure of 1305 psia and at the depressurized helium pressure
(26.7 psia). The complete electrical needs for each CACS
loop are supplied from a single essential bus.
Each auxiliary circulators unit consists of its electric
motor drive, a centrifugal compressor and a diffuser. Because
of the wide range of operating pressure levels, the electric
motor drives will be capable of variable speed operation. The
motors are the squirrel-cage induction type, and variable
speeds will be produced by a variable-frequency power supply.
Each auxiliary circulator is designed with its own independent
power supply and control system. The auxiliary circulator
design data for the depressurized case are given below:
Type Centrifugal
Drive Electric Motor
Fluid Helium
Speed 4900 rpm
Inlet Temperature 400 0 F
Inlet Pressure 25.3 psia
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Outlet Pressure 26.7 psia
Mass Flow 11.1 lb/sec
Power 460 hp
Each auxiliary circulator unit has its own independent
service system which functions 1) to provide cooling water
to the auxiliary circulator motor windings and bearings,
2) to supply purified buffer helium to prevent leakage of
the bearing lubricant into the reactor coolant and to prevent
leakage of the reactor coolant into the motor casing, 3) to
remove and replace the motor bearing lubricant, and 4) to
remove oil vapor from the purge helium from the circulators.
The motor cooling circuit consists of a helium-water
heat exchanger, a water cooler, and a water circulation pump.
Fans mounted on the auxiliary circulator shaft direct helium
through the heat exchanger, which is located in the motor
casing, and over the motor windings. It is assumed that the
heat transferred from the motor casing will be rejected to
an independent CACS cooling-water system.
Lubricating oil for the motor bearings is cooled by a
water cooling coils located. in the oil reservoir.
The auxiliary loop isolation valve is a self-actuating
butterfly-type check valve. It is closed by the action of
both the normal main loop operating pressure differential
and by gravity. The valve is opened, given the main loops
have failed, by the pressure rise created by the operation
of its auxiliary circulator. These valves are similar to
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those used in the Ft. St. Vrain primary cooling system.
The auxiliary heat exchanger is a helically wound,
axial flow tube bundle. It is a pressurized-water type heat
exchanger, and it operates at an average water pressure of
2100 psia. The helium flows up directly through the tube
bundle, through the auxiliary loop isolation valve, to the
auxiliary circulator.
The core auxiliary cooling-water system consists of the
auxiliary heat exchangers and their associated heat removal
equipment. There are three separate cooling-water loops
(one for each CACS loop), and each loop provides the heat
rejection for its CACS loop by means of a forced-convection
air heat exchanger. A schematic flow diagram for one loop is
shown in Figure A. 1 4.
Each cooling water loop contains an auxiliary circulating
water pump, a circulating water pump, a forced air cooler,
a demineralizer and filter, and a pressurizer. During normal
plant operation, the auxiliary circulating pump operates to
provide a small flow through the auxiliary heat exchanger to
prevent boiling. The forced-air cooler fans are not run, and
natural air draft is sufficient to maintain the system at
a constant sub-cooled temperature. This flow also acts to
prevent thermal shock to the loop upon start-up of the CACS,
however, it is small enough so that it does not represent a
large thermal loss to the reactor.
HP Helium
Cylinder
From
System
Make-up
Pumps
Air Fans
FIGURE A.14 A Schematic Flow Diagram of a Core Auxiliary Cooling Water Loop
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The pressurizer maintains the system at 2100 psia
by the addition of helium from gas cylinders, and water
quality is maintained by a bypass filter and demineralizer
unit provided around the auxiliary circulating pump and
also by periodic chemical treatment.
Upon start-up of the CACS, the circulating water pump
is started along with the air cooler fans. The auxiliary
circulating pump is shutdown, and the system operates at
full flow with no control required.
The air cooler consists of finned tubes which are
arranged counter-current to the air flow. The cooler is
designed to reduce the water temperature from 500OF to
180 0F.
The entire CACS and the cooling water loops are designed
to seismic category I specifications and are an engineered
safeguard feature.
The fault tree diagram for failure of a CACS loop to
provide adequate core cooling is included as Figure A.15.
A failure rate of 8.3 x 10-3 per demand for each CACS loop
was calculated from the following contributors.
Auxiliary circulator failure 1 x 10- 3 /d
Auxiliary circulator power supply 3 x 10~ /d
failure
Circuit breaker to power supply 1 x 10- 3/d
failure
Auxiliary circulator control
system failure
Auxiliary loop isolation valve
failure
Circulating water pump failure
Pump control system failure
(circuit breaker failure
dominates)
Check valve failure
2 motor operated valves fail to
remain open
Air cooler fan failure
and fan control system
(circuit breaker failure)
1 x 10-3/d
1 x 10~4/d
1
1
1
2
x
x
x
x
10-3/d
10-3/d
10~ /d
10~ /d
6 x l0'4
2 x 10-3
8.3 x 10-3/d
Test and maintenance unavailability 1.2 x 10-2
The test and maintenance unavailability is based on contri-
butions from the four motor operated valves, the circulating
water pump and the two fans of each loop, and corresponds
to almost 9 hours of downtime per month per loop.
The calculation above assumes that both air cooler
forced draft fans are necessary. If only one is sufficient,
then the random failure rate is 5.7 x 10- 3/d and the test
and maintenance unavailability becomes 1.0 x 10-2
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A.ll The Resuperheater Bypass Circuits
The resuperheater bypass circuit for each main loop
provides a path for the helium circulator-turbine exhaust
steam around the resuperheater portion of the steam generator
module to the main condenser. Each circuit consists of a
resuperheater bypass control valve, an isolation valve, a
check valve and resuperheater bypass circuit safety valves.
The three circuits join before a common spray desuperheater,
and the desuperheated steam is then directed to the main
condenser. There is also a provision for providing the de-
superheated steam to drive the main feed pump turbines during
start-up and programmed shutdowns. A schematic of the circuit
for one loop is shown in Figure A.16.
With the initiation of a reactor shutdown, the main
turbine-generator throttle valve is closed, and the resuper-
heater bypass control valve is designed to open to provide a
path for the circulator-turbine exhaust steam to the main
condenser. Each circuit is sized to pass only 25% of the
full loop flow, and so initially the resuperheater bypass
circuit relief valves will lift to exhaust the excess steam
to the atmosphere. Should the main condenser be unavailable,
following the shutdown, then the relief valves would remain
open to maintain the exhaust circuit for the helium circula-
tor-turbine. The resuperheater bypass controller regulates
the resuperheater bypass control valve in order to maintain
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the circulator-turbine exhaust pressure proportional to the
reactor inlet helium pressure. This control action is most
important in the event of a PCRV depressurization accident
because it adjusts the circulator power, and thus the helium
flow, in accordance with the reactor coolant pressure.
In the event that the resuperheater bypass control valve
fails open, the circulator turbine exhaust is maintained by
the resuperheater relief and safety valves which lift to pre-
vent overpressurization of the resuperheater. This will also
allow continued operation of the main circulators, however,
the actual extent of circulator operation in this mode
(exhausting through resuperheater safety and relief valves)
is unknown. The steam generator inventory depletion times used
in the ESD modelling assumed proper resuperheater bypass valve
operation. Therefore, failure of this valve to correctly
operate was assumed to fail the loop, and no credit was
allowed for continued main loop operation as discussed above.
The fault tree diagram for the failure of the circulator-
turbine exhaust circuit of one main loop is shown in Figure
A.17. A failure rate of 1.4 x 10-3 per demand was calculated
for failure of one resuperheater bypass system based on the
following:
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Isolation valve failure to remain open 1 x 10~ /d
Resuperheater bypass control valve 3 x 10~ /d
failure
Resuperheater bypass controller failure 1 x 10- 3/d
Resuperheater exhaust path relief 1 x 10- 6/d
valve failures (2)
1.4 x 10- 3/d
Test and maintenance unavailability 2 x 10- 3/d
The test and maintenance unavailability contribution was due
to the resuperheater bypass control valve and is equivalent
to a downtime of 1.5 hours a month.
A.12 The Service Water System
The service water system is designed to remove heat
from reactor auxiliary equipment, emergency equipment and
building cooling equipment. A schematic of the system is
shown in Figure A.18. The system consists of three service
water pumps each of which can supply either of the two
parallel service water headers. Each of the parallel headers
can independently supply the all of the essential service
water loads.
Only one of the three pumps is necessary to provide all
of the service water requirements for normal and abnormal
operating conditions. The two parallel headers are equipped
with check valves to prevent back-flow of water between them,
and the standby pumps are started automatically by a low
IReturn f
Header #2 eturn Header #1
FIGURE A.18 A Schematic Flow Diagram of the Service Water System
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pressure signal in the discharge headers. Heat rejection
to the atmosphere is accomplished by a two-cell mechanical
draft cooling tower. Either cell provides adequate heat
rejection in all operating conditions, and either cell can
be used with either of the two parallel service water paths.
This system is designed as a seismic category I system,
and each of the service water pumps and cooling tower fans
are powered by separate essential electrical buses.
The fault tree diagram for the failure of the service
water system is included as Figure A.19. Failure of this
system is dominated by failures eliminating the pumps, and
by failures eliminating the cooling towers.
During the reactor shutdown, the failure probability
of this system will depend upon 1) the number of essential
buses energized, and 2) whether or not the standby cooling
tower can be automatically started in the event of a failure
of the operating tower.
The system failure probability is based upon the
following data.
Failure of operating pump:
Failure of the motor-operated valve 1 x 10~ /hr
Failure of the pump 3 x 10- 5 /hr
3.1 x 10- 5 /hr
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Failure of a standby pump:
Failure of the motor operated valve 1 x 10- 3 /d
Failure of the check valve 1 x 10 /d
Filter plugged 1 x 10~ /d
Pump failure 1 x 10- 3 /d
Pump circuit breaker failure 1 x 10- 3 /d
Pressure switch failure 1 x 10~ /d
3.3 x 10- 3 /d
Failure of the operating tower:
Fan failure 1 x 10- 5 /hr
Valve failures (2) 2 x 10~ /hr
1.2 x 10- 5 /hr
Failure of the standby tower:
Fan failure
Fan circuit breaker failure
Valve failures (4)
3 x 10-4/d
1 x 10-3/d
4 x 10- 3 /d
5.3 x 10- 3 /d
For the case in which all three essential buses are
available, and the standby cooling tower can be automatically
started, the failure probability is less than 1 x 10~7 per
hour. When all three of the essential buses are not avail-
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able, the subsystem failure probability will depend upon
both the initial operating state of the service water system,
and the actual essential buses energized. For example, if
essential buses A and B are available, and the service water
system is operating with the pump energized from bus A and
the cooling tower fan energized from bus B, then the system
should continue operating with its failure probability re-
duced slightly due to the loss of one standby pump (the one
energized from bus C). If instead, only bus C were energized,
then the service water system will always fail due to the fact
that the cooling tower fans are energized from buses A and
B only.
Assuming that all the initial operating states of the
service water system are equally likely, an averaged failure
probability can be calculated from all the cases of two buses
energized and one bus energized. These are respectively
3 x 10-3 and .333 per shutdown. The latter is due to the
fact that having only bus C available leads to failure of
the system, and if only one bus is available, it will be
bus C on the average one-third of the time.
In the case where cooling tower transfer is not possible,
the system failure probability for three essential buses
available, is dominated by failure of the cooling tower.
With only two essential buses available, the failure proba-
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bility is .333. This is due to the fact that with the
cooling towers energized from buses A. and B, power will be
lost to the buses on the average of one-third of the time if
only two buses are energized. With one bus energized this
will occur on the average of two-thirds of the time, and the
failure probability is then .667.
These results are summarized in the table below.
Service Water System Failure Probability
No. of
Essential
Buses Standby Cooling No Standby Cooling
Energized Tower Transfer Tower Transfer
3 1 x 10 7  1 x 10-5
2 3 x 10-3 .333
1 .333 .667
In most of the analyses performed in this study, the
standby service water cooling tower was assumed to be trans-
ferable in the event of failure of the operating tower, and
the impact of this assumption was investigated in the
sensitivity analyses. Note that for most cases where offsite
power is available this analysis is conservative because no
credit was allowed for the circulating water injection.
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A.13 The Instrument and Service Air System
This system provides clean, dry air to pneumatic valve
operators and controllers and the other areas that require
clean air. The system also provides service air for portable
tools and the other pressurized air requirements throughout
the plant. The system consists of three compressor units
each of which contains a compressor, an after-cooler and a
receiver. Each unit supplies a common header from which there
are two independent instrument air supply circuits and the
service air supply circuit. The instrument air supply lines
also contain filters and a dryer. Figure A.20 is a skematic
flow diagram for the system.
Each compressor unit is powered from a different essential
bus, and two of the three compressor units are capable of
providing full instrument and service air requirements. Also,
each receiver is sized such that, when fully changed, it can
supply the full instrument air demand for a period of one
minute without power to the compressors.
During a reactor shutdown, the air accumulation in the
receivers is sufficient to perform all necessary valve and
controller operations. Also, a single operating compressor
unit is assumed to provide sufficient instrument air to per-
form all vital valve operations and controller functions.
The system is designed to seismic category I specifica-
tions, and each compressor unit will be protected from missiles
in the event of an accident coming from one of the adjacent units.
Instrument Air
COMPRESSOR AFTERCOOLER RECEIVER
FIGURE A.20 A Schematic Flow Diagram of the Instrument and Service Air System
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The fault tree diagram for failure of this system to
function is shown in Figure A.21. It is important to note,
that proper operation of each compressor unit is dependent
upon adequate service water being supplied to its after-
cooler.
The operating failure rate for each compressor unit
(similar to a pump) is 3 x 10- 5 /hr. A beta factor value
of 0.03 was used to estimate the common mode failure
probability, and the probability of a combination of valve
and piping failures which would eliminate both supply lines
was estimated to be less than 1 x 10~ .
The operation of this system is dependent upon the
essential electrical supply, and with three essential buses
powered, its failure probability in the initial 30 minutes
following reactor shutdown is 5 x 10 7. Including the depen-
dence of the service water system, reduces this to 1 x 106 .
With only two buses energized, the failure probability is
of the system reduces to 3 x 10-3 because of its dependence
on service water, and with only one essential bus energized
the failure probability of the one operating compressor unit
is .333. However, failure of the instrument air compressors
due to the loss of service water, is assumed to take place
fifteen minutes after the shutdown.
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A.14 The Reactor Plant Cooling Water System
This system provides cooling water to those plant com-
ponents which carry radioactive or potentially radioactive
fluids. It provides a monitored intermediate barrier
between these fluids and the service water system, in which
the final heat rejection occurs.
The system consists of two independent closed loops,
each of which contains two circulating water pumps and two
heat exchangers to the service water system. Each loop pro-
vides 50 percent of the PCRV cooling load, and either loop
can provide the remaining cooling load of the system. A
schematic flow diagram of the system is provided in Figure
A.22.
Each loop operates with one pump and one heat exchanger
in service. The others remain in standby in case of failure
of the operating items.
A fault tree diagram for failure of this system is
included as Figure A.23.
Due to the doubly redundant nature of the reactor plant
cooling water system, its failure probability was determined
to be primarily dependent on the loss of the service water
system. This is especially true if less than three essential
buses are energized.
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A.15 The Main Circulator Service System
This system supplies the main circulator-turbine with
high-pressure water for bearing lubrication. It also supplies
purified buffer helium to the lower shaft-seal of the cir-
culator-turbine bearing unit to prevent both the in-leakage
of bearing water to the reactor coolant, and the out-leakage
of the reactor coolant. Cooled and filtered bearing water
is supplied to each main circulator from an independent
module. The purified buffer-helium is supplied from an
integrated system which is common to all three circulators.
A schematic flow diagram for the system is shown in
Figure A.24. The componentsof this system are located inside
the reactor containment, and they must then be designed to
perform properly at the pressures and temperatures associated
with all containment atmosphere conditions.
During a reactor shutdown, the continued supply of high-
pressure, clean, and cooled water to the circulator-turbine
bearing is essential. The turbine-driven bearing-water
pump supplies water a roughly 1000 psi above the reactor
coolant pressure at all operating conditions. Thus, while
the reactor coolant pressure may vary, and with it the bearing
water supply pressure, the differential pressure will be
maintained constant. The bearing water at the pump discharge
if filtered before it is supplied to the bearing. In addition
to the turbine-driven pump, each module contains an electric
drive pump which is used during start-up.
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The bulk of the water leaves the bearing through the
main drain. The back pressure on this main drain is main-
tained at 20 psi above the reactor coolant pressure by a
differential pressure control valve, and the drain water
passes through a heat exchanger before it is returned to
the surge-separator tank for recycle.
The bearing heat load is removed in the heat exchanger
by water from the reactor plant cooling water system. The
heat generated by bearing friction varies with the circulator
speed, and during normal operation of the circulator, this
amounts to 3 x 106 BTU/hr. During a normal pressurized
shutdown, where the main helium circulators are quickly
slowed down, the bearing heat load reduces greatly. At 10%
circulator speed, the heat load is only 1954 BTU/hr and would
require a reactor plant cooling water flow of less than 0.2
gpm at a 200 F temperature rise through the heat exchanger.
Because of the low heat load, the bearing water temperature
should be relatively stable, and the continued supply of
reactor plant cooling water to the heat exchanger was not
considered to be critical during a reactor shutdown. However,
during a PCRV depressurization accident, it was assumed that
reactor plant cooling water was necessary to maintain accep-
table bearing water temperatures. The main circulators
operate at close to the design speed during a depressurization
accident, and it was felt that this would generate consider-
able friction.
The buffer helium supply was also not considered to be
crucial to the shutdown performance of the circulator.
Neither the helium coolant out-leakage nor the bearing water
in-leakage which might result should have any significant
effect on the circulator operation.
The fault tree diagram for the circulator bearing water
supply is shown in Figure A.25. The system failure probability
was determined from the following contributors.
Failure of the bearing-water differential 
-6pressure control valve 1 x 10 /hr
Failure of the bearing drain-water 
-6differential pressure control valve 1 x 10 /hr
Bearing water pump failure 3 x 10- 5 /hr
Bearing water pump control valve failure 3 x 10 -6/hr
3.5 x 10- 5 /hr
The probability of a circulator failure due to a bearing water
supply failure is then <2x10-5 for the first 30 minutes
following the shutdown. This failure probability is negligible
compared to the failure rates of the other main loop sub-
systems. However, it is important to note that the correct
operation of the three control valves is dependent on instru-
ment air. The exact effect which loss of instrument air has
on the performance of the bearing water supply is unknown,
but instrument air failure already leads to main loop failure.
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Thus the additional failure of the bearing water supply
should not significantly contribute to the main loop failure
probability.
A.16 Off-Site Power Supply
The availability of AC electric power during a reactor
shutdown is quite important. Without power to the main loop
cooling system and the CACS, the loss of core heat removal
capability will eventually occur.
During a reactor shutdown, the off-site power connection
becomes the primary source of electricity to the essential
plant loads because a turbine trip always accompanies a
reactor shutdown. If this source of electrical power is lost,
then only the emergency diesel generators remain.
A.16-1 The Loss of Off-Site Power
In general, the loss of off-site power can accompany a
reactor shutdown by two methods.
The first mechanism begins with the initiation of a
reactor shutdown, which also initiates a turbine trip. The
loss of the main generator can cause a load transient in the
electrical network which may exceed the stability unit of
the system. If this limit is exceeded, then off-site power
is lost. Off-site power may also fail-to energize the
essential electrical buses following a reactor shutdown due
to a failure in the high-speed switching mechanism which
transfers the load from the unit auxiliary transformer to the
off-site power transformer.
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The second mechanism is initiated by the loss of the
external plant load and off-site power source. In this
event, the turbine-load-reject mechanism functions to reduce
the turbine-generator load in order that it continue operating
to power the plant's electrical loads. If the turbine-load-
rejection fails, a turbine trip and reactor shutdown will be
initiated.
The probability of a loss of off-site power and external
load to the power plant is 0.1 per year. This value is
based on nuclear power plant experience between March 1969
and March 1974. An examination of the Abnormal Occurrence
Reports filed with the Atomic Energy Commission between these
dates was made by Fleming (10). Eight occurrences of a loss
of off-site power and external load were reported in this
period, which represents over 690,000 reactor-hours of nuclear
power plant operation. This is an average of 1 loss of off-
site power event per over 86,000 reactor-hours, or just
slightly over 0.1 events per reactor year.
In the GCFR, given a loss of off-site power event, a
reactor trip need not occur unless the turbine load-reject
mechanism fails. Fossil-fired power plants in the U.S.,
and nuclear units in Great Britian can successfully undergo
full turbine-load-rejection and continuing operation to power
the plant auxiliaries. Experience in the U.S., based on a
limited number of power plant tests resulted in only 1
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failure to full-load reject of the 7 plants tested . In
the U.K., 79 station years of nuclear power plant experience
has resulted in 95 situations of "risk to the turbine," where
a fault in the electrical network required the plant to be
disconnected. Of these events, only 16 resulted in a turbine
trip at the plant (12). This is an average probability of
0.17 for failure of the turbine to successfully full-load-
reject. This would indicate that the failure rate of turbine-
load-reject mechanisms is on the order of 10-1 per demand.
Thus, the probability that a loss of off-site power will
result in a reactor shutdown is on the order of 10-2 per year.
Considering that this evaluation is concerned with the rela-
tive core-melt probabilities of the various initiating event
categories, this order of magnitude estimate was thought to
be most appropriate.
In the RSS a probability of 1 x 10-3 per turbine trip
is given for the occurrence of a loss of offsite power as a
result of the reactor shutdown. This was based on information
supplied by the Federal Power Commission on transient stability
for power plants east of the Rockies. This value pertains
to a 1000 MW(e) generating plant. The effect on the electrical
network of a 300 MW(e) GCFR would be much less severe, and the
probability of this occurrence would be much less likely.
Therefore, this occurrence was not considered to be a significant
factor leading to a reactor shutdown with offsite power un-
available.
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A.16-2 The Restoration of Off-Site Power
The likelihood that offsite power will be restored is
a function of time. WASH-1400 utilized data from the
Bonneville power administration on transmission line outages
for the years 1970, 1971 and 1972 to determine a model for
the restoration of offsite power. This curve is shown in
Figure A.26. The curve is a cumulative plot of the percen-
tage of repairs completed within a given time.
The curve is based on data from more than 1500 outages
of transmission lines rated at 500, 345, 287, 230, 138 and
115 kV. While these outages did not all constitute a loss
of offsite power, the repair data are directly applicable to
the reapir of an offsite power line. The outages in the data
were caused by such factors as falling trees, lightning,
storm, fire, malicious damage, and accidental damage. This
data can be seen more clearly in Figure A.27 which is taken
directly out of Appendix III of the RSS. This is a histo-
gram of the restoration times, and it also lists the major
contributors to each category.
In the ESD, the restoration of off-site power was allowed
to occur at specific time intervals following the shutdown.
These are listed below with the values taken from Figure A.26.
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Time Interval Within Probability of the Restoration
Which Offsite Power of Offsite Power to the Essential
May Be Restored Buses Within the Time Interval
30 minutes .75
25 minutes .70
20 minutes .68
15 minutes .65
10 minutes .60
5 minutes .35
Restoration of offsite power after the initial thirty
minute interval was not considered because the main loops were
assumed to be capable of core cooling for at most thirty
minutes. Thus, if electrical power was not available from
at least one diesel generator, of if offsite power were not
restored, then a loss of adequate core cooling was assumed
to occur.
A.17 Main Loop Isolation Valves
Description
Each main cooling loop is supplied with a self-actuating
isolation valve to prevent back-flow of helium through the
loop in the event its main circulator is shutdown. The valve
is located at the entrance to the cross duct leading from
the main circulator outlet plenum to the reactor inlet plenum.
This was shown in Figure 2.1 and in Figure 2.3.
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Each valve consists of seven solid-steel air foil-shaped
louvers which act independently of each other. The design of
the louvers is such that, with the main circulator operating,
aerodynamic lift forces hold the valves open. If the circu-
lator is stopped, the helium flow will stop and may reverse;
this eliminates the aerodynamic lift forces. The louver is
then closed by gravitational forces and it is held closed by
the pressure differential force across the closed valve.
The louvers rotate on self-lubricating spherical bushings
that minimize binding even if the louver deflects under
pressure loading or temperature differential. Also, the open-
ing of each louver is limited by a stop pin which maintains
the air foil at a small "angle of attack." This will minimize
louver vibration under normal operation, and it will provide
an additional design force for the valve.
Valve Reliability
The reliability of the main loop isolation valve was
considered for both the closing of the valve and the opening
of the valve. The design of the valve is such that the louvers
operate independently, yet not all must be in the same position
(all open, or all closed) for the valve to be effectively
open or closed. This can be seen more clearly in Figure
A.28 (13) which is a plot of the ratio of the valve flow re-
sistance to the full open valve flow resistance as a function
of the number of louvers open. From the figure, it is seen
that with three louvers open, the flow resistance is not
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significantly different from the full open flow resistance,
and the valve was assumed to be fully open. Likewise, the
valve flow resistance is not significantly increased until
at least six louvers close. Thus, the failure of the valve
to close was assumed to result from the failure of at least
six louvers to shut, and the failure of the valve to open
was assumed to result from the failure of at least three
louvers to open.
The reactor safety study gives a check valve failure
rate of 1 x 10~ per demand. Assuming that each louver is
an independent check valve, but allowing for potential common
mode failures (Beta factor = 0.1) gives a valve failure rate
on the order of 10-5 per demand. However, it was this
author's opinion that the failure rate of the valve to close
could be significantly higher. This is due to the fact that
the valve may be full open in a high temperature environment
for many months. Also, there are no present provisions for
testing the valves during reactor operation. Thus, a con-
servative estimate of 1 x 10-3 per demand was used for failure
of the valve to close. On the other hand, the reliability of
the valve to open on demand was considered to be higher due
to the fact that during a shutdown it does not remain in the
closed position for any length of time before it is required
to open. Also, the opening of the valve only requires the
correct operation of three louvers, as opposed to six for the
closing of the valve.
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Following shutdowns in which the reactor remains pressur-
ized, main loop isolation valve failures which result in
core flow bypass were included in the ESD modelling by assuming
the limiting steam generator inventory depletion times. These
do not significantly affect the main loop reliability. How-
ever, there can be main loop isolation valve operations during
a shutdown which may have a significant effect on the main
loop reliability. In those shutdown sequences where a circu-
lator-turbine control valve failure occurs in one or two
operating loops, an out-of-balance condition will exist be-
tween the three main cooling loops. This situation can be
created by a failure of either the large control valve or the
small control valve, and the circulator for the loop with the
failed valve (this loop is called the failing loop) will
operate at a higher speed than the loops with correctly
functioning valves (these loops are called the normal loops).
The helium flow in the normal loops may then stop or even
reverse due to the pressure rise created by the circulator
in the failing loop, and the main loop isolation valves for
these normal loops may close.
If the isolation valves do close, then when the failing
loop stops, the isolation valves for the normal loops must
re-open to allow heat removal to continue with the main loop
cooling system. It is also required that the helium circu-
lator remain operable after the period of running behind its
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closed isolation valve. In the event the isolation valve
does not close, then the helium circulators in the normal
loops must not fail due to the increased pressure differen-
tial, or possible reverse flow against which they are
operating.
These events are modelled explicitly in the ESD for
those shutdown sequences in which they can occur. A dis-
tinction is made in the probability that an isolation valve
will close for sequences in which the failing loop has a
failed large control valve and those in which the small con-
trol valve is failed. This was due to the fact that the
closing force on the valve should be much greater if a cir-
culator is being driven at its full rated speed. Also, the
forces imposed on a normally operating circulator, whose
isolation valve failed to close, would be much greater. A
distinction was also made in the modelling of the isolation
valve openings depending upon whether the loop was normally
operating or if it had a failed CT small CV. However, in
the final analysis, no distinction was made in the valve for
reliability of the valve to open for these two cases.
The reliability values used for each of these valve or
circulator functions were presented in Table 4-X along with
the ranges assumed for the sensitivity analysis. Summarized
below are those considerations made in arriving at these
values.
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A main loop isolation valve closes given:
1) A CT large CV fails on another loop.
The closing forces in this case should be relatively
large (about that available in a normal loop shutdown),
however, due to fact that the loop circulator is still
operating there will be a combination of forces acting on
the valve. Therefore, the probability that the valve closes
was assumed to be 5 x 10-3.
2) A CT small CV fails on another loop.
The closing forces in this case are relatively small,
especially compared to the case above, and the probability
for this event was assumed to be 2.5 x 10-2
A main loop isolation valve opens and the circulator
is operable:
The pressure rise created by the circulator in its
shutdown mode is not as great as that normally available
to open the valve. However, sufficient positive opening
force should be available. The valve has just been shut
and it should not be subject to any conditions which might
cause it to stich in the short period before it is re-opened.
Also, the out-of-balance condition which closed the valve
should be within the design margin of the valve, and it
should not significantly affect the re-opening of the valve.
However, the circulator must remain operable after the period
of operation behind its closed valve. This was assumed to
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be the limiting factor, and the failure probability for this
event was assumed conservatively to be 1 x 10-3. A main
helium circulator remains operable after an out-of-balance
condition in which its isolation valve failed to close. The
condition caused by:
1) A CT large CV fails to close in another loop.
While the out-of-balance condition will last only a
minute or two, the pressure forces against which the circu-
lator must operate are large. It was assumed that the cir-
culator had a 50 percent change of surviving this condition.
This is felt to be conservative, but there is no basis for
judgement. The range in the sensitivity analysis was from
a 95 percent chance of survival to only a 10% chance of
survival.
2) A CT small CV fails to throttle in another day.
In this case, the out-of-balance condition may last
as long as 3 or 4 minutes. However, the pressure forces
against which the circulator must operate are much less than
in the case above. The circulator was assumed to have a 95
percent chance of surviving these conditions, and the range
used in the sensitivity analysis was from .995 to .75.
501
A.18 Main Loop Support System Dependencies
Those systems which perform support functions for the
main loop cooling system are:
. The main circulator service systems,
. The service water system,
. The instrument and service air systems, and
. The uninterruptable AC power supplies.
The dependence of the main loop cooling system on the
functioning of its support systems was lumped into a single
input variable. It was assumed that a failure in a support
system caused the elimination of the main loop cooling system
heat removal capability in either the interval between five
and fifteen minutes after the shutdown, or some time after
15 minutes.
Individual failures of the main circulator service
systems and uninterruptable AC power supplies were not con-
sidered to be important contributors to the failure of the
main loop cooling system following a shutdown. For the
main circulator service system, no change in function occurs
and so the failure probability of the system during the shut-
down and decay heat removal operations is low compared to the
failure rate of the other main loop shutdown cooling sub-
systems. For the uninterruptable AC power supplies, failures
independent of loss of power to the essential buses were not
considered because no change in function occurs. Also, in
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most cases, loss of essential AC power eliminates the
main loop irrespective of the uninterruptable AC power on
the loop.
For the pressurized reactor shutdowns, the service
water system was also not considered essential to initial
operation of the main loop cooling system. The service
water system provides the ultimate heat rejection for the
main circulator-turbine bearing heat load. This heat duty
is quite small in a pressurized shutdown and operation of
the main loop cooling system should continue unaffected for
a considerable period of time. The actual time period will
depend on the water inventory of the bearing-water system
if no consideration of the reactor plant cooling water sys-
tem is allowed.
However, in a depressurized shutdown, the bearing fric-
tion was assumed to be somewhat more significant that in a
pressurized shutdown, and the operation of the reactor plant
cooling water system and the service water system were re-
quired. The probability of main loop cooling system failure
due to the loss of either of these systems was determined
to be limited by the service water system failure probability.
The most important dependence of the main loop cooling
system, following any shutdown, is with the instrument air
system. The main loops depend on instrument air for vital
valve actions and valve controller functions. These include,
503
most importantly, the CT small control valve and shutdown
controller, the resuperheater bypass control valve, the
bearing-water pump turbine control valve, and the bearing
water differential pressure control valves. Of these
valves, the turbine control valves are required to perform
important regulating functions during the shutdown and they
therefore need a continuous supply of instrument air. The
operation of the CT small CV was assumed to be the limiting
factor in the functioning of the main loops. With the loss
of instrument air, a maximum of 15 minutes of main loop
cooling system operation was allowed due to partial valve
action using the accumulator air supply early in the shut-
down process. At the end of this timethe steam generators
of all the loops were assumed to be depleted due to incom-
plete throttling of the CT small CV's.
The instrument air system is also dependent on the
service water system for the cooling-water requirements of
the air compressors. Thus, failures of the service water
system will eliminate the instrument air compressors after
a time lag, and this was assumed to occur in the interval
of 15 to 30 minutes following the shutdown.
A range of the failure probability of the main loop
cooling system due to support system failures following a
reactor shutdown was determined based on the above con-
siderations and the failure rates of the support systems.
504
These ranges were listed in Table 4-XII for pressurized shut-
downs and depressurized shutdowns, and for each of the
availability states of the essential electrical supply.
A.19 Containment Equalization Pressure Ranges
Following a PCRV depressurization accident, the con-
tainment equalization pressure range may have a significant
effect on the main loop and the CACS heat removal capabilities.
Three ranges of the containment equalization pressure range
were selected as was discussed in Section 3.4-3. The design
equalization pressure is 1.8 atmospheres, and the three
pressure ranges chosen for modelling the shutdown cooling
accident sequences were 1) >1.50 atmospheres, 2) 1.50 to
1.25 atmospheres, and 3) <1.25 atmospheres.
In order to estimate the probability of occurrence of
these pressure ranges, the containment isolation system and
the containment purge system were investigated. The presently
available information on these system indicates that they
should be capable of acting to maintain the containment
integrity with a high degree of reliability. Also, no attempt
was made to estimate the likelihood of containment failure due
to a missile generated during the PCRV depressurization.
The probability of the containment equalization pressure
ranges was determined based solely on the judgement of this
author.
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The reliability of the containment to be properly iso-
lated following the receipt of a high containment pressure
signal was considered to be at least as high as .999. Thus,
the probability that the containment equalization pressure
would be greater than 1.50 atmospheres was assumed to be
.999.
For the containment pressure to equalize below 1.25
atmospheres would require a rather large opening in the
containment. This might result from a complete failure of
the containment purge system to isolate the inlet or exhaust
ducts. It might also result from a large, missile-produced
breech in the containment. However, the probability of any
of these occurrences following a PCRV depressurization was
considered to be less than 1 x 10~ per event.
The probability that the containment equalization
pressure range is between 1.50 and 1.25 atmospheres was simply
assumed to be the probability that it was not in either of
the other two ranges.
The sensitivity of these assumptions was investigated
in some detail in the sensitivity analyses, and this is
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.
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Appendix B
CACS Operating States Following a
Depressurization Accident
Following a PCRV depressurization accident, the CACS
operating states were described by a single variable with
index number 22. This variable described the properly
combined operating states of the CACS for each condition of
main loop isolation valve failure and for different time
intervals following the shutdown.
The four possible combinations of main loop isolation
valve bypass were described as shown below.
507
The overall CACS operating states, as described in
Table 3-IXa&b, were combined as shown in the example below
for the case of 3 essential buses energized and main loop
failure occuring in the interval 5 to 10 minutes following
the shutdown.
The overall CACS operating states as described by the index
numbers are summarized in Table B-I.
Table B-I
CACS Operating States Following a Depressurization Accident (a)
Time Three Essential Two Essential One EssentialInte Buses Energized Buses Energized Bus'Energized
Main Loop
Failure CEP CEP 1.50 CEP CEP CEP 1.50 CEP CEP CEP
Occurs 1.50atm. 1.25atm. 1.25atm. 1.50atm. 1.25atm. 1.25atm. 1.50atm. 1.25atm.
0 to 2 22.1 22.13 22.15 22.21
minutes 22.2 22.14 22.16 22.22
2 to 5 22.3 22.1 22.15 22.23 22.21
minutes 22.4 22.2 22.16 22.24 22.22
5 to 10 22.5 22.17 22.13 22.23 22.21
minutes 22.6 22.18 22.14 22.24 22.22
10 to 15 22.7 22.3 22.13 22.25 22.23
minutes 22.8 22.4 22.14 22.26 22.24
15 to 20 22.9 22.5 22.13 22.27 22.23 22.29
minutes 22.10 22.6 22.14 22.28 22.24 22.30
20 to 25 22.9 22.19 22.17 22.27 22.23 22.21 22.29
minutes 22.10 22.20 22.18 22.28 22.24 22.22 22.30
25 to 30 22.11 22.7 22.17 22.31 22.25 22.21 22.29
minutes 22.12 22.8 22.18 22.32 22.26 22.22 22.30
(a) Top index is the success state and the bottom index is the failure state.
* No successful CACS operating state 0-yCD
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Appendix C
Nomenclature
ACRS
AEC
CEP
CT large CV
CT small CV
DBDA
ERDA
GA
GCFR
HTGR
LMFBR
LOCA
LWR
NSSS
OPS
p
PCRV
PCS
PPS
PSID
q
RSS
T
z
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
Atomic Energy Commission
the beta factor, fraction of common mode failures
containment equalization pressure
circulator-turbine large control valve
circulator-turbine small control valve
design basis depressurization accident
Energy Research and Development Administration
General Atomic Company
gas-cooled fast breeder reactor
high temperature gas-cooled reactor
liquil-metal-cooled fast breeder reactor
loss of coolant accident
light water reactor
nuclear steam supply system
operational protection system
subsystem unit reliability
prestressed concrete reactor vessel
plant control system
plant protection system
Preliminary Safety Information Document
subsystem unit failure probability
Reactor Safety Study
test and maintenance unavailability of
subsystem common mode failure probability
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